Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. Nos.02-TD-82 & 99-TX-4. Honorable Terrence J. Brady, Judge, Presiding.
 The opinion of the court was delivered by: Presiding Justice O'malley
 Respondent, Glen Investments, appeals the order of the circuit court of Lake County granting the petition pursuant to section 2--1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 5/2--1401 (West 2002)) of petitioner, David F. Wright, and vacating its earlier issuance of a tax deed to respondent. We find that our jurisdiction over this appeal is lacking and consequently dismiss the appeal.
 Petitioner has been the owner of the subject property for many years and at all times relevant to this matter has resided in the subject property as his primary residence. Three times before the instant case, petitioner's procrastination caused the property to be sold at a tax sale, and each time thereafter, he timely redeemed it. In December 1999, the County of Lake applied for a judgment that petitioner's property was liable to be sold for unpaid taxes for the 1998 tax year. On December 1, 1999, the trial court entered an order finding that there was a tax delinquency on petitioner's property and ordering a sale of that property for back taxes, to commence on December 6, 1999. On December 7, 1999, respondent paid the back taxes, costs, and penalties for the property for the 1998 tax year. Petitioner did not thereafter redeem the property.
 On May 9, 2002, respondent filed a petition for tax deed, and a take notice was issued advising that petitioner's right of redemption would expire on September 30, 2002. The Lake County sheriff was unable to personally serve petitioner with the take notice, and the sheriff's attempt to serve petitioner via certified mail was refused. Petitioner did not redeem the subject property before the September 30, 2002, expiration of the redemption period.
 On October 10, 2002, respondent presented its application for tax deed. Petitioner was not in attendance at that hearing. The trial court examined the application for tax deed and, relying on respondent's representations, found that respondent had met the necessary requirements. Thus, the court entered an order issuing a tax deed. The eviction of petitioner was thereafter scheduled to occur on November 18, 2002. Upon learning of the eviction notice, petitioner retained counsel to challenge the eviction.
 On January 6, 2003, petitioner filed a petition pursuant to section 2--1401 of the Code seeking to vacate the issuance of the tax deed to respondent. On February 13, 2003, the trial court heard argument on the petition and granted it, finding that respondent, contrary to its representations in October 2002, had not been diligent in attempting to achieve service on petitioner, because respondent did not talk to petitioner's neighbors or condominium association to attempt to ascertain his usual whereabouts for purposes of personal service. The trial court also ordered petitioner to reimburse respondent for the back taxes, interest, penalties, costs, and legal expenses. On April 24, 2003, the trial court entered a final order, noting that petitioner had tendered and respondent had received the redemption payment. Respondent timely appeals.
 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court improperly granted petitioner's section 2--1401 petition, because petitioner failed to allege that he had been diligent before the issuance of the tax deed and, in the absence of such an allegation, cannot maintain his section 2--1401 petition. Respondent also argues that the trial court erred in finding that respondents lack of diligence in effecting service on petitioner was tantamount to fraud or deception on the court sufficient to allow petitioner to challenge the issuance of the tax deed.
 We do not reach the issues respondent raises because, in light of the requirements of the Property Tax Code (Tax Code) (35 ILCS 200/1--1 et seq. (West 2002)), we find that respondent's acceptance of the redemption payment has divested us of jurisdiction over this appeal.
 Section 22--80(b) of the Tax Code provides, in pertinent part:
 "Except in those cases described in subsection (a) of this Section [not applicable here], and unless the court on motion of the tax deed petitioner extends the redemption period to a date not later than 3 years from the date of sale, any order of court finding that an order directing the county clerk to issue a tax deed should be vacated shall direct the party who successfully contested the entry of the order to pay to the tax deed grantee or his or her successors and assigns (or, if a tax deed has not yet issued, the holder of the certificate) within 90 days after the date of the finding:
 (1) the amount necessary to redeem the property from the sale as of the last day of the period of redemption, except that, if the sale is a scavenger sale pursuant to Section 21--260 of this Act [(35 ILCS 200/21--260 (West 2002))], the redemption amount shall not include an amount equal to all delinquent taxes on such property which taxes were delinquent at the time of sale; and
 (2) amounts in satisfaction of municipal liens paid by the tax purchaser or his or her assignee, and the amounts specified in paragraphs (1) and
 (3) of subsection (a) of this Section, to the extent the amounts are not included in paragraph (1) of this subsection (b).
 If the payment is not made within the 90-day period, the petition to vacate the order directing the county clerk to issue a tax deed shall be denied with prejudice, and the order directing the county clerk to issue a tax deed shall remain in full force and effect. No final order vacating any order directing the county clerk to issue a tax deed shall be entered ...