The opinion of the court was delivered by: AMY J. ST. EVE, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Harrah's Illinois Corporation's ("Harrah's") employees
detained Plaintiff Johnny Green on the night of May 7, 2002 after he
allegedly urinated on the floor of the casino. After Harrah's detained
him in a holding cell, Joliet police officers arrested Plaintiff and took
him to the Joliet Police Department, where he was held and released in
less than an hour. Plaintiff filed an eight-count complaint, alleging
violations of state and federal law, against Defendants Harrah's, Sherry
Torrens, Tony Capretti, Charles Andrews, the City of Joliet, Officer Richard Olson, and Officer Tomas Ponce.*fn1 Defendants Harrah's,
Torrens, and Capretti moved for summary judgment on all remaining counts.
For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion is granted with
respect to Counts V and VI(a).*fn2 The Court dismisses Plaintiff's
remaining state-law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On May 7, 2002, Sherry Torrens was working as a cocktail waitress in
the slot machine area at Harrah's Joliet Casino in Joliet, Illinois. Tony
Capretti was working as a security guard, and Chuck Andrews was working
as the security shift manager, managing Capretti.
While cleaning in the slot machine area that evening, Torrens observed
Mr. Green urinating on the casino carpet. Torrens walked around the slot
machines in order to verify her observation and to be sure Green was not
spilling or pouring out a drink. A few seconds later, from a different
vantage point, Torrens noted that the stream of urine was still flowing.
Torrens concluded that Green was urinating on the carpet.
Torrens notified Tony Capretti, who was stationed in her area, that she
had observed a patron urinating in the casino. When Capretti went to the area Torrens had
observed Plaintiff urinating, Plaintiff and his wife were no longer
there. Torrens identified Plaintiff as an African-American man in his
late forties wearing a blue shirt and accompanied by a woman, Capretti
observed a dark spot on the carpet where Torrens indicated the urination
had occurred. Observing the liquid on a towel, Capretti concluded that it
looked like urine. Torrens went downstairs to make a written statement
about the incident.
A Harrah's security guard informed Charles "Chuck" Andrews of the
situation. Andrews approached Plaintiff and, after speaking with Torrens,
escorted him from the casino floor. Andrews informed Plaintiff that a
witness had seen him urinating on the floor. Andrews took Plaintiff
downstairs and placed him in a holding cell before calling Joliet police.
Officer Richard Olson arrived and spoke with Torrens. He found her to be
a credible witness, and subsequently placed Plaintiff under arrest.
Because Olson's vehicle was not appropriate for custody of detainees,
Officer Tomas Ponce came to Harrah's to take Plaintiff to the police
Harrah's video surveillance of the incident shows only that Harrah's
employees had approached Plaintiff, taken him downstairs, and held him in
a small room until the police arrived. The video does not show Plaintiff
urinating on the casino floor.
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of triable fact exists only if "the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party." Pugh v. City of Attica, 259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510
(1986)). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of
establishing the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). A
party will successfully oppose summary judgment only if it presents
"definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. Roebuck & Co., 233 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2000).
The Court "considers the evidentiary record in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in his
favor." Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir.
II. Local Rules and Standing Orders
Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B) requires a party opposing summary judgment to
file a statement containing "a response to each numbered paragraph in the
moving party's statement," and warns that "[a]ll material facts set forth
in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be
admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party."
Plaintiff cited this rule and then ignored it. Claiming that Defendants'
organization and presentation of fact made it "impossible" for Plaintiff
to present his responses as required by the rule, Plaintiff did not even
attempt to respond with any specificity to Defendants' statement of
facts. Instead, Plaintiff filed a statement of 242 additional facts,
giving no indication of which statements correspond to any particular
statement of fact by Defendant. Defendant's statements of fact were not
improper under Rule 56.1, and Plaintiff was bound by the rules of ...