United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division
June 14, 2004.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff,
CHARLES STATES Defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: MICHAEL MASON, Magistrate Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The District Court has referred defendant Charles States'
("States") motion to suppress to this Court for an evidentiary
hearing and a Report and Recommendation. States seeks to suppress
all statements he made to law enforcement officers following his
arrest on October 9, 2002, arguing that they were made in
violation of his right against compelled self-incrimination under
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. We conducted an
evidentiary hearing on June 3, 2004. After carefully considering
the sworn testimony of Officer John Cruz, Officer Steve Flores,
Detective Brian Johnson, Detective Rich Sullivan, Officer John
Graham, Agent Richard Hardgrave and defendant Charles States; the
documents entered into evidence by the government;*fn1 and
the written submissions by both parties, we make the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the reasons set
forth below, this Court respectfully recommends that the District
Court DENY States' motion to suppress.
Findings of Fact
In May, 2002, States was charged, pursuant to a criminal
complaint, with participation in a drug conspiracy. The complaint
alleged that as part of the conspiracy, States participated in
numerous kidnapings in which some victims were severely beaten.
That month, this Court issued an arrest warrant for States in
connection with the charges in the complaint. Around 12:30 a.m.
on October 9, 2002, based on information from an informant,
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents and Chicago Police
Department ("CPD") officers went to a multi-unit apartment
building at 1246*fn2 E. 79th Street to execute the
arrest warrant for States. Two FBI agents and three CPD officers
("Arresting Authorities") entered the apartment building and
proceeded to apartment #307 on the third floor, where they
believed States was located.
At that time States and a female, Felicia Waller, were inside
apartment #307. When the Arresting Authorities reached the
apartment, they repeatedly knocked on the door and announced that
they were law enforcement officers. After not receiving a
response, Officer Graham proceeded to strike the door with a
sledgehammer. Upon hearing a "loud boom, boom, boom, at the
door," States retrieved two semi-automatic pistols from the
bedroom and began firing them at the door and in the direction of
the Arresting Authorities, eventually shooting Officer Graham in the
finger. In an attempt to protect themselves and to suppress
States' gunfire, the Arresting Authorities returned fire through
the door and into the apartment. At that time, the door to the
apartment had not been breached.
During the crossfire, States heard shouts of "FBI" and ceased
his gunfire. Then, States threw the two semi-automatic pistols he
had been firing out of an apartment window and tried to open the
door, but it was jammed. Once the gunfire subsided, the Arresting
Authorities kicked in the door and ordered States to get on the
ground with his hands up and to crawl out of the apartment.
Thereafter, States was frisked, handcuffed, arrested and placed
in the backseat of a CPD patrol car assigned to Officers Cruz and
Flores.*fn3 Officers Cruz and Flores were instructed to
monitor States at the scene and to drive him to the Area 2 police
station, located on 111th Street in Chicago.
States remained in the patrol car at the scene for over an
hour. During that time, he was asked for his name, social
security number, and date of birth in order to run an identity
check, but was not questioned further by any law enforcement
officers.*fn4 In fact, Officers Cruz and Flores were specifically told by their
supervisor, Sergeant Blysko, to make sure that no one talked to
States. Both officers testified that they successfully executed
Sergeant Blysko's orders and we find their testimony credible.
Before States was transported to the Area 2 police station, he
was also given a gun shot residue test, but again was not
subjected to any questioning by law enforcement officers.
Officers Cruz and Flores also testified that States never
requested an attorney or stated that he wanted to remain silent
and/or not speak to the officers. In fact, Officer Flores
testified that States initiated conversations with the officers
while he was in the backseat of the patrol car. Again, we find
the testimony of the officers credible.
Once States arrived at the Area 2 police station, he was placed
in a witness room by himself until approximately 1 p.m. on
October 9, 2002. Once at the police station and while in the
witness room, the government's witnesses testified that States
was never questioned about the shooting or his involvement in the
drug conspiracy giving rise to the issuance of the warrant for
his arrest. The averments in States' suppression motion and his
testimony at the hearing do not contradict this testimony and,
therefore, we find that States was not questioned by police
during that period of time. The government's witnesses also
testified that while at the station, States never requested an
attorney or expressed an intent to remain silent. States
disagrees. Again, we find the testimony of the government's
witnesses credible and find that States did not request an
attorney or express an intent to remain silent while at the
station. At approximately 1 p.m. on October 9, 2002, Detective Johnson
escorted States from the witness room to a conference room at the
police station. Agent Hardgrave, Agent Schulte and Assistant
States Attorney Tony Garcia were already in the conference room
when Detective Johnson and States arrived. The individuals
introduced themselves to States and then Agent Schulte read
States his Miranda rights for the first time since he was taken
into custody that day. Thereafter, Agent Schulte gave States the
Interrogation Advice of Rights form. States read the form and
signed the Waiver section at 1:09 p.m. according to the time on
the form.*fn5 (Government's Ex. 2) Thereafter, the law
enforcement officers, for the first time, began interrogating
States. As a result of the interrogation, States made
incriminating statements which he now seeks to suppress.
Conclusions of Law
The only issue before this Court is the alleged violation of
States' Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled
self-incrimination while subject to custodial
interrogation.*fn6 The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
protects against compelled self-incrimination. In Miranda v.
Arizona, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of compelled
self-incrimination in the context of custodial interrogation,
finding that "without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation . . .
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where
he would not otherwise do so freely." 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
To combat the inherent pressures custodial interrogation
presents, the Miranda Court established "a `series of
recommended `procedural safeguards' . . . [that] were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory
self-incrimination was protected.'" Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
443-44 (1974)). Those procedural safeguards include "the now
familiar Miranda warnings namely, that the defendant be
informed `that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires'." Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980) (quoting Miranda, 438 U.S. at 479). These
rights are only necessary in the context of custodial
interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
Because a person's right to Miranda safeguards is limited to
the context of custodial interrogation, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly addressed what constitutes custodial interrogation,
initially defining it as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." Id. Later, the Supreme Court refined the definition
stating that it "must reflect a measure of compulsion above and
beyond that inherent in custody itself." Innis, 446 U.S. at
300-01. Ultimately, the Court found that interrogation under
Miranda "refers not only to express questioning, but also to
any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."
Id. "A practice that the police should know is reasonably
likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus
amounts to interrogation." Id. at 301.
With a refined definition of interrogation in place, courts
began to recognize situations in which Miranda protections do
not apply. For example, a defendant is not entitled to Miranda
protections when subject to "routine booking" questions because
they are not designed to elicit incriminating responses.
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600-601 (1990). Booking
questions include inquiries regarding a defendant's "name,
address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current
age." Id. at 600.
Additionally, because Miranda warnings are a prophylactic
measure created by the Court to prevent the inherently compelling
pressure created by custodial interrogation, they only attach in
that context. United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 339 (7th
Cir. 1994). A person cannot anticipatorily invoke his Miranda
rights. Id. at 340. "[I]n order for a defendant to invoke his
Miranda rights the authorities must be conducting
interrogation, or interrogation must be imminent." Id.
(relying on McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n. 3 (1991)
("We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his
Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than
`custodial interrogation'.").*fn7 States' Verified Motion to Suppress
Now that we have outlined the law applicable to States' motion
to suppress, we analyze whether there are any facts to support
his argument that his post-arrest statements were obtained in
violation of his Fifth Amendment right. We find none.
The natural starting point in our analysis is a review of
States' verified motion to suppress. In order to analyze whether
the motion provides facts to support suppression, we briefly
summarize its content. States' verified amended motion to
suppress, as amended,*fn8 contains the following factual
"Around midnight on October 8/9, 2002, Charles States
was watching a DVD in his apartment at 1248 E.
79th Street, Chicago, when he heard his front
door being loudly battered or rammed several times.
He ran to the front window and looked out, but he did
not see any police vehicles parked outside. Fearing
that gang members were invading his home, Mr. States
retrieved a weapon and fired through the front door,
whereupon numerous rounds of fire came from the other
side of the door. At this point Mr. States heard
shouts of "FBI," and he tried to open the door but he
was unable to do so because the lock was jammed from
being rammed. The police then kicked in the door. Mr.
States was ordered to crawl on the floor to the front
door, where he was handcuffed at gunpoint and kicked
in the head because he had allegedly shot one of the
arresting officers. While waiting to be driven to the
Chicago Police Department station located at 727 East
111th Street, Mr. States said to a Chicago Police
Department detective that he did not want to talk to
him about his case. Mr. States does not know the
identity of the Chicago Police Department detective,
nor did he have access to a clock or watch so he does
not know the exact time of his statement either.
After his arrival at the station, while in the
company of agents whose identity he does not know,
Mr. States said that he wanted to talk to a lawyer.
There was no clock in the area, so Mr. States does
not know the exact time of his statement, but it was
before he received any Miranda warnings. At
approximately 1:00 p.m. on October 9, 2002, law
enforcement agents initiated conversation with Mr.
States. He was given the standard Miranda warnings
and executed a waiver of his Miranda rights. The
interrogation of Mr. States began about 1:10 p.m. and did not conclude until 4:40.
During the interrogation Mr. States made
incriminating statements which the government is
seeking to introduce into evidence against him."
In order for us to find a violation of States' rights under
Miranda, we must first determine whether States was entitled to
Miranda protections during the period of time at issue in the
motion. To put it another way, we must decide whether States was
subjected to custodial interrogation at any point between
approximately 12:30 a.m. and 1:09 p.m. on October 9, 2002. If we
answer the question in the negative, our analysis ends there. If
States was not subjected to custodial interrogation, then he was
never entitled to the safeguards articulated in Miranda. If
States was not entitled to Miranda protections then law
enforcement officers could not possibly have violated his right
to those protections and his motion to suppress must be denied.
As stated above, custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes
is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. It is
uncontested that defendant was `in custody' during the entire
period of time at issue in this hearing. Therefore, our only
inquiry is into whether States was `interrogated' while in
custody. Again, interrogation encompasses "not only express
questioning, but also any words or actions on the part of the
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter
portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions
of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police." Innis,
446 U.S. at 301. Based on the averments in defendant's motion to suppress, it is
undisputed that the first prong of the definition of
interrogation was not met. Defendant's motion does not state that
he was ever subjected to direct questioning by law enforcement
officers prior to being given the standard Miranda warnings and
executing a waiver of his Miranda rights. See Innis, 446 U.S.
at 302. The averments in defendant's motion also do not meet that
second prong of the definition. Defendant's motion does not state
that he was subjected to the "functional equivalent" of
After carefully reviewing States' motion, we cannot find any
facts, disputed or otherwise, that could support a finding that
States was subjected to custodial interrogation prior to
approximately 1:10 p.m. on October 9, 2002, negating, it appears
to us, the need for a hearing on the motion. Defendant's
averments that "[w]hile waiting to be driven to the Chicago
Police Department station . . . [he] said to a Chicago Police
Department detective that he did not want to talk to him about
his case" and that "[a]fter his arrival at the station, while in
the company of agents whose identity he does not know, [he] said
that he wanted to talk to a lawyer" are of no import. There are
no averments that when States made these alleged statements he
was subject to interrogation or that interrogation was imminent.
Therefore, at best, these alleged statements were an anticipatory
invocation of his Miranda rights which is prohibited under
LaGrone, 43 F.3d at 339.
Additionally, the allegation that States was kicked in the head
by Officer Graham and another unidentified officer, even if true,
would not support a finding of custodial interrogation. That
"fact" is more relevant to the issue of whether his post-arrest
statements were voluntary, an issue defendant did not raise and
we will not address. However, for the sake of completeness, we note that the Seventh
Circuit has already addressed this issue, finding that kicking a
defendant in the head while he is being arrested does not make
his confession involuntary. See Watson v. Detella,
122 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 1997) (Kicking someone while making an arrest
is not official coercion. A confession after such conduct would
not be involuntary because the defendant "was not kicked during
some sort of interrogation or in an effort to force him to
States' Hearing Testimony
Both parties agreed to a hearing, which we conducted on June 3,
2004. Because a hearing was held and additional facts were
presented, we now analyze those additional facts to determine
whether they provide a basis for suppressing States' post-arrest
statements. We find that they do not. In fact, even if we took
virtually all*fn9 of States' hearing testimony as true, it
would still fail to provide a basis for suppressing his
States only provided one additional set of "facts" at the
hearing that require comment. On direct examination, States'
testified that while in the backseat of the patrol car, he was
questioned by law enforcement officers on two separate occasions.
States elaborated, testifying that first he was questioned about
his identity, and that later a law enforcement officer made
substantive inquires about the shooting. As stated above, we do not find States' testimony credible. However, even
if true, these facts are not grounds to suppress his post-arrest
The first series of questions were "routine booking" inquires
and are not considered interrogation. Muniz, 496 U.S. at
600-601. As for the second series of questions, States failed to
specify what questions the law enforcement officer posed. Because
we do not know the content of the alleged questions, we cannot
determine whether they were designed to elicit an incriminating
response. States' testimony that he asked me "questions about the
shooting" does not appear to us to be sufficient. However, for
the purposes of argument, we will assume the second officer's
questions constituted custodial interrogation and that in
response to those questions States asserted his right to remain
silent under Miranda. Those "facts" are not grounds to suppress
his post-arrest statements.
The alleged custodial interrogation while States was in the
backseat of the patrol car did not lead to the incriminating
statements at issue. States did not make the incriminating
statements he seeks to suppress until approximately twelve hours
later. A defendant's valid invocation of his right to remain
silent under Miranda does not preclude all subsequent custodial
interrogation. Miranda provides that once a defendant indicates
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. However, "[i]t does not state
under what circumstances, if any, a resumption of questioning is
permissible." Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 101 (1975). In
Mosley, the Supreme Court found that "the admissibility of
statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to
remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his `right to cut
off questioning' was `scrupulously honored'." Id. at 104. A person's right to remain silent is scrupulously honored
when "authorities ceased questioning him after he refused to make
a statement, waited several hours before reinitiating questioning
and resumed it only after again advising him of his Miranda
rights." United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 538 (7th Cir.
Under Wyatt, even if States was subject to custodial
interrogation in the backseat of the patrol car, and validly
invoked his right to remain silent under Miranda, that right
was scrupulously honored. States testified that after he
allegedly invoked his right to remain silent, the interrogation
ceased and did not resume until approximately twelve hours later,
after States received Miranda warnings and waived them. States'
allegation about the questioning in the backseat of the patrol
car has no relevance to whether his post-arrest statements in the
conference room should be suppressed.
That said, as stated above, we do not find a majority of
States' testimony credible. Based on the all the evidence before
us, both oral and written, we find that States was not subjected
to custodial interrogation until after he was given and
subsequently waived his Miranda rights. Therefore, his
post-arrest statements were not elicited in violation of his
Fifth Amendments rights under the Constitution and should not be
This Court respectfully recommends that the District Court DENY
defendant's motion to suppress. The statements defendant made on
October 9, 2002 were obtained lawfully and should not be
suppressed. Specific written objections to this report and
recommendation may be served and filed within 10 business days
from the date that this order is served. Failure to file
objections with the District Court within the specified time will result in a waiver of the right to appeal all
findings, factual and legal, made by this Court in the report and
recommendation. Lorentzen v. Anderson Pest Control,
64 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 1995).