United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
September 29, 2004.
SB DESIGNS, GARY SIDNEY and MAURICE SIDNEY, Plaintiffs,
REEBOK INTERNATIONAL, LTD., and CROSSOVA PRODUCTIONS, Defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROBERT GETTLEMAN, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In their second amended complaint, SB Designs and its
co-owners, Gary Sidney and Maurice Sidney, assert violations of
the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125, against Reebok (Count
I) and Crossova Productions*fn1 (Count III), and violations
of the "Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,"
815 ILCS 510/1 et seq.,*fn2 against Reebok (Count II), arising from
defendants' alleged infringement of plaintiffs' trademark.
Defendant Reebok moved separately to dismiss the instant
complaint, and the court converted the motion to a motion for
summary judgment. Because plaintiffs' state law claim arises out
of the same facts that form the basis for their claim under the
Lanham Act, the court's discussion herein focuses on the merits
of plaintiffs' claim under the Lanham Act. For the reasons discussed herein, the court grants Reebok's
motion for summary judgment as to Counts I and II.
According to the second amended complaint, on December 19,
1994, Gary and Maurice Sidney applied for registration for the
CROSSOVER KING trademark, which consists of the image of a
basketball player in the action of a crossover dribble with a
moving ball image and the trade name "CROSSOVER KING"
underscoring the logo. On February 24, 1998, the CROSSOVER KING
trademark was registered. On October 23, 2001, plaintiffs
registered the CROSSOVER KING word mark, as well.
SB Designs allegedly markets basketball apparel affixed with
the CROSSOVER KING trademark through the internet, magazine
advertising, street marketing, trade shows and sponsorship of
sports-related events. According to plaintiffs, beginning in June
1997, Christian Sidney, on behalf of SB Designs, pitched the
CROSSOVER KING concept to Reebok. SB Designs hoped that Reebok
would use the CROSSOVER KING concept in conjunction with
professional basketball player Allen Iverson ("Iverson"), who has
an endorsement agreement with Reebok. In response to his first
letters to Henry Que Gaskins, Reebok's brand manager of Allen
Iverson apparel, and Paul Fireman, then-chief executive officer
and president of Reebok, Christian Sidney received a letter from
Reebok's Idea Submissions Coordinator, Kim Lessow, indicating
that Reebok could not consider SB Design's idea unless SB Designs
signed Reebok's Idea Submissions Guidelines Form. Although SB Designs did not sign the guidelines form, Maurice
Sidney and/or Gary Sidney met with Reebok sale representative
Alonzo Alexander on three occasions, and Diego Ross, Reebok's
urban marketing manager, on one occasion. Further correspondence
ensued, and on March 3, 1998, Christian Sidney, on behalf of SB
Designs, allegedly sent CROSSOVER KING promotional art pieces to
Gaskins, Fireman, and Peter Roby, Reebok's brand director of
basketball. Roby declined interest and returned the art pieces,
and Heather Snow, Reebok's legal manager of intellectual
property, indicated that Reebok would not consider SB Designs'
CROSSOVER KING concept, and returned the art pieces.
Gaskins, however, allegedly called Christian Sidney on March
17, 1998, indicating that he wanted to explore discussions about
using the CROSSOVER KING concept in Reebok's (Allen) Iverson 13
Apparel line, and that there was also great potential for a
related CROSSOVER QUEEN concept. On September 22, 1998, Gaskins
informed Christian Sidney that they could not move forward until
Reebok's new chief executive officer gave direction. On December
17, 1998, Christian Sidney contacted Reebok's new chief executive
officer directly to pitch the CROSSOVER KING and CROSSOVER QUEEN
concepts. Reebok's idea submissions coordinator responded that
the Idea Submissions Guideline Form had to be signed before
Reebok would consider SB Design's idea. Again, SB Designs did not
sign the document.
In early 1999, Gaskins indicated that Reebok was planning to
move forward with the Iverson 13 Apparel line concept (presumably
without SB Designs), after which SB Designs broke off its contact
with Reebok. Gaskins never returned the CROSSOVER KING and
CROSSOVER QUEEN promotional art pieces that were sent by
Christian Sidney. Plaintiffs allege that in 1997 Reebok aired a television
commercial on the BET television network showing Iverson
performing a crossover dribble, "then the commercial flashed to a
crown with the number 3 enclosed, indicating that Iverson was the
`Crossover King.'" Plaintiffs also allege that in 2002 they
discovered two television commercials featuring Iverson and
rapper Jada Kiss. According to plaintiffs, one of these
commercials "indirectly insinuated that Allen Iverson was the
Crossover King," and the other "insinuated that Allen Iverson was
the Crossover King."
In March 1999, SB Designs allegedly discovered various internet
sites that promoted Iverson, Reebok and the 13 Apparel line using
the CROSSOVER KING trademark. In September 2000, SB Designs
discovered the website of Crossover Promotions, Iverson's
promotional company.*fn3 Plaintiffs allege that the website
is sponsored by Reebok, and that Crossover Promotions is actively
attempting to position and promote Iverson as the so-called
"Crossover King." Plaintiffs also allege that numerous other
third-party websites have promoted Iverson and sold Reebok
merchandise in conjunction with the use of the phrase "Crossover
King." For example, plaintiffs claim that in 2000 and early 2001
a website called the "Allen Iverson Chamber" featured Iverson and
Reebok merchandise and used the phrase "Crossover King." They
also claim that other websites contained material that infringed
the CROSSOVER KING marks. In addition, Plaintiffs allege that
Iverson retained Reebok to coordinate the marketing and promotion
of Iverson's name, including use of the crossover concept.
Moreover, according to the second amended complaint, the
Crossover Promotions name and image is confusingly similar to the
CROSSOVER KING trademark. Based on these allegations, plaintiffs seek damages and
injunctive relief under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and
1125, against Reebok (Count I) and Crossova Productions (Count
III), and under the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, 815 ILCS 510/1 et seq., against Reebok (Count II). Reebok
originally filed the instant motion as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss on April 23, 2004. The court converted it to a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A movant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 when the
moving papers and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See Fed.R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Unterreiner v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 8 F.3d 1206, 1209 (7th Cir. 1993). Once a moving party has
met its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings
and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for
trial. See Fed.R. Civ. P. 56(e); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill
Assoc., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7th Cir. 1990). The court
considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion. See Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc.,
979 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1992).
A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986); Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir.
1993). However, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's]
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which
the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party]."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Reebok advances two main arguments in support of its motion:
(1) plaintiffs fail to allege that Reebok itself used plaintiffs'
putative trademarks; and (2) plaintiffs fail to produce evidence
that Reebok is secondarily liable for the allegedly infringing
actions of Crossover Promotions or the third-party websites.
I. Lanham Act Claim (Count I)
A. Reebok's alleged direct infringement
Trademark infringement may occur when one either uses or
reproduces a registered mark in advertisement of goods or
services that is likely to cause confusion.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), (b). As Reebok points out, and the Lanham Act makes
clear, liability attaches under sections 1114 and 1125 of the
Lanham Act only when an unauthorized person or entity uses
another's trademark, or reproduces, counterfeits, copies, or
colorably imitates another's trademark. The second amended
complaint alleges three instances of directly infringing conduct
by Reebok: (1) the 1997 BET commercial; and (2) the two
commercials featuring Iverson and Jada Kiss, which allegedly
aired in 2002. Plaintiffs, however, do not allege that Reebok
ever used or imitated the CROSSOVER KING marks in its
commercials. Plaintiffs do not provide any evidence of Reebok's use of plaintiffs' marks, and they do not dispute
Reebok's argument in its motion that the alleged conduct does not
constitute direct infringement by Reebok. The court therefore
grants Reebok's motion for summary judgment with respect to the
theory of direct infringement as set forth in Count I.
B. Reebok's alleged secondary liability
The heart of the dispute between the parties centers on
Reebok's alleged secondary liability for the alleged infringement
by third-parties Crossover Promotions and various other websites.
A party that does not directly infringe on another's mark may be
found secondarily liable for the infringement, under either a
contributory or vicarious theory of liability. Hard Rock Café
Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services Inc., 955 F.2d 1143
(7th Cir. 1992). If the court finds there are genuine issues
of material fact as to either theory, summary judgment is
inappropriate. Reebok does not argue the alternative ground that
there was no infringement by third parties. For the purposes of
the pending motion only, the court will assume that Crossover
Promotions and the third-party websites infringed plaintiffs'
marks.*fn4 As set forth below, however, the court finds that
the undisputed facts entitle Reebok to judgment regarding both
theories with respect to both Crossover Promotions and the third
party websites. The court, therefore, grants Reebok's motion for
summary judgment with respect to secondary liability as set forth
in Count I. Vicarious liability
The Seventh Circuit has recognized that a joint tortfeasor may
bear vicarious liability for trademark infringement by another.
David Berg & Co. v. Gatto Int'l Trading Co., 884 F.2d 306
(7th Cir. 1989). This theory of liability "requires a finding
that the defendant and the infringer have an apparent or actual
partnership, have authority to bind one another in transactions
with third parties or exercise joint ownership or control over
the infringing product." Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1150.
Hard Rock Café held that a flea market owner could not be
vicariously liable for infringing acts by vendors who rented
space in the market, noting that the owner did not hire the
vendors, take a portion of their sales, or exercise control over
them beyond that exercised by a landlord. 955 F.2d at 1150. In
the instant case, the issue is whether there is a genuine issue
of material fact regarding the relationship between Reebok and
Crossover Promotions and/or the third party websites.
Plaintiffs make multiple claims that there was a business
relationship between Reebok and Crossover Promotions, Iverson's
promotional company, and that Reebok "allowed, encouraged, and
ratified" the actions of Iverson and Crossover Productions.
Reebok argues that there is no evidence of an agency,
partnership, or other relevant relationship between Reebok and
Crossover Promotions, and therefore Reebok cannot be vicariously
liable. The court agrees, for the reasons stated herein, that
plaintiffs fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
the existence of a relationship between Crossover Promotions and
Reebok that would expose Reebok to vicariously liability under
the standard expressed in Hard Rock Café.
Reebok does not deny there it has a history of prior dealings
with Crossover Promotions. Despite plaintiffs' claim, however,
Lynch did not testify at his deposition that Crossover Promotions and Reebok had a "close relationship." Rather, Lynch
testified that at one time Reebok did allow Crossover Promotions
to sell Reebok products over the Crossover Promotions website. It
is undisputed that Reebok has sponsored Crossover Promotions'
Celebrity Summer Classic softball and basketball games in past
years. Lynch, however, denied in his affidavit and at his
deposition that there is, or ever was, a business relationship or
contract between the two entities, and plaintiffs presented no
evidence to refute this claim. The mere existence of a
relationship of some kind between Crossover Promotions, which is
connected to Iverson, and Reebok, which has an endorsement deal
with Iverson, does not render Reebok vicariously liable for the
actions of Crossover Promotions.
The court notes that plaintiffs concede that they present no
evidence of vicarious liability, but argue that they are entitled
to further discovery on the issue of the precise nature of the
relationship between Reebok and Crossover Promotions and/or
Iverson. Plaintiffs speculate that the endorsement agreement
between Reebok and Iverson (the "Agreement") may contain evidence
of such a relationship with Crossover Promotions. Reebok attached
a copy of the Agreement to its motion to dismiss that was heavily
redacted but contained paragraph 13.13, a statement that the
Agreement does not constitute a partnership, joint venture, or
employer-employee relationship between Iverson and Reebok. Lynch
testified in his affidavit that Crossover Promotions is not a
party to the Agreement. Plaintiffs present no evidence in
Plaintiffs never made a formal discovery request or other
motion to obtain an unredacted copy of the Agreement, but this is
not the first time plaintiffs have raised the issue of the
Agreement. Plaintiffs filed two Rule 56(f) affidavits reciting a
need for an unredacted copy in order to respond to Reebok's motion. The first was filed on June
7, 2004, in anticipation of the court's conversion of the motion
to dismiss, and the second affidavit, which was similar to the
first, was attached to plaintiffs' response to the instant motion
filed on August 6, 2004. Plaintiffs also aired their desire for
an unredacted copy in open court at a status conference hearing
on June 10, 2004, and again during Lynch's deposition on July 19,
A party in need of additional discovery must bring the issue
before the court in a timely and expeditious manner. Kalis v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 231 F.3d 1049, 1058 (7th Cir. 2000).
A plaintiff cannot continue to delay a summary judgment motion
for lack of discovery after being granted time to pursue the
purportedly necessary discovery. See Woods v. City of
Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 990-91 (2000).*fn5 Reebok filed its
motion to dismiss on April 23, 2004, with a heavily redacted copy
of the Agreement attached. It was then plaintiffs' prerogative
whether to file any follow-up discovery requests, and they had
the burden to do so in a timely fashion. After the first 56(f)
affidavit was filed, and the motion was converted on June 10,
2004, Plaintiffs were given until July 16, 2004, to respond, and
then granted two extensions, to August 6, 2004. Plaintiffs never
brought the issue formally before the court.
Under Rule 56(f), a nonmoving party may submit an affidavit
requesting a continuance if further discovery is needed to oppose
a motion for summary judgment. Fed.R. Civ.P 56(f). The plain
language and purpose of the rule dictate that such affidavits are
to be filed before the response to summary judgment, not as an
attachment to the response, at which point a continuance is moot.
For these reasons, plaintiffs' second 56(f) affidavit is of no
significance to their response to the summary judgment motion. Further,
plaintiffs' speculation as to the contents of the Agreement is
nugatory because an unredacted copy is not before the court by
plaintiffs' own doing. While the court must accept any reasonable
inference against the movant on summary judgment, it need not
accord weight to pure speculation. Fed.R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Stop-N-Go of Madison, Inc. v. Uno-Ven Co., 184 F.3d 672
(7th Cir. 1999). The court, therefore, will consider the
record as it stands, which contains no triable issue of Reebok's
vicarious liability for the acts of Crossover Promotions.
Reebok also argues that it is not vicariously liable for the
allegedly infringing acts of several other third-party websites.
Plaintiffs attach various screen shots and print-outs of several
allegedly infringing websites, but these exhibits show no
indication that the websites are owned by, endorsed by, or
otherwise affiliated with Reebok. In general, the websites
contain what appear to be comments and postings by basketball
fans about Iverson and other players, and some of the websites
offer Reebok shoes and apparel for sale. There is no evidence
that Reebok supplied the products for sale on the websites, or
permitted the sales or the use of Reebok's tradename or logos.
Lynch stated in his affidavit that at no time has Reebok
authorized, licensed, permitted, or encouraged the use of
Reebok's trademarks, trade name, service marks, or trade dress on
any of the websites cited by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs do not refute
this claim, and thus create no triable issue as to whether there
is a relationship between Reebok and these websites that would
subject Reebok to vicarious liability.
For the reasons stated above, the court grants summary judgment
with respect to the vicarious liability theory as set forth in
Count I in connection with both Crossover Promotions and the
third-party websites. Contributory liability
Even if the court finds Reebok is not vicariously liable,
plaintiffs argue, Reebok is still liable under the theory of
contributory liability. Contributory liability for infringement
attaches when the defendant either intentionally induces a third
party to infringe the plaintiff's mark or supplies a product to a
third party with actual or constructive knowledge that the
product is being used to infringe the mark. Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982);
Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1150 (applying the Inwood
Laboratories standard). Plaintiffs allege only the latter basis
for contributory infringement liability and therefore must prove
that Reebok supplied a product to third parties with actual or
constructive knowledge that the product was being used to
infringe the CROSSOVER KING marks. Inwood Laboratories,
456 U.S. at 854. The Seventh Circuit has clearly held that a supplier
has no affirmative duty to seek out and prevent trademark
violations, but has a duty only to understand what a reasonably
prudent person would understand Hard Rock Café,
955 F.2d at 1149. The court is thus left to consider two issues on
plaintiffs' contributory infringement causes of action: (1)
whether Reebok supplied a product to third parties that was used
by third parties to infringe plaintiffs' marks; and (2) whether
Reebok had actual or constructive knowledge of the
Plaintiffs point to only one instance involving an actual
product. It is a t-shirt advertising the 2001 Celebrity Summer
Classic, allegedly for sale on the Crossover Promotions website,
that features the "RBK" logo of one of Reebok's product lines on
the sleeve, and a logo for the Celebrity Summer Classic on the
front. Although plaintiffs allege that the Celebrity Summer Classic logo infringes plaintiffs' mark, the logo bears little
resemblance to the CROSSOVER KING mark, and is markedly different
from Crossover Promotions' general logo.*fn7 Again, for the
purposes of this motion only, the court will assume that the
Celebrity Summer Classic logo infringes plaintiffs' mark.
Assuming infringement, this t-shirt satisfies the requirement
that the infringement involve a defendant-supplier's product, as
evidenced by Reebok's mark on the shirt sleeve. Plaintiffs fail,
however, to provide any evidence that the shirt was supplied to
Crossover Promotions by Reebok, rather than purchased or received
from another source.
Even assuming the t-shirt was supplied by Reebok, plaintiffs
present no evidence that Reebok was "allowing Crossover
Promotions to manufacturer products bearing Crossover Promotions'
and Reebok's marks in conjunction," as plaintiffs claim. Further,
plaintiffs offer no evidence regarding how and when the Celebrity
Summer Classic logo was placed on the shirt. There is no evidence
that Lynch or anyone at Reebok visited the Crossover Promotions
website, or otherwise inspected Crossover Promotions' promotional
material or merchandise. Plaintiffs therefore fail to identify a
triable issue as to whether Reebok knew or should have known that
the allegedly infringing mark would be affixed to the product, if
it was indeed supplied by Reebok.
The bulk of allegedly infringing incidents cited by plaintiffs
are not related to infringing products allegedly supplied by
Reebok. Rather, plaintiffs' allegations are centered on the sale
of Reebok shoes and apparel on the Crossover Promotions website,
which displays Crossover Promotions' allegedly infringing mark, and Reebok's sponsorship
of the Celebrity Summer Classic, which was advertised with
Crossover Promotions' allegedly infringing mark. Plaintiffs point
to an "Itinerary" for the 2004 Celebrity Summer Classic that was
allegedly posted on the Crossover Promotions website. The "RBK"
logo appears on the last page of the three page document along
with the logos of six other sponsors, and "RBK" appears twice in
the text as a sponsor. Reebok concedes that in addition to
sponsoring the event, it provided shoes and apparel for the
tournament, but plaintiffs do not present any evidence that these
Reebok products, other than the t-shirt discussed above, were
affixed with an allegedly infringing logo.
Plaintiffs appear to argue two bases for Reebok's contributory
liability for Crossover Promotions' allegedly infringing actions.
First, that a non-infringing supplier is contributorily liable if
the product it supplies is associated in some way with an
infringing product that the supplier did not supply. Second, that
sponsors of an event who supply products for the event, without
more, are contributorily liable for infringement committed by the
event's promoters or organizers. To accept either argument
requires a significant expansion of this theory of liability,
which is unwarranted under the instant facts. Plaintiffs cite to
Hard Rock Café as their only supporting authority without
elaboration, but they are in fact arguing for a substantial
expansion of the Seventh Circuit's contributory liability theory.
Hard Rock Café does extend the contributory liability
doctrine of Inwood Laboratories beyond the
manufacturer-distributor context. 955 F.2d at 1149. The expansion
of the "product" requirement for contributory infringement,
however, is more limited than plaintiffs suggest. The Seventh
Circuit's expansion of contributory liability is premised on a
defendant's direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality
used by a third party to infringe the plaintiff's mark. Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1149; see also Lockheed Martin Corp.
v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir.
1999) (suggesting the contributory liability theory could be
applied to the internet if there was evidence of monitoring and
control). Reebok asserts that it exercises no control over any of
Crossover Promotions' conduct or materials, as Lynch testified in
his affidavit and his deposition. Plaintiffs dispute this
assertion, but present no evidence in support of their claim.
Therefore, an extension of the doctrine beyond "products" is not
warranted in the instant case because there is no evidence from
which a reasonable jury could infer that Reebok controlled or
monitored the contents of the Crossover Promotions website or the
promotional material related to the Celebrity Summer Classic.
Plaintiffs' argument that Reebok is contributorily liable for
the content of other third-party websites is less developed than
its arguments regarding Crossover Promotions' conduct, and
therefore even less persuasive. Several of the websites cited by
plaintiffs contain fan messages and postings that refer to
Iverson and other basketball players as a "crossover king," or
otherwise use the phrase "crossover king."*fn8 One of the
websites also offers Reebok sneakers and apparel for
sale.*fn9 Another displays the text "Allen Iverson
Crossover King" and images of a Reebok logo and an unidentified
basketball player performing a crossover dribble.*fn10
Plaintiffs do not explain how these websites infringe their mark.
More significantly, plaintiffs present no evidence that Reebok
sponsored or was in any way associated with any of the websites
attached as exhibits. Plaintiffs also present no evidence that Reebok
provided any products sold or displayed on any of the websites.
Plaintiffs argue that they need more discovery to determine
whether Reebok has sponsored third-party websites. As with the
Agreement, plaintiffs recited this need in both of their 56(f)
affidavits, but did not take advantage of the ample time provided
to take any relevant discovery. This is the same argument
plaintiffs advanced regarding their lack of evidence of vicarious
liability, and it fails again here for the reasons set forth
above. The court, therefore, will consider the record as it
stands, which contains no evidence from which a reasonably jury
could find Reebok's contributory liability for the acts of
For the reasons stated above, the court grants Reebok's motion
for summary judgment with respect to the contributory liability
theory as set forth in Count I with respect both Crossover
Promotions and the third-party websites.
II. Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Claim (Count
Where a plaintiff's factual allegations under the Illinois
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act also form the basis for
plaintiff's claim under the Lanham Act, the legal inquiry is the
same under both statutes. Claims for unfair competition and
deceptive business practices brought under Illinois statutes are
to be resolved according to the principles set forth under the
Lanham Act. Gimix, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 699 F.2d 901,
908 (7th Cir. 1983). Illinois courts look to federal case law
and apply the same analysis to state infringement claims. Spex,
Inc. v. Joy of Spex, Inc., 847 F. Supp 567, 579 (N.D. Ill 1994)
(dismissing claims under the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act). Because the court grants summary
judgment for defendant Reebok with respect to all portions of
Count I, the court also grants summary judgment as to Count II.
For the reasons stated herein, Reebok's motion for summary
judgment is granted as to Counts I and II. Plaintiffs are
directed to appear for a report on status as to defendant
Crossova Productions on October 13, 2004, at 9:00 a.m.