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June 2, 2004.


The opinion of the court was delivered by: AMY J. ST. EVE, District Judge


Plaintiff Pamela Austin-Edwards filed a three count First Amended Complaint ("FAC") against Loyola University Medical Center ("Loyola"), alleging that Loyola violated her civil rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Loyola discriminated against her on the basis of her race. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Loyola breached an implied and constructive contract by failing to provide Plaintiff with a non-hostile work environment. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Loyola intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiff. Loyola moved for summary judgment on all counts. For the reasons stated herein, summary judgment is granted in favor of Loyola on all counts.


 I. Summary Judgment

  Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of triable fact exists only if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Pugh v. City of Attica, 259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986)). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 So. Ct. at 2510, The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A party will successfully oppose summary judgment only if it presents "definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2000). The Court "considers the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in his favor." Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 2002).

 II. Local Rule 56.1

  The Court first addresses Plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56.1, which governs summary judgment briefing in the Northern District of Illinois. L.R. 56.1. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires the moving party to provide a "statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law." L.R. 56.1(a)(3). The opposing party must then file a "supporting memorandum of law," L.R. 56.1(b)(2), and "a concise response to the movant's statement" that includes, inter alia, "a response to each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement." L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(A). "All material facts set forth in the [Rule 56.1] statement . . . will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party." L.R.56.1(b)(3)(B). The opposing party may file a separate "statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment." Id.

  Plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 in several respects. First, Plaintiff responded to only a fraction of Loyola's 99 statements of fact.*fn1 The statements in Plaintiff's response include impermissible argument, conclusory statements, and additional, nonresponsive information that belongs, if anywhere, in a separate statement of additional material facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B). Second, Plaintiff failed to file a memorandum of law in opposition to summary judgment. Finally, Plaintiff submitted several typewritten pages in which Plaintiff makes numerous statements. (R. 46-1, Pl.'s Rule 56.1 Resp.) There is no indication, however, that Plaintiff made these statements under oath subject to penalty of perjury. Moreover, Plaintiff cites no record evidence in support of any of these statements.

  Accordingly, the Court will deem admitted each of Loyola's statements of material fact that is supported by the record to which Plaintiff failed to respond. Fischer v. Ameritech, No. 98 C 7470, 2002 WL 1949726, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2002). Although this Court is mindful of Plaintiff's unrepresented status, "[e]ven pro se litigants must follow the rules." Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., No. 00 C 5578, 2002 WL 1285797, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2002) (deeming facts admitted where pro se Plaintiff's submission did not conform to Local Rule 56.1).*fn2

  Plaintiff's failure to comply with Local Rule 56.1, however, does not result in an automatic grant of summary judgment in favor of Loyola. The Court still must evaluate all facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. O'Donnell v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 1847, 2003 WL 22339285, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct, 14, 2003).


 I. Plaintiff's Employment At Loyola

  Loyola hired Plaintiff, an African American, as a part-time Patient Transporter in 1999. (R. 40-1, Def.'s Rule 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14.) In 2001, Plaintiff applied for and received a position as a part-time Visitor Control Liaison in the Maternity/Newborn Unit. (Id.) A Visitor Control Liaison staffs the front desk, oversees visitors, and monitors the newborns in the unit. (Id. ¶ 17.)

  Christine Murphy, the Nurse Manager for the Maternity/Newborn Unit, hired Plaintiff as a Visitor Control Liaison and served as Plaintiff's direct supervisor. (Id. ¶ 15.) Murphy had ultimate authority to set the work schedules for the Visitor Control Liaisons. (Id. ¶ 21.) Loyola told the Visitor Control Liaisons that their work schedules were not final until Murphy posted the final schedule. (Id.) The posted work schedule for the period from December 2, 2001 through January 12, 2002 was a "Holiday Schedule" and had a separate Notice attached to it directing Visitor Control Liaisons to "not make any plans based on the requested Schedule," and to "[p]lease wait for the approved copy to be posted." (Id. ¶ 22.) II. Plaintiff Failed To Work Her Assigned Shift

  Murphy initially assigned Plaintiff to work from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. on December 24, 2001. On or about December 21, 2001, Murphy posted the final work schedule in which she reassigned Plaintiff to work from 3:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff did not work her assigned shift. (Id. ¶ 30.) Rather, Plaintiff switched her shift with another employee and worked from 7:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. on December 24, 2001. (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff did not notify Murphy of the switch and did not obtain Murphy's prior approval before working a different shift than the one Murphy assigned to her. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.)

  On December 27, 2001, Murphy issued Plaintiff a verbal warning for failing to work her assigned shift and for failing to notify Murphy and to obtain prior approval before working a different shift. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39.) During this meeting, Plaintiff told Murphy that she was dissatisfied with her job and that she was resigning. (Id. ¶ 45.) Plaintiff filled out and signed ...

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