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November 4, 2004.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge


This matter is before the court on Defendant The Boeing Company's ("Boeing") motion for reconsideration of this court's ruling on September 1, 2004, granting in part and denying in part Boeing's motion for summary judgment. This matter is also before the court on the parties' motions in limine. For the reasons stated below, we deny the motion for reconsideration. We also deny all of Boeing's motions in limine without prejudice.


  Plaintiff Michael Santos ("Santos") worked for Boeing as a Mailroom Specialist in its Chicago, Illinois office between September 17, 2001, and October 21, 2002. Steve Richards ("Richards") was the direct supervisor for Santos and one of Santos' co-workers was Bob Delelio ("Delelio"). Santos alleges that Richards and Delelio made comments regarding his racial and national origin. Santos complained about the comments to Boeing supervisors and Santos claims that Boeing retaliated against Santos by demoting him from the lead mailroom position and taking away his office. Santos also claims that Boeing ultimately terminated him because of his race and national origin.

  In addition, Santos claims that Boeing failed to protect its employees, including Santos, from the alleged fits of rage by Delelio at work. Santos claims that Delelio threw items across the mailroom, kicked furniture, and screamed and shouted at Santos and other co-workers. Santos claims that he informed Richards that he feared for his physical safety around Delelio, but Richards ignored Santos' complaints. In December of 2001, Santos complained about Delelio's alleged tantrums to Dave Komendat ("Komendat"), Boeing's Director of Security. Santos claims that Komendat assured Santos that he would investigate the matter, but that Boeing did not conduct any investigation. Around January 15, 2002, Santos once again reported Delelio's conduct after Delelio became enraged and began yelling at Santos. Santos claims that Delelio received a telephone call, apparently regarding Santos' complaint, and after Delelio hung up the telephone, he yelled at Santos and turned and allegedly grabbed for a box cutter. Santos claims that he feared that Delelio would use the knife to harm him and ran out of the mailroom. Santos' second amended complaint contains a hostile work environment claim alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") (Count I), a race discrimination claim alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981") (Count II), Title VII retaliation claims (Counts III, IX, and X), Section 1981 retaliation claims (Counts IV and V), a Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") claim, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (Count VI), a negligent retention claim (Count VII), and a Title VII race and national origin claim (Count VIII). On May 10, 2004, we granted Boeing's motion to dismiss the negligent retention claim (Count VII). Boeing filed a motion for summary judgment and on September 1, 2004, we granted Boeing's motion for summary judgment on the discrimination claims, denied Boeing's motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claims, the hostile work environment claim, and the FLSA claim. We also denied Boeing's motion for partial summary judgment on damages. Boeing has now filed a motion for reconsideration in regards to the September 1 rulings. The parties have also filed motions in limine.


  A motion for reconsideration may be brought "to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1996). Such motions cannot be used as a "vehicle to produce new evidence that could have been" produced earlier or as a vehicle to "rehash?" the same arguments presented to the court on a prior occasion. Id.


  I. Prior Improper Filing by Boeing

  The instant motions filed by Boeing are improper for a variety of reasons, but this is not the first time that Boeing has filed documents that are wholly deficient. On November 1, 2004, we denied Boeing's motion to amend its answer to include a new affirmative defense because Boeing did not state in its motion what affirmative defense it was seeking to introduce. Also, the motion contained so many typographical errors and apparent omitted language as to render the motion incoherent and we were not able to properly rule on the motion.

  II. Motion for Reconsideration

  The instant motion for reconsideration is so completely without merit that it borders on being a frivolous filing. Boeing's erroneous arguments are due to a focus on phrases taken out of context from our prior ruling, a lack of understanding of the pertinent case law, and an insufficient review of our prior order. Regardless of whether the deficiencies in Boeing's motion for reconsideration are the result of gamesmanship or a lack of diligence on Boeing's part, this court has needlessly expended time untangling Boeing's arguments. In addition, in its motion for reconsideration Boeing disregards procedural rules and attempts to proceed in an informal and disorganized manner that will not be condoned by this court.

  A. Improper Reliance on Rule 59(e)

  Boeing's entire motion for reconsideration is improperly premised on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Rule 59(e) only applies when a party seeks the reconsideration of a ruling that was accompanied with a final judgment. See Fed.R. Civ. P. 59(e) (explaining that the section addresses a "motion to alter or amend a judgment"); Crestview Village Apartments v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Develop., 383 F.3d 552, 558 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that "[a]fter final judgment has been entered, a plaintiff may amend with leave of the court following a motion to set aside the judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)."); U.S. v. Olsen, 2001 WL 817854, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (explaining that the defendant was "correct that neither Rule 59(e) nor Rule 60(b) appl[ied] . . . because the ruling did not dispose of the entire case and the court did not enter a final judgment."). No final ...

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