The opinion of the court was delivered by: SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendants Village of
LaGrange Park's ("Village") and Daniel McCollum's ("McCollum")
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, we
grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety.
Plaintiff Chester Lauth ("Lauth") has worked as a police
officer with the Village since January 2, 1989 and became Officer
in Charge in August or September 2002. The Village is a municipal
corporation located west of the city of Chicago. Since January 2,
1996, McCollum has been Chief of Police and reports to Steven
Jones, who is the Manager of the Village. McCollum has the
authority to bring charges against an officer and recommend an
officer's termination, subject to approval by Steven Jones. The
Board of Police Commissioners ("Board") has the final authority,
subject to administrative review, to terminate sworn officers in
the Village. McCollum has an obligation to ensure that the laws are
enforced and that police department's rules and regulations are
followed.
In February 2000, the officers of the Village approached and
gained information from the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) Union
about forming a union. During a FOP meeting, Lauth alleges that
he complained about McCollum's unfair discipline procedures.
During a meeting held on February 17, 2000, Lauth claims that
McCollum stated that he knew what Lauth had said at the FOP
meeting and that McCollum threatened to fire him. Subsequently,
McCollum assigned Lauth to perform some legal research in the law
library, which McCollum claims was in response to Lauth
questioning McCollum's ability to discipline officers and send
them for fitness for duty evaluations. However, Lauth argues that
his assignment to do legal research was because of his union
involvement.
Based on the FOP's recommendation, the officers formed a social
lodge of the FOP, Lodge No. 243, on April 3, 2000. The lodge was
a social organization open to any member of the police
department. During the Village's annual Party in the Park in July
2000, Deputy Chief Breckinridge ("Breckinridge") instructed Lauth
that he could not be present at the FOP booth while on duty.
McCollum later advised Breckinridge that officers working at the
Party in the Park could visit the FOP booth during their lunch
and breaks. As a result, officers were allowed to take their
breaks at the FOP booth the following day.
On October 19, 2000, the non-supervisory police officers voted
to recognize the FOP as their bargaining agent. The FOP filed an
unfair labor practice charge against the Village on behalf of
Lauth on January 14, 2002. The charge resulted from Lt. Thomas
Dreffein ("Dreffein") instructing Lauth that he could not consult
a union representative before answering a questionnaire regarding
condoms found in a door compartment of a police squad car. McCollum told Lauth that
he did not personally care if Lauth consulted with a union
representative before he signed the questionnaire. Under
advisement from the Village's labor attorney, McCollum posted a
notice to police officers acknowledging that the Village denied
Lauth's request to call his union representative prior to
answering a written questionnaire.
Later in 2002, after reviewing an incident where a recovered
stolen vehicle was improperly sealed on December 20, 2002,
McCollum concluded that the officers needed better training on
how to store recovered evidence properly. Lauth claims that at
the end of his shift, he turned the stolen vehicle over to
Hernandez, the officer in charge for the next shift. None of the
officers involved were disciplined, and Lauth does not claim that
he was singled out because of his union involvement.
On or about May 22, 2003, Lauth was the officer in charge when
Officer Ricky Lee Jones ("Jones") reported a missing child to
him. During an interrogation by McCollum on June 6, 2003, Lauth
admitted that he should have asked more questions of Jones when
Jones reported his conversation with the child's mother to Lauth.
Lauth does not dispute that he violated rules and regulations
requiring supervisors to inspect and ask questions of
subordinates and be responsible or accountable for their acts or
omissions. Moreover, Lauth alleges that he notified McCollum on
February 29, 2004 that other officers failed to document a
missing child that had been missing since February 5, 2004.
On May 23, 2003, Lauth hired an officer for four hours of
overtime without receiving approval from the deputy chief
contrary to staffing policy. The staffing policy requires that
the staffing shift shortages be approved on a case by case basis
by the Deputy Chief prior to authorizing any overtime
expenditures. Lauth claims that he asked for clarification about
the new staffing policy because it seemed to violate the required policy of three officers on the street
during each shift. Additionally, Lauth contends that Officer Wade
("Wade") violated the policy in January 2004, but he was never
disciplined. When Lauth was asked to draft a memorandum
explaining his actions in filling the staffing shortage, Lauth
contends that Breckinridge told him that Breckinridge would have
authorized Lauth's hiring of the overtime anyway. Lauth does not
dispute that he violated the policy, and he was disciplined as a
result of the violation. Lauth claims McCollum's motive for
including this violation in the charges presented before the
Board was not due to the violation itself, but due to his union
activities.
On November 4, 2003, McCollum filed charges of misconduct with
the Board against Lauth's violation of departmental policy for
failing to properly supervise Jones in the missing child
incident. The Board conducted a disciplinary hearing on the
charges against Lauth on December 4th and 5th, 2003. Lauth claims
that McCollum did not file charges against him for solely failing
to properly supervise Jones, but that McCollum filed charges for
failing to forward a written report on Jones' misconduct,
violating the staffing policy on May 23, 2003, and failing to
maintain a working knowledge of the Intergovernmental Missing
Child Recovery Act of 1984. Further, prior to the hearing before
the Board, Lauth was made an offer to accept the 60 day
suspension without pay. Lauth contends that the 60-day suspension
offer was motivated by McCollum's animus against Lauth due to his
union activities and unrelated to the missing child incident.
On December 5, 2003, the Board found that: (1) Lauth violated
the rules, regulations, and policies of the Village with respect
to his supervision of the missing child incident; (2) he failed
to forward a report of Jones' misconduct when he learned of it;
(3) he failed to follow the lawful written instructions of a
superior in filling an overtime vacancy; and (4) his testimony demonstrated
that he failed to establish and maintain a working knowledge of
the Intergovernmental Missing Child Recovery Act of 1984. The
Board ordered Lauth to be suspended without pay for thirty days
on December 18, 2003. Lauth filed a one count complaint in the
instant action alleging a denial of equal protection of the law
as a class of one under 42 U.S.C. ยง 1983 ("Section 1983").
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R. Civ. P.
56(c). In seeking a grant of summary judgment, the moving party
must identify "those portions of `the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265
(1986) (quoting Fed.R. Civ. P. 56(c)). This initial burden may
be satisfied by presenting specific evidence on a particular
issue or by pointing out "an absence of evidence to support the
non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. Once the movant has met
this burden, the non-moving party cannot simply rest on the
allegations in the pleadings, but, "affidavits or as otherwise
provided for in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R. Civ. P. 56(e).
A "genuine issue" in the context of a motion for summary judgment
is not simply a "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists when "the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
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