The opinion of the court was delivered by: CHARLES KOCORAS, District Judge
This matter comes before the court on Third-Party Defendant James
McHugh Construction Company's ("McHugh") motion to dismiss, or in the
alternative, to stay the complaint of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff
Trinity Roofing Service, Inc. ("Trinity") and to compel arbitration. For
the reasons set forth below, the motion to stay is granted.
McHugh is the general contractor on a construction project in Chicago
(the "Project"). On March 8, 2001, McHugh contracted Trinity to provide
roofing services for the Project (the "Subcontract"), including the
furnishing of a zinc. metal roofing system and accompanying shop drawings. On August 19, 2002, Trinity
sent Plaintiff Umicore Building Products USA, Inc. (Umicore) a purchase
order for Umicore to deliver shop drawings and to fabricate roofing
materials for Trinity's use on the Project (the "Purchase Order"). On
November 12, 2003, Umicore, a Delaware corporation based in North
Carolina, filed a complaint in this court against Trinity, an Illinois
corporation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Umicore's complaint
alleges five counts of breach of contract under Illinois law, claiming
that it fully performed under the terms of the Purchase Order and that
Trinity has not paid for its services.
On February 9, 2004, Trinity filed a third-party complaint against
McHugh, seeking to indemnify McHugh for any resulting judgment in favor
of Umicore. Trinity's third-party complaint against McHugh also alleges
breach of contract. On March 17, 2004, McHugh notified Trinity of its
election to arbitrate their dispute pursuant to a binding arbitration
clause contained in the Subcontract. On the same day, McHugh also filed
the present motion to stay Trinity's third party complaint and compel
The Subcontract's arbitration clause provides: "Any dispute between
[Trinity] and [McHugh] shall, at [McHugh's] sole option, be decided (1)
by arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association or (2) by litigation in any
appropriate court located in Chicago, Illinois." McHugh ex. A, Art. 23.
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.,
indicates a strong federal policy in favor of the enforcement of private
arbitration agreements. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1987). According to the FAA, a
written agreement to arbitrate "in a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v.
Mercury Construction, 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). Where a contract
includes an arbitration clause, the clause creates a presumption that
the dispute should be arbitrated, unless the party opposing arbitration
can show that the clause is incapable of an interpretation that could
cover the dispute at hand. AT & T Technologies, Inc. v.
Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986).
Based on the clear language of the clause, we find the Subcontract's
arbitration provision binding as to Trinity. Trinity does not object to
the enforceability of the Subcontract's arbitration clause and requests that we stay its
third-party complaint against McHugh. Trinity also requests leave to file
a motion to compel arbitration against Umicore pursuant to the terms of
the Purchase Order. However, the only present issue for this opinion is
the McHugh-Trinity arbitration provision, so any discussion of Umicore's
purported obligation to arbitrate is inappropriate at this time.
Based on the foregoing analysis, McHugh's motion to stay the
proceedings and compel arbitration is granted, but only as to Trinity's
third-party complaint. Trinity is granted leave to ...