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United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

June 21, 2004.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: SAMUEL DER-YEGHIAYAN, District Judge


This matter is before the court on Defendant Elizabeth Millett's ("Millett") and Diana Bounds' ("Bounds") motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, we grant the motion to dismiss.


  Plaintiff Patricia B. Brantley ("Brantley") brought suit against defendants Millett and Bounds, alleging discrimination based on a physical handicap arising from her employment at Ameritech Services, Inc. ("Ameritech") and subsequent termination therefrom. Brantley's one page, handwritten, pro se complaint states that she suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome caused by an on-the-job injury, and brings suit alleging violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII").

  We note that Millett and Bounds initially filed the complaint pro se, but subsequently they obtained counsel who assisted them in responding to the instant motion. Brantley claims in her answer to the instant motion that "the record shows that the Plaintiff also, on 1/14/04, filed a 10 page version of her complaint. . . ." (Ans 2). However, this supposed ten page complaint filed on 1/14/04 is not listed in the official case record, and thus was not properly filed by Brantley. Brantley even admits in her answer to the instant motion that she never served Defendants with the 10 page version of her complaint. (Ans. 2). Therefore, the ten page complaint mentioned by Brantley was never properly filed, is not part of the official record in this case, and cannot be considered by the court.


  In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take all well-pled facts as true, and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Thompson v. Ill. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002); Pleva v. Norquist, 195 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 1999). The court must limit the scope of its consideration solely to the pleadings; usually consisting of the complaint, any attached exhibits, and supporting briefs. Thompson, 300 F.3d at 753. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) (indicating that "[s]tatements in a pleading may be adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion . . . [and that] [a] copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes").

  Under the federal standard of notice pleading, it is required only that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Furthermore, pro se complaints are afforded liberal construction and are not held to the more stringent standard expected of complaints drafted by legal counsel. McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000); Kyle v. Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 1999); Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, Ind., 839 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988). Finally, claims for relief should not be dismissed by the court "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).


  The complaint names only Millett and Bounds as defendants, and it contains general allegations of discrimination because of an alleged physical handicap. Brantley does not explain precisely how Millett and Bounds were involved in the alleged discrimination. Millett and Bounds argue, in their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss, that neither the ADA nor Title VII provide for individual liability, and thus they are entitled to dismissal from this action.

  We agree. It is indeed well-settled in this Circuit that both the ADA and Title VII provide only for employer liability, not individual liability. See Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 797 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a claim for individual liability against a supervisor "would fail, for the ADA provides only for employer, not individual, liability . . . [and that the] case law is clear that a supervisor cannot be held liable in his individual capacity under the ADA or under Title VII."); Gastineau v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that Title VII could not be used hold an individual employee or agent liable); Geier v. Medtronic, 99 F.3d 238, 244 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a "supervisor, in his individual capacity, does not fall within Title VII's definition of employer."); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that "a supervisor does not, in his individual capacity, fall within Title VII's definition of employer. . . .").

  In fact, in her answer to the instant motion, Brantley does not dispute this point. Therefore, we grant the motion to dismiss.


  Based on the foregoing analysis, we grant Defendants' motion to dismiss.


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