The opinion of the court was delivered by: JAMES MORAN, Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Darlene Moore brought this action against defendants
alleging violations of her civil rights pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In May 2003, she agreed to dismiss her Monell policy
claims against the City of Chicago (City) in exchange for
defendants' assurances that they would cooperate to move the case
to a faster trial. On March 16, 2004, we denied plaintiff's
motion for leave to file an amended complaint reinstating those
claims against the City. Plaintiff then filed a motion to
reconsider that order. Defendant Delores Gibson-Edwards filed a
motion to dismiss the claims against her. For the following
reasons, plaintiff's motion to reconsider, along with her earlier
motion to amend, are granted, and defendant Gibson-Edwards'
motion is denied.
In our March 16, 2004 order, we denied plaintiff's motion for
leave to amend the complaint because we determined that the
claims failed to satisfy the statute of limitations, as is
required following a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a). See Adams v. Lever Bros, Co., 874 F.2d 393,
395 (7th Cir. 1989). When doing so, we believed that the City had been entirely dismissed from the complaint as part
of the May 2003 dismissal order. That was not the case. Instead,
plaintiff's state law claims against the City (counts VIII and IX
of the second amended complaint) were, and are, still pending.
This does not exempt plaintiff from the requirement that her
new claims must satisfy the statute of limitations Rule 41(a)
still applies. Rule 15(c), however, allows plaintiff to meet that
requirement by "relating back" the new claims as long as they
arise from the same set of facts contained in the original
pleading. Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.,
874 F.2d 402, 410 (7th Cir. 1989). Here, there is no dispute that the
Monell claims arise from identical facts as the state law
claims currently pending. For that reason, plaintiff's motion to
reconsider is granted, leaving us to resolve the issue presented
in the original motion to amend: whether the May 2003 dismissal
was with or without prejudice.
Rule 41(a)(2) states that a voluntary dismissal is without
prejudice unless otherwise specified in the order. Our May 21,
2003 order is silent as to this issue, though it does refer to
defendant's motion asking for dismissal of the Monell claims,
with prejudice. Plaintiff's counsel claims not to have noticed
that language, stating that the topic was never discussed during
negotiations. The City argues that the parties must have intended
to dismiss the claims with prejudice, otherwise it would have
made no sense for the City to agree to withdraw the motion to
structure discovery. Plaintiff insists that the opposite is true
she would not have dismissed the policy claims with prejudice
in exchange for a mere promise by defendant to cooperate.
There is nothing (other than the language in defendant's
motion, which plaintiff may not have noticed) to indicate that
the parties discussed this issue before it arose in the motion to
amend the complaint, and defendant does not claim that there was.
Absent any such evidence, Rule 41(a)(2) forces us to conclude that the dismissal
was without prejudice. We also believe that this result makes the
most sense in the context of the parties' bargain. Plaintiff has
the right to reinstate the policy claims against defendant and
defendant has the right to re-file its motion seeking to
structure discovery. Also, while the City certainly would have
benefitted from prevailing on the motion to structure, rather
than agreeing to withdraw it, there were also benefits to seeing
the Monell claims dismissed and pursuing expedited litigation
of the remaining claims. This idea is supported by the fact that
defendant made no attempt to modify the May 21, 2003 order prior
to the filing of plaintiff's motion to amend. In any case, we do
not second-guess the motivation of the parties in reaching their
agreement but conclude, in light of Rule 41(a)(2), that plaintiff
is permitted to amend the complaint to reinstate the policy
claims. In doing so, we commend both parties for their candor in
discussing the issue.
In plaintiff's original complaint she stated a claim against
certain unknown police officers. On June 25, 2003, she filed a
second amended complaint, naming defendant Gibson-Edwards for the
first time. In the body of the complaint, however, Gibson-Edwards
was not mentioned by name. Instead, the complaint stated only
that "requests for medical attention were ignored by unknown
Chicago Police Officers." Defendant Gibson-Edwards now claims
that we should dismiss her from the suit with prejudice.
If a complaint mentions a defendant in the caption, but alleges
no action on his/her part, that defendant should be dismissed
from the action even under liberal pleading requirements. Potter
v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974). That is not
the case here. Although not mentioned by name, Gibson-Edwards is
referred to in the complaint. She is well aware that plaintiff is claiming that she failed to provide
medical attention. In Potter, and the cases that follow it, no
action by the defendants was mentioned in the complaint, giving
them no notice of the plaintiffs' claims. 497 F.2d at 1207-08;
see also Hernandez v. County of DuPage, 1997 WL 598132, *9-10
(N.D.Ill.) (dismissing claims where plaintiff named four of the
defendants in the caption but failed to specifically mention them
in the complaint, using only the word "defendants"). Here,
plaintiff simply erred in failing to change the language of the
body of the complaint when naming Gibson-Edwards as a defendant.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion to reconsider and
her motion to amend are granted, and defendant Gibson-Edwards'
motion to dismiss is denied.
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