Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

OZKAN v. LOYOLA UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division


October 13, 2004.

OZGUR I. OZKAN, M.D., Plaintiff,
v.
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: MILTON SHADUR, Senior District Judge

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This Court's oral ruling at the time of presentment of the motion by defendants Loyola University Medical Center ("Loyola") and Drs. Charles Bouchard and Amjad Ahmad to dismiss all counts of the Complaint brought against them by Dr. Ozgur Ozkan disposed of all facets of that motion except for the part that addressed Dr. Ozkan's Count IV claim (which sounds in defamation). Dr. Ozkan has now complied with this Court's oral directive that required a response in that regard, so that the remaining tag end of the motion is now ripe for decision.

In Count IV Dr. Ozkan has targeted Loyola's June 10, 2003 notice of his termination from its Ophthalmology Residency Training Program, authored by Dr. Bouchard, as the assertedly defamatory statement. Although Dr. Ozkan did not attach a copy of the notice to his Complaint (as would have been preferable to his simply adverting to it in Complaint ¶ 18 and characterizing its contents in Complaint ¶ 19), defendants have properly attached a photocopy of the letter as Ex. C to their memorandum in support of the motion. It is of course the letter itself, rather than its characterization in Complaint ¶ 19, that controls for Fed.R.Civ. P. ("Rule") 12 (b) (6) purposes.

  It is thus incorrect for Dr. Ozkan to say in Complaint ¶ 19 that the letter, which set out his asserted deficiencies that were the predicate for termination, "caused him to lose his position with Defendant Loyola University Medical Center" — it was obviously the asserted deficiencies themselves, and not the document, that were the cause. And with that being so, Dr. Ozkan has failed to allege any damages that assertedly flowed from the letter, so that he is compelled to rely on one or two of the categories of per se defamatory statements: statements that impute an inability to perform or a want of dignity in discharging employment duties and statements that impute a lack of ability in his trade or profession.*fn1

  On that score alone the challenged statements might stand muster. But where Dr. Ozkan fails instead is in his effort to escape the privilege that attaches to communications such as the June 10 letter (see, e.g., Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 124 Ill.2d 483, 490, 530 N.E.2d 468, 471 (1988)). In that respect Dr. Ozkan seeks to respond by speculating that the transmittal of a copy or copies of the letter as indicated at its foot may have been unprivileged:

cc: Graduate Medical Education Office Rita G. Ndinka*fn2
  Such a Micawber-like hope that "something may turn up" does not justify retention of the defamation claim at this time. Ozkan will have ample opportunity for discovery in the course of this litigation, and if his presently unsupported speculation were to prove out he will be free to reassert his claim. In the meantime, defendants' motion to dismiss Count IV is granted.


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.