The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOHN W. DARRAH, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Anna M. Hall, filed suit against Defendant, Chicago
Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union 130, U.A. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant discriminated Plaintiff on account of her race and
gender, in violation of Title VII, by not investigating and
following through on a grievance that she filed. Plaintiff also
alleges that Defendant breached its duty as a union of fair
representation, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 185. Presently before
the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff
failed to file a response. For the following reasons, that motion
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v.
Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 150 (7th Cir.
1994). "One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment
rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or
defenses. . . ." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986) (Celotex). Thus, although the moving party on a motion for summary judgment is responsible
for demonstrating to the court why there is no genuine issue of
material fact, the non-moving party must go beyond the face of
the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file to demonstrate, through
specific evidence, that a genuine issue of material fact exists
and to show that a rational jury could return a verdict in the
non-moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-27;
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-56 (1986)
(Anderson); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (Matsushita); Waldridge v.
Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1994).
Disputed facts are material when they might affect the outcome
of the suit. First Ind. Bank v. Baker, 957 F.2d 506, 507-08
(7th Cir. 1992). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a
court must view all inferences to be drawn from the facts in the
light most favorable to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 247-48; Popovits v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 185 F.3d 726,
731 (7th Cir. 1999). However, a metaphysical doubt will not
suffice. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. If the evidence is merely
colorable or is not significantly probative or is no more than a
scintilla, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S.
Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's motion for summary
judgment Local Rule 56.1(a) Statement of Facts. Plaintiff's
failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1(b) results in accepting as
true all facts set out in a Rule 56.1(a) statement. See Smith v.
Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 682-83 (7th Cir. 2003). Even though
Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's statement of material
facts and such facts are deemed admitted, Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment will only be granted if it can demonstrate that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Johnson v.
Gudmundson, 35 F.3d 1104, 1112 (7th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the
undisputed facts, for the purposes of this motion, taken from
Defendant's Local Rule 56.1(a) & (b) statements of material facts
(referred to herein as "Def.'s 56.1") and exhibits, are as
Plaintiff is an African-American female employed by the City of
Chicago as a plumber. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 11. Plaintiff is a member of
Defendant, a labor organization that is authorized to represent
members with respect to the terms and conditions of their
employment. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 1-2, 11; Compl. ¶ 14. Sometime during
her employment with the City of Chicago, Plaintiff went on duty
disability leave. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 12. Plaintiff then requested,
from the City of Chicago, that she be permitted to return to
work. Compl. ¶ 11. A plumber or caulker who has been injured,
like Plaintiff, must obtain a full medical release before she can
return to work for the City of Chicago. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 52, 87.
Plaintiff was advised that she would not be permitted to return
to work because the City of Chicago did not have "light duty"
assignment. Compl. ¶ 12.
Plaintiff, though, believed that three Caucasians were taken
back after injuries as plumbers or caulkers by Defendant and the
City of Chicago and placed on light duty. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 54, 138,
144, 149, 153, 154. Plaintiff also believed that an
African-American male was taken back after an injury as a plumber
by the City of Chicago and Defendant and placed on light duty.
Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 81, 138, 144, 152. However, none of these
employees ever worked for the City of Chicago on light duty,
disability duty, restricted duty, or with any medical or doctor's
restrictions or ever filed a grievance such as Plaintiff did.
Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 144-149.
Plaintiff filed a grievance against the City of Chicago with
Defendant and asked Defendant to investigate how many plumbers
and caulkers were on duty disability with doctor's restrictions and where it is stated that no light duty work
exists with the City of Chicago. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 44. Plaintiff
received a response from a City of Chicago supervisor indicating
that there was no light duty work available in the district where
Plaintiff worked. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 49-51. There has never been
light duty work available in Plaintiff's district during
Plaintiff's period of employment. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 11, 52.
Plaintiff then presented another copy of her grievance to one
of Defendant's representatives. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 53. Plaintiff
claimed that other employees who were injured were taken back by
the City of Chicago and placed on light duty. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 54.
Plaintiff also wanted to know how many plumbers were on duty
disability with doctor's restrictions. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 57. Although
Plaintiff was required to file the grievance with the City of
Chicago, Defendant's representative investigated Plaintiff's
grievance and informed Plaintiff that the City of Chicago does
not have any light duty work available for any plumber or
caulker. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 18, 67-70, 73.
Plaintiff was dissatisfied with Defendant's actions regarding
her grievance and filed an unfair labor practice charge against
Defendants with the Illinois Labor Relations Board on July 22,
2002. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 92. Plaintiff then filed the instant suit on
May 7, 2003.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated Plaintiff on
account of her race and gender, in violation of Title VII, by not
investigating and following through on a grievance that she
filed. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant breached its duty as
a union of fair representation, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 185. To establish a prima facie violation of Title VII against a
union, Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the union committed a
breach of the collective bargaining agreement with respect to
Plaintiff; (2) the union allowed the breach to go unrepaired and
thus violated its duty of fair representation; and (3) "there was
some indication that the [u]nion's activities were motivated by
racial [or gender-based] animus." Johnson v. Artim Transp. Sys.,
Inc., 826 F.2d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1987) (Johnson); accord
Greenslade v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 112 F.3d 853, 866-67 (7th
Cir. 1997). To demonstrate the union's activities were motivated
by the required animus, Plaintiff must show that grievances from
similarly situated male or non-African-American union ...