Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

MUSTAFA v. GAWLIK

September 17, 2004.

ANNA MUSTAFA, Plaintiff,
v.
SGT. JOSEPH GAWLIK, Star No. 1509, OFFICER C. BURKE, Star No. 17604, OFFICER T. LYNCH, Star No. 3061, OFFICER SUSAN SCHOBER, Star No. 14295, OFFICER E. RIORDAN, Star No. 6767, Defendants.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROBERT GETTLEMAN, District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Anna Mustafa has sued Chicago Police Officers Joseph Gawlik, C. Burke, Susan Schober, and E. Riordan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging false arrest (Count I), excessive force against defendant Burke (Count II), and violations of her constitutional right to equal protection under the law (Count III).*fn1 Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Counts I and III.*fn2 For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted.

FACTS

  On December 28, 2001, just three and one-half months after the September 11, 2001, attacks on this country, plaintiff was at O'Hare Airport to fly by Swissair to Tel Aviv, Israel, to attend her father's funeral. At the check-in counter she told the agent that she wanted a "Muslim" meal. Immediately after that her luggage was selected to be screened through a bomb detection machine. Believing that she was being singled out because of her Muslim faith, plaintiff began to complain. She became agitated and began to question why her purse was not also checked, shouting a number of times, "Maybe I have a bomb in my purse." It is unquestioned that the area was crowded and that her actions created a disturbance.

  Muhammed Qadeer, the Swissair manager to whom most of the comments were directed, told another Swissair manager to call the police. When the police arrived approximately five minutes later, plaintiff was still shouting. Qadeer told the first officer to arrive, defendant Schober, that, "She make a bomb threat, says this thing like she had a bomb in the purse, . . . maybe I have a bomb in my purse."

  Schober attempted to interview plaintiff, but plaintiff was screaming and uncooperative. Schober claims, however, that plaintiff acknowledged that, "I may have said that I have a bomb in my purse." Plaintiff denies telling that to Schober.

  Other officers arrived at the scene, and ultimately a decision was made to arrest plaintiff. Qadeer signed a criminal complaint indicating that plaintiff "knowing and intentionally stated that she may have a bomb in her purse as she was checking in for Swissair Flight No. 125 to Zurich."

  Schober filled out an arrest report indicating that plaintiff was arrested on a charge of Felony Disorderly Conduct — Bomb Threat, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(3). A grand jury returned an indictment against plaintiff for Felony Disorderly Conduct. A bench trial commenced on August 21, 2002, and concluded, after a lengthy recess, on November 8, 2002. The judge found that plaintiff had in fact stated words such as, "Maybe I have a bomb in my purse," but nonetheless found plaintiff not guilty because the evidence indicated that officials on the scene did not ever actually believe that plaintiff had a bomb.*fn3

  DISCUSSION

  Plaintiff was arrested, charged with and acquitted of Felony Disorderly Conduct, in violation of 720 ILCS 5-26-1(a)(3), which provides:
A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly transmits or causes to be transmitted in any manner to another a false alarm to the effect that a bomb or other explosive of any nature . . . is concealed in such a place that its explosion or release would endanger human life, knowing at the time of such transmission that there is no reasonable grounds for believing that such bomb . . . is concealed in such place.
  In Counts I and III plaintiff charges defendants with false arrest in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on both counts, arguing that there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff and, even if there was not, they are shielded from a suit for damages by qualified immunity.

  Plaintiff's response focuses on the language of the statute and the words uttered by her at the airport. According to plaintiff, subsection (a)(3) of the Disorderly Conduct Statute makes it illegal only to state that a bomb is concealed. The undisputed evidence, however, demonstrates that plaintiff stated only that she "may" have a bomb in her purse, not that she actually did have one. Therefore, plaintiff argues, defendants knew or should have known that plaintiff did not violate the plain wording of the statute and knew or should have known that they did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff.

  Law enforcement officers have probable cause to arrest an individual "when the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense." Kelly v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 1998). The court evaluates probable cause "not on the facts as an omniscient observer would perceive them but on the facts as they would have appeared to a reasonable person in the position of the arresting officer — seeing what he saw, hearing what he heard." Id. See also Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir. 2000).

  In the instant case, the officers came upon a scene where plaintiff was clearly causing some sort of a disturbance and had repeatedly made remarks to the effect that she may have had a bomb. Although possible, maybe even likely, that the persons to whom plaintiff made the remarks understood that plaintiff was complaining about the manner of her treatment rather than actually meaning that she did in fact have a bomb, it is clear that persons in the surrounding area where disturbed by the remarks. Additionally, Qadeer, the Swissair manager, had told the officers that plaintiff was making a bomb threat. Once a reasonably credible witness or victim informs the police that someone has committed a crime, the police have probable cause to arrest the suspect, and the existence of probable cause does not depend on the actual truth of the complaint. Woods, 234 F.3d at 987 (citing Jenkins v. Kentucky, 147 F.3d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1998), Kelly, 149 F.3d at 647). Thus, Qadeer's complaint was sufficient to supply probable cause to arrest, even if Qadeer never really believed that plaintiff had a bomb. Given the security concerns and sensitivities of the country in general and air travelers in particular shortly after the September 11 attacks, it was manifestly reasonable for the officers to conclude that plaintiff had disturbed the peace. Thus, the court holds that defendants had probable cause to arrest plaintiff.

  Moreover, even if the court were to accept plaintiff's narrow interpretation of the statute, a position that no Illinois court has as of yet reached and that this court need not decide, and were to find that plaintiff's comments fell outside the statute's restrictions, plaintiff ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.