United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
October 10, 2004.
NANA BARFI ADOMAKO, Plaintiff,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY and THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, Defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: JAMES MORAN, Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Nana Barfi Adomako filed a pro se complaint against
the National Security Agency, the United States Department of
Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (collectively,
defendants). Plaintiff accuses defendants of "reading/listening"
to his thoughts. He requests unspecified monetary damages and
injunctive relief. Along with his complaint, plaintiff filed a
petition to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following
reasons we dismiss plaintiff's complaint and deny the petition.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) we may authorize plaintiff to
proceed in forma pauperis if he demonstrates an inability to
pay the required costs and fees. Plaintiff states that he is
unemployed and last had a job in December 2002. It is unclear if
plaintiff receives financial support from any other source.
Instead of completing the financial affidavit, plaintiff, on an
attached piece of paper, writes that he cannot answer for anyone
else, but also answers "no" to the questions left blank in the
affidavit. In that attached explanation plaintiff discloses that
he owns a car worth $3000, but also asserts that it was towed
away by the government in the year 2000, or 2001. Regardless of whether we instruct plaintiff
to complete the financial affidavit or if we find that the
attached document sufficiently evidences financial need,
plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed.
As part of the initial review of a petition to proceed in
forma pauperis, we analyze the claims and dismiss the complaint
if we determine that the action is frivolous or malicious, it
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Alston v Debruyn,
13 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1994). In reviewing the petition we
apply the standard used in a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and dismiss a claim only
if it appears beyond a doubt that there exist no facts to support
the allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Complaints by pro se parties are held to less stringent
standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Alvarado v.
Itscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff alleges that defendants have read and listened to his
thoughts after committing crimes against him. He asserts that
those crimes continue to this day. He also claims that the
defendants have deprived him of an attorney. For those injuries
plaintiff seeks unspecified damages. Plaintiff also requests that
this court enjoin defendants from reading, listening and engaging
in any other acts re his thoughts. Plaintiff fails to provide any
factual support for his allegations.
We give plaintiff's complaint a generous interpretation, but we
need not "invent factual scenarios that cannot be reasonably
inferred from the pleadings." Smith-Bey v. Hospital Adm'r,
841 F.2d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 1988). The total absence of factual
allegations in the complaint would require us to concoct a
factual context to support plaintiff's claims. Thus, the sparse
and incoherent complaint fails to state a claim, even under the
lenient pleading standards to which plaintiff is entitled. As written, plaintiff's
allegations "rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly
incredible." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 24, 33 (1992). The
complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or fact and is
frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Further, if we construe plaintiff's request for damages to be
brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), then defendants are immune. Plaintiff's
allegations may be framed as violations of his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994), the Supreme Court refused
to infer a Bivens-type cause of action against an agency of the
federal government. Plaintiff never alleges that individual
agents violated his rights. Further, his failure to provide
factual support for his allegations prevents us from finding any
waiver of defendants' sovereign immunity. Under §
1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), plaintiff's suit must be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons plaintiff's petition to proceed in
forma pauperis is denied.
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