The opinion of the court was delivered by: SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge
This matter is before the court on Defendant Elizabeth
Millett's ("Millett") and Diana Bounds' ("Bounds") motion to
dismiss. For the reasons stated below, we grant the motion to
Plaintiff Patricia B. Brantley ("Brantley") brought suit
against defendants Millett and Bounds, alleging discrimination
based on a physical handicap arising from her employment at
Ameritech Services, Inc. ("Ameritech") and subsequent termination
therefrom. Brantley's one page, handwritten, pro se complaint
states that she suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome caused by an
on-the-job injury, and brings suit alleging violations of the
Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
("ADA"), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII").
We note that Millett and Bounds initially filed the complaint
pro se, but subsequently they obtained counsel who assisted
them in responding to the instant motion. Brantley claims in her
answer to the instant motion that "the record shows that the
Plaintiff also, on 1/14/04, filed a 10 page version of her
complaint. . . ." (Ans 2). However, this supposed ten page
complaint filed on 1/14/04 is not listed in the official case
record, and thus was not properly filed by Brantley. Brantley
even admits in her answer to the instant motion that she never
served Defendants with the 10 page version of her complaint.
(Ans. 2). Therefore, the ten page complaint mentioned by Brantley
was never properly filed, is not part of the official record in
this case, and cannot be considered by the court.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
must take all well-pled facts as true, and construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Thompson v.
Ill. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir.
2002); Pleva v. Norquist, 195 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir.
1999). The court must limit the scope of its consideration solely
to the pleadings; usually consisting of the complaint, any attached exhibits, and supporting briefs.
Thompson, 300 F.3d at 753. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c)
(indicating that "[s]tatements in a pleading may be adopted by
reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another
pleading or in any motion . . . [and that] [a] copy of any
written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part
thereof for all purposes").
Under the federal standard of notice pleading, it is required
only that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Furthermore, pro se complaints are afforded
liberal construction and are not held to the more stringent
standard expected of complaints drafted by legal counsel.
McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir.
2000); Kyle v. Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir.
1999); Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, Ind., 839 F.2d 375, 378
(7th Cir. 1988). Finally, claims for relief should not be
dismissed by the court "unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
The complaint names only Millett and Bounds as defendants, and
it contains general allegations of discrimination because of an
alleged physical handicap. Brantley does not explain precisely
how Millett and Bounds were involved in the alleged
discrimination. Millett and Bounds argue, in their memorandum in
support of their motion to dismiss, that neither the ADA nor Title VII
provide for individual liability, and thus they are entitled to
dismissal from this action.
We agree. It is indeed well-settled in this Circuit that both
the ADA and Title VII provide only for employer liability, not
individual liability. See Silk v. City of Chicago,
194 F.3d 788, 797 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a claim for
individual liability against a supervisor "would fail, for the
ADA provides only for employer, not individual, liability . . .
[and that the] case law is clear that a supervisor cannot be held
liable in his individual capacity under the ADA or under Title
VII."); Gastineau v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 493
(7th Cir. 1998) (holding that Title VII could not be used
hold an individual employee or agent liable); Geier v.
Medtronic, 99 F.3d 238, 244 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a
"supervisor, in his individual capacity, does not fall within
Title VII's definition of employer."); Williams v. Banning,
72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that "a supervisor
does not, in his individual capacity, fall within Title VII's
definition of employer. . . .").
In fact, in her answer to the instant motion, Brantley does not
dispute this point. Therefore, we grant the motion to dismiss.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant Defendants' ...