The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOAN H. LEFKOW, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case involves allegations that defendants, Hard Rock
Concrete Cutters, Inc. ("Hard Rock"), James M. Dvoratchek
("Dvoratchek"), and Peter M. Held ("Held"), failed to pay hourly
employees wages and overtime for compensable work time
(preparation, travel, and cleanup) before and after the period of
the workday that Hard Rock considered to be compensable time.
Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint contains four counts. Count I
asserts that defendants' alleged failure to properly compensate
its employees violated the minimum wage and overtime pay
requirements of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL"),
820 ILCS 105/1, et seq. Count II is a claim for unpaid wages under the
Illinois Wage Payment Collection Act ("IWPCA"), 820 ILCS 115/1,
et seq. Counts III and IV assert that defendants' alleged
failure to properly compensate its employees violated the minimum
wage and overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-07. Count IV alleges that the FLSA
violations were willful. Before the court are cross-motions for
partial summary judgment. The parties do not attempt to resolve
questions regarding particular uncompensated time worked by
specific employees. Rather, the parties' arguments focus on which
categories of alleged work time are compensable under the federal
and state statutes that plaintiffs invoke. For the reasons stated
below, plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is granted
in part and denied in part. Defendants' motion for partial
summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
Summary judgment obviates the need for a trial where there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R. Civ. P. 56(c).
To determine whether any genuine fact exists, the court must
pierce the pleadings and assess the proof as presented in
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and
affidavits that are part of the record. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c)
Advisory Committee's notes. The party seeking summary judgment
bears the initial burden of proving there is no genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). In response, the non-moving party cannot rest on bare
pleadings alone but must use the evidentiary tools listed above
to designate specific material facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324; Insolia v. Philip Morris
Inc., 216 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2000). A material fact
must be outcome determinative under the governing law. Insolia,
216 F.3d at 598-599. Although a bare contention that an issue of
fact exists is insufficient to create a factual dispute,
Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir.
2000), the court must construe all facts in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party as well as view all reasonable
inferences in that party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). FACTS
Hard Rock is engaged in the business of cutting concrete. Peter
Held ("Held") is the president and a shareholder of Hard Rock.
James V. Dvoratchek ("Dvoratchek") is the secretary-treasurer and
a shareholder of Hard Rock. Held and Dvoratchek have authority
over the pay practices of Hard Rock.
Plaintiffs are current and former employees of Hard
Rock.*fn1 From July 19, 1997 through August 2001, the hourly
wage plaintiffs received for "covered work" under their
collective bargaining agreements ranged from $14.90 to $30.41.
The number of hours plaintiffs worked per week varied
substantially per week and per plaintiff. Plaintiffs did not
always work forty hours in a week. Plaintiffs recorded and
submitted their own time sheets.
Hard Rock employs both "driver-operators" ("drivers") and
"helpers." Drivers drive company vehicles to and from the job
site. Although drivers are allowed to bring their assigned
vehicles home at night, some drivers park the vehicles in the
yard at night. Drivers pick these vehicles up on the morning of
the following workday. Helpers are supposed to meet drivers with
whom they are paired at the job site. Drivers may pick up helpers
at Hard Rock's yard if it is convenient for the driver. Most Hard Rock employees drivers and helpers travel
directly from their homes to the first job site of the day, and
from the last job site of the day to their homes. However,
drivers occasionally need to stop by Hard Rock's yard prior to
traveling to the job site to perform some or all of the following
tasks: picking up work orders; filling water tanks and portable
gas tanks on work trucks; picking up additional equipment
necessary for the day's work; hooking up trailers needed for
work; and performing safety and operational checks on the
vehicles and trailers.*fn2 Following the work day, drivers
occasionally need to stop by Hard Rock's yard to drop off
vehicles or equipment for repair or to turn in completed work
orders. Debris such as concrete slabs removed from the work site
are also unloaded at this time.*fn3 Helpers occasionally
perform some of these tasks. Hard Rock also asks drivers to have
the oil changed in their assigned vehicles on a regular basis.
Two supervisory employees were usually at Hard Rock's yard in the
morning when work crews would be arriving and departing from the
yard: Ken Leazer and Mike DeBartolo. Held was also there
occasionally. (Dvoratchek Dep., at 48-49.) Some supervisory
employees were also at the yard at the end of the workday,
usually until approximately 5:30 pm. (Id. at 101.)
Prior to September 2000, Hard Rock's policy was to pay
employees only for time spent at job sites and not for time spent
at the beginning of the workday driving to a job site nor for
time at the end of the workday driving from a job site.
Plaintiffs were aware of this policy. There were two exceptions
to this policy. First, if the drive time to the first job site
exceeded one hour, as measured from Hard Rock's yard, Hard Rock
paid the driver his regular hourly wage for the total drive time, regardless of whether the driver had worked
more than forty hours in the week. (Pl. L.R. 56.1 ¶ 49.) Second,
if a driver came to Hard Rock's yard for preparation or cleanup
before going to the first job site, Hard Rock paid him for all
time spent, not just time in excess of one hour, traveling
between the yard and job site if the driver reported this time on
his time sheet. Hard Rock also contends that drivers who reported
time spent having the oil changed on a company vehicle were paid
for that time.
However, Hard Rock never informed its employees that they would
be paid for time spent in preparation, travel, or cleanup nor
instructed them to report such time worked on their time sheets.
Hard Rock also never instructed employees to report time spent
having the oil changed in company vehicles. "Employees learned
how to put down time on their time sheets from what other
employees told them to do." (Pl. L.R. 56.1 ¶ 44.) Factual
disputes exist as to whether plaintiffs were compensated for all
hours worked. Held testified that he had no records reflecting
the number of hours plaintiffs worked for which they would have
been paid had they reported their hours. However, Hard Rock's
payroll records reflect that some plaintiffs received straight
time rather than overtime pay for hours worked in excess of
forty.*fn4 Factual disputes exist as to how often this
occurred.
Plaintiffs contend that they were not properly compensated for
certain preparation, travel, and cleanup time. Plaintiffs seek
compensation at their regular rate of pay for all such uncompensated work performed in weeks in which plaintiffs did not
work in excess of 40 hours ("straight time compensation") and at
one and one-half times their regular pay for all such work
performed in weeks in which plaintiffs worked over 40 hours
("overtime compensation"). Plaintiffs argue that, as to all
counts, they are entitled to summary judgment on liability for
the time period from August 15, 1997 through September, 2000.
Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on
plaintiff's claims for (1) straight time compensation; (2)
punitive damages under the IMWL; and (3) a three-year statute of
limitations under the FLSA.
I. "Principal Activity" Under the FLSA and IMWL
Under the FLSA, any time an employee spends performing the
"principal activity or activities which such employee is employed
to perform" is compensable, 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). "Principal
activities" include all activities which are an integral part of
the principal activity. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.24. An activity is
integral to a principal activity if
. . . the activity is made necessary by the nature of
the work performed, it fulfills mutual obligations
between the employer and his employees, the activity
directly benefits the employer in the operation of
his business, and the activity is closely related to
other duties performed by the employees. Thus, in
order for a particular activity to be "integral and
indispensable," it must be necessary to the principal
activity performed and done for the benefit of the
employer.
Gonzalez v. ...