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August 10, 2004.

EUGENE W. BROWN, JR., Plaintiff,

The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOHN W. DARRAH, District Judge


Plaintiff, Eugene W. Brown, Jr., filed suit against Defendant, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Union. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his gender, in violation of Title VII, by not properly acting on grievances filed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff, in violation of Title VII, after Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Defendant. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, that motion is granted.


  Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 150 (7th Cir. 1994). "One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. . . ." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (Celotex). Thus, although the moving party on a motion for summary judgment is responsible for demonstrating to the court why there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must go beyond the face of the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file to demonstrate, through specific evidence, that a genuine issue of material fact exists and to show that a rational jury could return a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-27; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-56 (1986) (Anderson); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (Matsushita); Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1994).

  Disputed facts are material when they might affect the outcome of the suit. First Ind. Bank v. Baker, 957 F.2d 506, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1992). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view all inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48; Popovits v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 185 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 1999). However, a metaphysical doubt will not suffice. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative or is no more than a scintilla, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250.


  Plaintiff's response to Defendant's motion for summary judgment of Rule 56.1(a) Statement of Facts is deficient in many respects; it contains improper denials, evasive factual arguments which are often unresponsive to Defendant's corresponding statement of fact, and often lacks proper citation to evidence in the record. These failures prevent a determination of which facts are actually in controversy. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, Defendant, in accordance with Local Rule 56.2, advised Plaintiff of his obligations under Local Rule 56.1. Plaintiff's failure to comply with Rule 56.1(b) results in accepting as true all facts set out in a Rule 56.1(a) statement. Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 527-28 (7th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff also failed to file his own statement of material facts that are in dispute.

  Even though Plaintiff failed to properly respond to Defendant's statement of material facts, which are therefore deemed admitted, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will only be granted if it can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Gudmundson, 35 F.3d 1104, 1112 (7th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the undisputed facts, for the purposes of this motion, taken from Defendant's Local Rule 56.1(a) & (b) statements of material facts (referred to herein as "Def.'s 56.1") and exhibits, are as follows.

  Plaintiff is a male who was employed by the Illinois Department of Public Aid until he was terminated on September 12, 2001. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 3-4. Plaintiff was a member of Defendant, a labor organization that represents and collectively bargains for its members, until his termination. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 5-10.

  Plaintiff filed a number of grievances against the Department relating to: (1) harassment he allegedly suffered, (2) the alleged denial of sick leave benefits, (3) obtaining a copy of his personnel file, (4) the alleged failure to handle one of his grievances properly, (5) retaliation by his supervisor, (6) suspensions Plaintiff received, and (7) Plaintiff's use of Department stationery for matters not related to the Department. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 31-33, 35-40. Plaintiff also filed a grievance regarding an oral reprimand he received for tardiness; eventually, this grievance was granted, and the reprimand was removed from Plaintiff's file. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 34; Def.'s Ex. D, Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 15. Plaintiff, though, felt these grievances were not properly handled and were not advanced to the proper levels because he was a male. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 14-15.

  Plaintiff only knows of three female employees on whose behalf the Union filed grievances and whose grievances were resolved. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 68. These three females are the only evidence of female employees' grievances which Plaintiff believes were treated differently than his grievances. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 72.

  One female filed a grievance challenging a written reprimand she received for excessive tardiness. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 69; Def.'s Ex. C, Pl.'s Dep. at 75-76; Def.'s Ex. D, Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 20. This grievance was eventually resolved in favor of the female, and the reprimand was removed from the female's file. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 69; Def.'s Ex. C, Pl.'s Dep. at 77; Def.'s Ex. D, Pl.'s Dep. Ex. 20. The second female filed a grievance concerning a safety hazard. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 70. Plaintiff is unaware of the third female's basis for filing her grievances. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 71.

  Before Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with the Department, he was placed on administrative leave. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 48. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against Defendant with the EEOC, alleging that Defendant has not properly acted upon his grievances. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 11-12. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was terminated from his position with the Department because, for among other reasons, Plaintiff had physically harassed other employees. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 49.

  Defendant then filed a "priority" grievance against the Department on Plaintiff's behalf. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 51. This grievance was denied. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 61. After representing Plaintiff through the initial stages of his grievance, a representative of Defendant chose not to advance Plaintiff's grievance to a higher stage because Defendant had consistently lost past discharge claims involving charges of physical harassment. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 51, 52, 54-60, 62-64. At no time during this grievance ...

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