The opinion of the court was delivered by: AMY J. ST. EVE, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Pamela Austin-Edwards filed a three count First Amended
Complaint ("FAC") against Loyola University Medical Center ("Loyola"),
alleging that Loyola violated her civil rights under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Loyola discriminated against her on
the basis of her race. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Loyola
breached an implied and constructive contract by failing to provide
Plaintiff with a non-hostile work environment. In Count III, Plaintiff
alleges that Loyola intentionally inflicted emotional distress on
Plaintiff. Loyola moved for summary judgment on all counts. For the
reasons stated herein, summary judgment is granted in favor of Loyola on
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine
issue of triable fact exists only if "the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Pugh v.
City of Attica, 259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986)).
"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 So. Ct. at 2510, The party seeking summary
judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any genuine issue of
material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23,
106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A party will successfully oppose summary
judgment only if it presents "definite, competent evidence to rebut the
motion." Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Roebuck & Co.,
233 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2000). The Court "considers the evidentiary
record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draws all
reasonable inferences in his favor." Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.,
282 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 2002).
The Court first addresses Plaintiff's failure to comply with the
requirements of Local Rule 56.1, which governs summary judgment briefing
in the Northern District of Illinois. L.R. 56.1. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3)
requires the moving party to provide a "statement of material facts as to
which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that
entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law." L.R.
56.1(a)(3). The opposing party must then file a "supporting memorandum of
law," L.R. 56.1(b)(2), and "a concise response to the movant's statement"
that includes, inter alia, "a response to each numbered paragraph in the
moving party's statement." L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(A). "All material facts set forth in the [Rule 56.1]
statement . . . will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the
statement of the opposing party." L.R.56.1(b)(3)(B). The opposing party
may file a separate "statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs,
of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment."
Plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 in several
respects. First, Plaintiff responded to only a fraction of Loyola's 99
statements of fact.*fn1 The statements in Plaintiff's response include
impermissible argument, conclusory statements, and additional,
nonresponsive information that belongs, if anywhere, in a separate
statement of additional material facts pursuant to Local Rule
56.1(b)(3)(B). Second, Plaintiff failed to file a memorandum of law in
opposition to summary judgment. Finally, Plaintiff submitted several
typewritten pages in which Plaintiff makes numerous statements. (R.
46-1, Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Resp.) There is no indication, however, that
Plaintiff made these statements under oath subject to penalty of
perjury. Moreover, Plaintiff cites no record evidence in support of any of
Accordingly, the Court will deem admitted each of Loyola's statements
of material fact that is supported by the record to which Plaintiff
failed to respond. Fischer v. Ameritech, No. 98 C 7470, 2002 WL 1949726,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2002). Although this Court is mindful of
Plaintiff's unrepresented status, "[e]ven pro se litigants must follow
the rules." Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., No. 00 C 5578, 2002 WL 1285797, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. June 11, 2002) (deeming facts admitted where pro se Plaintiff's submission did not conform to Local Rule 56.1).*fn2
Plaintiff's failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1, however, does not
result in an automatic grant of summary judgment in favor of Loyola. The
Court still must evaluate all facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, the non-moving party. O'Donnell v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C
1847, 2003 WL 22339285, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct, 14, 2003).
I. Plaintiff's Employment At Loyola
Loyola hired Plaintiff, an African American, as a part-time Patient
Transporter in 1999. (R. 40-1, Def.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14.) In 2001,
Plaintiff applied for and received a position as a part-time Visitor
Control Liaison in the Maternity/Newborn Unit. (Id.) A Visitor Control
Liaison staffs the front desk, oversees visitors, and monitors the
newborns in the unit. (Id. ¶ 17.)
Christine Murphy, the Nurse Manager for the Maternity/Newborn Unit,
hired Plaintiff as a Visitor Control Liaison and served as Plaintiff's
direct supervisor. (Id. ¶ 15.) Murphy had ultimate authority to set the
work schedules for the Visitor Control Liaisons. (Id. ¶ 21.) Loyola told
the Visitor Control Liaisons that their work schedules were not final
until Murphy posted the final schedule. (Id.) The posted work schedule
for the period from December 2, 2001 through January 12, 2002 was a
"Holiday Schedule" and had a separate Notice attached to it directing
Visitor Control Liaisons to "not make any plans based on the requested
Schedule," and to "[p]lease wait for the approved copy to be posted."
(Id. ¶ 22.) II. Plaintiff Failed To Work Her Assigned Shift
Murphy initially assigned Plaintiff to work from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30
p.m. on December 24, 2001. On or about December 21, 2001, Murphy posted
the final work schedule in which she reassigned Plaintiff to work from
3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff did not work her assigned
shift. (Id. ¶ 30.) Rather, Plaintiff switched her shift with another
employee and worked from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. on December 24, 2001.
(Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff did not notify Murphy of the switch and did not
obtain Murphy's prior approval before working a different shift than the
one Murphy assigned to her. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.)
On December 27, 2001, Murphy issued Plaintiff a verbal warning for
failing to work her assigned shift and for failing to notify Murphy and
to obtain prior approval before working a different shift. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39.)
During this meeting, Plaintiff told Murphy that she was dissatisfied with
her job and that she was resigning. (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff filled out and