The opinion of the court was delivered by: MICHAEL MASON, Magistrate Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The District Court has referred defendant Charles States'
("States") motion to suppress to this Court for an evidentiary
hearing and a Report and Recommendation. States seeks to suppress
all statements he made to law enforcement officers following his
arrest on October 9, 2002, arguing that they were made in
violation of his right against compelled self-incrimination under
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. We conducted an
evidentiary hearing on June 3, 2004. After carefully considering
the sworn testimony of Officer John Cruz, Officer Steve Flores,
Detective Brian Johnson, Detective Rich Sullivan, Officer John
Graham, Agent Richard Hardgrave and defendant Charles States; the
documents entered into evidence by the government;*fn1 and
the written submissions by both parties, we make the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the reasons set
forth below, this Court respectfully recommends that the District
Court DENY States' motion to suppress.
In May, 2002, States was charged, pursuant to a criminal
complaint, with participation in a drug conspiracy. The complaint
alleged that as part of the conspiracy, States participated in
numerous kidnapings in which some victims were severely beaten.
That month, this Court issued an arrest warrant for States in
connection with the charges in the complaint. Around 12:30 a.m.
on October 9, 2002, based on information from an informant,
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents and Chicago Police
Department ("CPD") officers went to a multi-unit apartment
building at 1246*fn2 E. 79th Street to execute the
arrest warrant for States. Two FBI agents and three CPD officers
("Arresting Authorities") entered the apartment building and
proceeded to apartment #307 on the third floor, where they
believed States was located.
At that time States and a female, Felicia Waller, were inside
apartment #307. When the Arresting Authorities reached the
apartment, they repeatedly knocked on the door and announced that
they were law enforcement officers. After not receiving a
response, Officer Graham proceeded to strike the door with a
sledgehammer. Upon hearing a "loud boom, boom, boom, at the
door," States retrieved two semi-automatic pistols from the
bedroom and began firing them at the door and in the direction of
the Arresting Authorities, eventually shooting Officer Graham in the
finger. In an attempt to protect themselves and to suppress
States' gunfire, the Arresting Authorities returned fire through
the door and into the apartment. At that time, the door to the
apartment had not been breached.
During the crossfire, States heard shouts of "FBI" and ceased
his gunfire. Then, States threw the two semi-automatic pistols he
had been firing out of an apartment window and tried to open the
door, but it was jammed. Once the gunfire subsided, the Arresting
Authorities kicked in the door and ordered States to get on the
ground with his hands up and to crawl out of the apartment.
Thereafter, States was frisked, handcuffed, arrested and placed
in the backseat of a CPD patrol car assigned to Officers Cruz and
Flores.*fn3 Officers Cruz and Flores were instructed to
monitor States at the scene and to drive him to the Area 2 police
station, located on 111th Street in Chicago.
States remained in the patrol car at the scene for over an
hour. During that time, he was asked for his name, social
security number, and date of birth in order to run an identity
check, but was not questioned further by any law enforcement
officers.*fn4 In fact, Officers Cruz and Flores were specifically told by their
supervisor, Sergeant Blysko, to make sure that no one talked to
States. Both officers testified that they successfully executed
Sergeant Blysko's orders and we find their testimony credible.
Before States was transported to the Area 2 police station, he
was also given a gun shot residue test, but again was not
subjected to any questioning by law enforcement officers.
Officers Cruz and Flores also testified that States never
requested an attorney or stated that he wanted to remain silent
and/or not speak to the officers. In fact, Officer Flores
testified that States initiated conversations with the officers
while he was in the backseat of the patrol car. Again, we find
the testimony of the officers credible.
Once States arrived at the Area 2 police station, he was placed
in a witness room by himself until approximately 1 p.m. on
October 9, 2002. Once at the police station and while in the
witness room, the government's witnesses testified that States
was never questioned about the shooting or his involvement in the
drug conspiracy giving rise to the issuance of the warrant for
his arrest. The averments in States' suppression motion and his
testimony at the hearing do not contradict this testimony and,
therefore, we find that States was not questioned by police
during that period of time. The government's witnesses also
testified that while at the station, States never requested an
attorney or expressed an intent to remain silent. States
disagrees. Again, we find the testimony of the government's
witnesses credible and find that States did not request an
attorney or express an intent to remain silent while at the
station. At approximately 1 p.m. on October 9, 2002, Detective Johnson
escorted States from the witness room to a conference room at the
police station. Agent Hardgrave, Agent Schulte and Assistant
States Attorney Tony Garcia were already in the conference room
when Detective Johnson and States arrived. The individuals
introduced themselves to States and then Agent Schulte read
States his Miranda rights for the first time since he was taken
into custody that day. Thereafter, Agent Schulte gave States the
Interrogation Advice of Rights form. States read the form and
signed the Waiver section at 1:09 p.m. according to the time on
the form.*fn5 (Government's Ex. 2) Thereafter, the law
enforcement officers, for the first time, began interrogating
States. As a result of the interrogation, States made
incriminating statements which he now seeks to suppress.
The only issue before this Court is the alleged violation of
States' Fifth Amendment right to be free from compelled
self-incrimination while subject to custodial
interrogation.*fn6 The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
protects against compelled self-incrimination. In Miranda v.
Arizona, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of compelled
self-incrimination in the context of custodial interrogation,
finding that "without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation . . .
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where
he would not otherwise do so freely." 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
To combat the inherent pressures custodial interrogation
presents, the Miranda Court established "a `series of
recommended `procedural safeguards' . . . [that] were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory
self-incrimination was protected.'" Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
443-44 (1974)). Those procedural safeguards include "the now
familiar Miranda warnings namely, that the defendant be
informed `that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires'." Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980) (quoting Miranda, 438 U.S. at 479). These
rights are only necessary in the context of custodial
interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
Because a person's right to Miranda safeguards is limited to
the context of custodial interrogation, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly addressed what constitutes custodial interrogation,
initially defining it as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." Id. Later, the Supreme Court refined the definition
stating that it "must reflect a measure of compulsion above and
beyond that inherent in custody itself." Innis, 446 U.S. at
300-01. Ultimately, the Court found that interrogation under
Miranda "refers not only to express questioning, but also to
any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."
Id. "A practice that the police should know is reasonably
likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus
amounts to interrogation." Id. at 301.
With a refined definition of interrogation in place, courts
began to recognize situations in which Miranda protections do
not apply. For example, a defendant is not entitled to Miranda
protections when subject to "routine booking" questions because
they are not designed to elicit incriminating responses.
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600-601 (1990). Booking
questions include inquiries regarding a defendant's "name,
address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current
age." Id. at 600.
Additionally, because Miranda warnings are a prophylactic
measure created by the Court to prevent the inherently compelling
pressure created by custodial interrogation, they only attach in
that context. United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 339 (7th
Cir. 1994). A person cannot anticipatorily invoke his Miranda
rights. Id. at 340. "[I]n order for a defendant to invoke his
Miranda rights the authorities must be conducting
interrogation, or interrogation must be imminent." Id.
(relying on McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n. 3 (1991)
("We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his
Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than
`custodial interrogation'.").*fn7 States' Verified Motion to Suppress
Now that we have outlined the law applicable to States' motion
to suppress, we analyze whether there are any facts to support
his argument that his post-arrest statements were obtained ...