The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Rarick
Docket No. 96773-Agenda 4-September 2004.
Respondent, Robert S., was found unfit to stand trial on a charge not specified in the record. He was admitted to the Elgin Mental Health Center (EMHC). Subsequently, respondent's treating psychiatrist filed a petition seeking the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication pursuant to section 2-107.1 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1 (West 2000)). After a two-day hearing, in which respondent represented himself, the circuit court of Kane County granted the petition. Respondent appealed, challenging, inter alia, the circuit court's decision to appoint, as an "impartial medical expert" pursuant to the "independent examination" provisions of section 3-804 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-804 (West 2000)), a person who was not qualified to conduct the examination. Respondent also contended that (1) section 2-107.1 of the Code "was never intended to be applied to non-dangerous pretrial detainees," (2) the application of section 2-107.1 deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial, and (3) reversal was warranted because the attorney in his pending criminal case was not notified of the hearing on the petition. The appellate court rejected these and other arguments. 341 Ill. App. 3d 238. We allowed the respondent's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), and allowed the Mental Health Association of Illinois and the Mental Health Project of the University of Chicago Law School's Mandel Legal Aid Clinic to file a brief as amici curiae in support of appellee.
Before this court, respondent contends that the appellate court erred in holding that (1) section 2-107.1 of the Code was constitutionally applied to him, a pretrial detainee who had been found unfit to stand trial, (2) he was not deprived of his right to due process of law where the independent examination guaranteed by statute was performed by an unlicensed intern with only a master's degree in psychology, and (3) he had no due process right to have notice of the forced-treatment action provided to his criminal defense attorney. We begin our review with a detailed recitation of pertinent facts.
On November 19, 2001, respondent's psychiatrist, Dr. Romulo Nazareno, filed a petition seeking to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication to respondent. The allegations of the petition tracked the requirements of section 2-107.1(a-5)(4) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4) (West 2000)), which provides in pertinent part as follows:
"(4) Authorized involuntary treatment shall not be administered to the recipient unless it has been determined by clear and convincing evidence that all of the following factors are present:
(A) That the recipient has a serious mental illness or developmental disability.
(B) That because of said mental illness or developmental disability, the recipient exhibits any one of the following: (i) deterioration of his or her ability to function, (ii) suffering, or (iii) threatening behavior.
(C) That the illness or disability has existed for a period marked by the continuing presence of the symptoms set forth in item (B) of this subdivision (4) or the repeated episodic occurrence of these symptoms.
(D) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.
(E) That the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment.
(F) That other less restrictive services have been explored and found inappropriate.
(G) If the petition seeks authorization for testing and other procedures, that such testing and procedures are essential for the safe and effective administration of the treatment."
The petition in this case specifically alleged that, because of his mental illness, respondent had exhibited a deterioration of ability to function, suffering, and threatening behavior. Dr. Nazareno requested authorization to administer Risperidone-a medication respondent had previously taken, briefly, without noticeable side effects-or, alternatively, Haldol, Haldol Deconate, and Cogentin. Nazareno also sought permission to conduct testing to monitor respondent's reaction to the medication.
On November 26, 2001, the circuit court held a competency hearing pursuant to respondent's request to represent himself. At that time, the court denied respondent's request. Respondent filed a motion to reconsider. On November 30, 2001, respondent appeared in court with appointed counsel from the Legal Advocacy Service of the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission for a hearing on pending matters. The circuit court denied respondent's motion to reconsider, but granted his request for an independent evaluation pursuant to section 3-804 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-804 (West 2000)). However, rather than appoint the psychiatrist who had previously conducted independent examinations of respondent, the court, pursuant to the cost-conscious request of the State, appointed the Kane County Diagnostic Center to perform the evaluation. Respondent's counsel objected, noting: "Everyone associated with the Diagnostic Center is a psychologist and not a psychiatrist and therefore does not have the expertise when it comes to medication. So every time we go to the Diagnostic Center, we're starting behind the 8-ball because of that very thing."
The circuit court acknowledged:
"Although Mr. Rose is right, I suppose what appears to be on paper in the-on the way I make the decisions on these things, I don't think that I would really say psychiatrist versus psychologist; and therefore you're behind the 8-ball. I look at the issues and what the facts are and rule accordingly."
The court persisted in its decision to appoint the Kane County Diagnostic Center.
At a pretrial conference on January 4, 2002, the circuit court revisited the issue of self-representation. Noting "representations" that respondent had represented himself ably in the past, the court reversed its prior ruling, and allowed respondent to proceed pro se.
Hearing in this matter commenced on January 18, 2002. The State's first witness was Dr. Nazareno.
Nazareno diagnosed respondent with paranoid schizophrenia. He testified that respondent's symptoms included hallucinations, delusions, sleeplessness, irritability, and an overall deterioration in the ability to function. For instance, respondent complained of sleep deprivation as a result of auditory hallucinations. Moreover, respondent suffered delusions. He believed that the government had implanted a microchip in his brain in an effort to read his mind. Respondent claimed that EMHC staff and patients were sending messages to a "mind reader" by actions such as rubbing their chins or adjusting their eyeglasses. In addition, respondent threatened to kill an EMHC patient who respondent believed was having a sexual relationship with women intended for respondent.
Dr. Nazareno testified that respondent's symptoms had subsided when he was medicated on a previous occasion with Risperidone. However, once the medication order expired, respondent again experienced auditory hallucinations, sleep deprivation, and delusional thinking. It was at that time that respondent threatened to kill a member of the EMHC staff.
Nazareno recommended administering Risperidone to respondent because, in the past, he had responded well to the drug without side effects. Nazareno suggested, however, that higher doses might be indicated. As alternatives, Nazareno recommended Haldol, Haldol Deconate (injectable), and, for side effects, Cogentin. Nazareno testified that Risperidone has fewer side effects than Haldol. According to Nazareno, Risperidone can cause dizziness, light-headedness, seizure, nausea, vomiting, muscular rigidity, difficulty swallowing, constipation, tardive dyskinesia, and neuroleptic malignant syndrome. He did not elaborate on the incidence of those side effects.
Nazareno acknowledged that Haldol has more severe side effects than Risperidone. He did not specify what those side effects might be. What is clear from his testimony is that Haldol would be the drug of choice if respondent refused to take Risperidone. Nazareno admitted that he had no way of knowing if respondent would have an adverse reaction to Haldol.
Nevertheless, Dr. Nazareno opined that the benefits of administering a psychotropic medication would outweigh the harm. He stated that respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision about potential side effects and benefits of the treatment. According to Dr. Nazareno, respondent's psychosis was the reason he could not make a knowledgeable decision whether to take the medication. Nazareno had tried less restrictive treatments, such as counseling and group therapy, but he deemed them ineffective without medication.
On cross-examination, Dr. Nazareno admitted that respondent had never threatened him and that he had never personally witnessed respondent threaten others. Nazareno also acknowledged that, during the court proceeding, he did not see a deterioration in respondent's functioning, and he noted that respondent did not exhibit his usual symptoms, such as talking to himself. However, Nazareno stated that respondent's behavior, and the way in which he asked questions, showed some paranoia and delusions. For instance, during questioning, respondent insinuated that Nazareno must also have heard voices. Nazareno pointed out that there are times during which an afflicted individual can contain delusions by focusing on a task.
The State next called Lesley Kane, an intern at the Kane County Diagnostic Center (KCDC). Kane conducted the court-ordered, independent examination of respondent. Kane's examination consisted of interviewing respondent for 60 to 90 minutes, talking to respondent's case worker, and reviewing two to three years of respondent's records. Noting that the "witness ha[d] been qualified as an expert" in a previous case, the circuit court qualified Kane as an expert over respondent's objection.
Citing symptoms similar to those identified by Nazareno, Kane diagnosed respondent with paranoid schizophrenia. With respect to whether respondent had exhibited a deterioration of his ability to function, suffering, or threatening behavior, Kane stated that respondent had indeed become increasingly tense and agitated, verbally aggressive, and more threatening in the months preceding the hearing. Moreover, his sexual preoccupations had increased, and EMHC staff had noted an increase in his use of profanity. Kane further testified that respondent's illness has existed for a period marked by the continuing presence of symptoms, noting that respondent has had a history of delusions dating back to the 1970s. Without elaboration, Kane stated her opinion that the benefits of psychotropic medication would outweigh the harm. Kane noted that respondent's behavior posed a risk to himself and to others, and that any side effects of the medication could be dealt with effectively. Kane did not address the nature or likelihood of side effects that might result from forced administration of psychotropic medication. Kane opined that respondent's suffering, the deterioration of his ability to function, and his violent and threatening behavior would decrease with medication.
Kane also concluded that respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision about psychotropic medication. Respondent told her he did not need psychotropic medication because he did not have a mental illness. When she spoke with him, he was evasive and avoided any discussion of his inability to sleep, hallucinations, or delusions. According to Kane, respondent was unaware of the severity of his illness, which is typical of people diagnosed with schizophrenia. When she ...