Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County Honorable Thomas M. Tucker, Judge Presiding
 The opinion of the court was delivered by: Presiding Justice O'mara Frossard
 After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of the first degree murders of Ruben Pulido and Mark Lopez. Defendant was 16 years old at the time of the double homicide. The trial court sentenced defendant to natural life in prison. On appeal defendant contends as follows: (1) he was denied effective representation by counsel because his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his statements; and (2) he was denied a fair trial because he was precluded from using compulsion as a defense. We affirm.
 On June 29, 2000, the victims, Ruben Pulido and Mark Lopez, were playing basketball with their friends. Both boys were 13 years old. Around 10 p.m. Pulido and Lopez joined their friends on Arturo Nurgaray's front porch at 1639 South 58th Court. A boy on a bike rode up and told the group on the porch that "this was Rocho's hood." Nurgaray said "we don't care" and told the boy not to "disrespect" in front of his house. The boy threw down his bike and yelled to defendant to "light 'em up." Defendant, who was directly across the street, pulled a gun and began firing at the porch. Defendant and the other boy on the bike rode off. Pulido and Lopez died from gunshots. Various witnesses were able to identify Juan Casillas as the boy on the bike who told the shooter to "light 'em up." Casillas was arrested on June 30, 2000. The police investigation led to the arrest of defendant also on June 30, 2000.
 Medical examiner Dr. An concluded that both Lopez and Pulido died from gunshot wounds to the back. Firearms expert Kurt Zielinski analyzed two bullet fragments from the crime scene. Both bullets were .22 caliber and Zielinski came to the inconclusive finding that both bullets were fired from the same gun.
 Assistant State's Attorney Peter Troy arrived at the police station shortly after 10 p.m. on June 30, 2000. Troy told defendant they were trying to contact his mother. At around 3 a.m., when defendant's mother arrived at the police station, Troy told her that her son was a suspect in a double homicide. Troy told her that he wanted to speak with defendant with her present. Defendant's mother, Troy, and Detective Rudy Sirgedas, the youth officer, were present for the interview with defendant, which lasted about 15 minutes. After the interview, defendant agreed to give a videotaped statement.
 In his statement defendant related that as he and Casillas pulled up at 58th Court, they saw a group of people. Casillas was on his bike and started talking gang slogans. Casillas gave defendant the order to "light these motherfuckers up." Defendant stated that he got off his bike and shot four times toward the porch where the people were sitting. Then he and Casillas got on their bikes and rode away.
 The defense called Detective Sirgedas as a witness. He explained the requirements of becoming a youth officer and described what he did on behalf of defendant. He explained that a youth officer notifies parents when a juvenile is in custody, ensures that the juvenile is not mistreated, and ensures the juvenile is kept away from adult offenders. He testified that he was involved in the case, both as a detective and as a youth officer. He stated that he investigated this case as a detective, but acted as a youth officer during the interview of defendant. The defense rested.
 Defendant was found guilty of the first degree murders of Mark Lopez and Ruben Pulido. Defendant's motion for new trial was denied. The trial court sentenced defendant to natural life in prison. This appeal followed.
 INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
 Defendant argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his statement. The issue is whether defense counsel's performance was deficient and if there is a reasonable probability that his deficient performance affected the outcome of trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). In the context of this case, in order to prevail on the issue of ineffectiveness, the defendant must demonstrate the following: (1) the motion would have been granted; and (2) the outcome of the trial would have been different had the evidence been suppressed. People v. Morris, 229 Ill. App. 3d 144, 157 (1992).
 In the instant case, if the motion were granted, defendant would have been found not guilty because his statements provided the evidence of his guilt. None of the witnesses identified defendant as being involved in the shooting. In the context of this case, the outcome of the trial would have been different had a motion to suppress statements been granted by the trial court. We, therefore, focus our analysis on whether the motion to suppress would have been granted if filed by trial counsel.
 In determining the voluntariness of a confession, the court considers the totality of the circumstances including the defendant's age, intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, education, physical condition, experience with the criminal justice system, legality of the detention, duration of the detention, duration of questioning, promises, threats, deceit, and physical or mental abuse by police. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500-01 (1996). Additional factors are considered important in determining the voluntariness of a confession by a juvenile, including whether a parent or other interested adult was present. No one factor is dispositive.
 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 requires a law enforcement officer who takes a juvenile into custody to immediately make reasonable efforts to notify the parent and, without unnecessary delay, to take the juvenile to the nearest juvenile police officer. 705 ILCS 405/5-405 (West 2000). The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized that because taking a juvenile's confession is a sensitive concern, the greatest care must be taken to assure the confession was not coerced or suggested and that " ` "it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair." ' [Citations.]" In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 54 (2000). The absence of a parent or youth officer is one factor to consider. Regarding voluntariness, of critical ...