The opinion of the court was delivered by: GERALDINE SOAT BROWN, Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Eddie Harris ("Harris") brought this pro se action
against Defendants Sheriff of Cook County Michael Sheahan
("Sheahan"), former Cook County Department of Corrections
("CCDOC") Superintendent Henry Troka ("Troka") and CCDOC
Superintendent Michael Holmes ("Holmes") (collectively,
"Defendants") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because of certain
conditions of his confinement. Specifically, Harris claims that
Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by suspending recreation
from August 2002 until August 2003 for detainees in the
protective custody wing, and by maintaining poor ventilation.
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-10, 11-13.) [Dkt. 6.]*fn1 Defendants have
moved for summary judgment on both counts in the amended
complaint. [Dkt 30.] The parties have consented to the
jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(c). [Dkt 21, 22, 24.] For the reasons set forth
below, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. JURISDICTION
Federal jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal
question jurisdiction). Federal question jurisdiction is proper
in this case because both counts of the amended complaint invoke
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants submitted a motion for summary judgment on both
counts of Harris' amended complaint on April 26, 2004. That same
day, Defendants also served a notice to Harris under Local Rule
56.2, explaining the procedure required for responding to a
motion for summary judgment and warning of the consequences for
failing to comply with the rule. (L.R. 56.2 Notice.) [Dkt
29.]*fn2 At a status hearing at which Harris was present by
telephone, a briefing schedule had been set on Defendants'
motion, requiring Harris to respond by May 26, 2004. (Order, Mar.
31, 2004.) [Dkt 28.] However, Harris failed to file any response
by that date. Accordingly, on June 7, 2004, this court issued an
order directing Harris to file a response to Defendants' motion
by June 25, 2004, and warning Harris that any failure to file a
response would result in dismissal of his case for want of
prosecution. (Order, June 7, 2004.) [Dkt 33.]
On June 30, 2004, Harris filed a document that the court
construes as intended to be his response to Defendants' motion
(hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff's Response). The Response
is entitled "Exhibits" on the docket, although it is actually an
untitled document that contains a subheading called "Exercise," not "Exhibits." (Pl.'s Resp.) [Dkt
34.] In any event, that Response fails to comply with Local Rule
56.1(b)(3). (Id.) Specifically, Harris does not respond to the
numbered material facts in Defendants' Statement of Material
Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(a), nor refer to parts in the
record which may have supported his disagreements. Nor does
Harris submit his own additional facts and supporting materials
in his Response. Because he is pro se, the court will construe
Harris' Response liberally. However, even doing so, the court
notes that the statements in Harris' Response are generally
non-responsive, argumentative rather than factual, and,
furthermore, without evidentiary support. Statements without
evidentiary support are not to be considered. See L.R.
56.1(b)(3)(B) (stating that "[a]ll material facts set forth in
the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be
admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing
party"); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir.
2003).*fn3 For those reasons, Defendants' Statement of
Material Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(a) and Supporting
Exhibits is deemed admitted in its entirety, pursuant to Local
Deeming the statements in Defendants' Statement of Material
Facts to be admitted does not, however, mean that summary
judgment will automatically be granted in favor of Defendants. Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn Assoc., Inc., 965 F.2d 565, 568 (7th
Cir. 1992). To warrant summary judgment, the evidence submitted
must be admissible at trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newsp., Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir.
1996), and the court must make the finding that given the
undisputed facts, summary judgment is proper as a matter of law.
Wienco, Inc., 965 F.2d at 568.
B. Factual Background*fn4
Harris is a pretrial detainee who is being held at the CCDOC
pending trial on first degree murder charges. (Defs.' LR Stmt.
Parties ¶ 1; Defs.' LR Stmt. ¶ 2; Defs.' LR Ex. 1, Harris Dep. at
15.) Harris was booked on February 8, 2002 and assigned to the
protective custody wing of Division XI of the CCDOC, where he has
remained ever since, due to "all the media attention that his
case has received." (Defs.' LR Stmt. Parties ¶ 1; Defs.' LR Stmt.
¶¶ 1, 3; Harris Dep. at 15, 18-19.)*fn5
Defendant Sheahan is, and has been at all relevant times, the
Sheriff of Cook County. (Defs.' LR Stmt. Parties ¶ 2.) Defendant
Troka was the Superintendent of Division XI until his retirement
on November 15, 2002. (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendant Holmes assumed
Troka's position after Troka's retirement, and is the current
Superintendent of Division XI. (Id. ¶ 4; Defs.' LR Ex. 4,
Affidavit of Michael Holmes ¶¶ 1, 2.)
2. The Recreation Regime Prior to August 27, 2002
During the entire time that Harris has been confined at the
CCDOC, detainees in the protective custody wing have followed a
"23 and 1" recreation regime, which means that they are locked in
their cells for 23 hours a day and may leave their cells for one
hour a day. (Defs.' LR Stmt. ¶ 18; Harris Dep. at 38; Holmes Aff.
¶ 8.) Under the recreation regime that was in place prior to
August 27, 2002, all 48 members of the protective custody wing
were given their one hour of free time together. (Harris Dep. at
34-35, 49.) The detainees had access to an indoor recreation room
and an outdoor recreation area. (Id. at 34-35.) The indoor
recreation room has a basketball hoop, pool table and weights.
(Id. at 34.) The outdoor recreation area has a basketball hoop.
(Id.) The detainees could not split up; all 48 ...