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U.S. v. MISIOLEK

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois


April 15, 2004.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
PIOTR MISIOLEK, Defendant

The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOHN W. DARRAH, District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are a motion to reconsider and a motion to dismiss the indictment filed by Defendant, Piotr Misiolek, and a motion to reconsider filed by the Government. The motions to reconsider relate to the Court's ruling dated January 22, 2004; whereby, the Court granted Defendant's Motion to Quash Arrest and granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence.

The factual background of this case is fully detailed in the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated January 22, 2004. Therefore, the Court will not restate the facts.

  Misiolek seeks reconsideration of the Court's finding that certain items that were rediscovered in a subsequent legal search were not suppressed pursuant to the independent source doctrine.

  Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function of correcting clear errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence which could not have been adduced during the pendency of the underlying motion. See United States v. Dombrowski, 1994 WL 577259 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 1994) (Dombrowski). Although the Rules of Criminal Procedure make no provisions for a motion to reconsider, the propriety of such motions in a criminal case has been established. See Dombrowski, 1994 WL 577259 at *3.

  The Court found that the items that were rediscovered in a subsequent legal search were not suppressed pursuant to the independent source doctrine. The Court found that the Government met its burden of establishing the two-part test used to determine whether the evidence was obtained by independent lawful means. See United States v. May, 214 F.3d 900, 906 (7th Cir. 2000). Misiolek presents no evidence that there was a clear error of law or facts and presents no newly discovered evidence. Accordingly, Misiolek's motion to reconsider is denied.

  The Government seeks reconsideration of the Court's ruling that the ecstacy pills recovered from Misiolek's residence are suppressed and may not be introduced as evidence.

  In its previous Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court suppressed the pills after finding that the pills were seized from Misiolek's residence following Misiolek's illegal arrest. At the time of the previous motions, the Government conceded that given the timing of the warrantless entry, the timing of the Miranda waiver, and the executed consent to search, the post-arrest statements made by the Defendant and the pills recovered during the consent search must be suppressed if the warrantless arrest was found to be unlawful. Now, the Government seeks to have the Court reconsider its previous Order, arguing that the pills recovered from the residence should not be suppressed pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Government concedes that it previously failed to present this argument.

  The Government's new argument does not constitute a clear error of law or facts, and it fails to present newly discovered evidence. Accordingly, the Government's motion to reconsider is denied. See Granite State Ins. Co. v. Degerlia, 925 F.2d 189, 192 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1991) (party cannot raise new legal theory in motion to reconsider). Misiolek also seeks the dismissal of the indictment against him based on the Court's finding that Misiolek's probable cause hearing that did not occur until 5 days after his arrest and 4 days after the second complaint constituted a violation of the standards set forth in Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). While the Court found the delay in bringing Misiolek before a magistrate to determine probable cause violated the rule articulated m McLaughlin, the Court denied suppressing evidence for this violation because none of the evidence that Misiolek sought to suppress was obtained pursuant to the McLaughlin violation.

  Now, Misiolek seeks to have the indictment against him dismissed as a sanction for the McLaughlin rule violation. Misiolek does not identify any prejudice that arose from the McLaughlin rule violation, and this Court previously found that suppression of evidence was not an appropriate sanction because none of the evidence that Misiolek sought to suppress was obtained pursuant to the McLaughlin rule violation. Accordingly, dismissal of the indictment is not the appropriate remedy for the McLaughlin rule violation. See United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587, 590-92 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding suppression of evidence was not the proper remedy for the McLaughlin rule violation — instead — a Bivens claim was the possible remedy for a McLaughlin rule violation); see also, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975) (a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause).

  For the foregoing reasons, Misiolek's Motion to Reconsider — and Motion to Dismiss the Indictment are denied. The Government's Motion to Reconsider is also denied.

20040415

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