The opinion of the court was delivered by: WILLIAM J. HIBBLER, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
After a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, petitioner,
Anthony Guest ("Guest"), was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.
After his direct and post-conviction appeals failed, Guest petitioned
this court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
On January 11, 2003, former Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted
Guest's death sentence to natural life in prison without the possibility
of parole. Before this court is Guest's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus amended after the commutation of his death sentence. For the
reasons stated below, the court denies Guest's habeas petition in its
entirety.
Following a bench trial before Judge Maurice Pompey in the Circuit
Court of Court County, Illinois, Guest was convicted of the murder of
John Geever, attempted murder, aggravated battery and two counts of
unlawful weapons use. At a separate sentencing hearing, Judge Pompey
found Guest eligible for the death penalty on the grounds that Guest had
been convicted of a prior California murder, which is a statutory
aggravating circumstance. Judge Pompey concluded that there were no
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mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death
penalty, and therefore sentenced Guest to death.*fn1
Guest filed a direct appeal with the Illinois Supreme Court, which
upheld Guest's conviction and death sentence on December 19, 1986. People
v. Guest, 503 N.E.2d 255 (1986) (Guest I). Guest then filed a
post-conviction petition with the Circuit Court of Cook County. On March
11, 1992, the Cook County Circuit Court granted the State's motion to
dismiss Guest's post-conviction petition. The Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed the Circuit Court's dismissal of Guest's post-conviction
petition on May 18, 1995. People v. Guest, 655 N.E, 2d 873 (1995) (Guest
II). On April 16, 1997, Guest filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in this court.
The following facts, which Guest does not challenge, are drawn from the
Illinois Supreme Court's ruling on Guest's direct and post-conviction
appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Mahaffey v. Schomig, 294 F.3d 907, 915
(7th Cir. 2002) (unless a habeas petitioner provides clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, a determination of a factual issue by a state
court is presumed correct for the purposes of habeas review). On February
5, 1981, Guest entered a Chicago grocery store with friend, John Marlow.
Ferris King, a security guard, observed Guest place toothpaste and a
toothbrush in his pocket. King approached Guest, identified himself, and
asked Guest to accompany him to his office located in the basement of the
building. Guest complied. When the two men arrived at the office, Guest
confronted King with a handgun.
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Guest then led King from the office to an employee's cafeteria also
located in the basement. Three employees Joanne Bailey, Marlean
Washington, and Gary Henderson were in the cafeteria when the two
men entered. When two of the employees attempted to flee, Guest began
firing in their direction. King then reached for his gun, exchanged
several shots with Guest, and was hit once in the shoulder. Guest then
fled down a south corridor, up a flight of stairs, and out the store's
front door. King chased Guest but abandoned his pursuit upon finding John
Geever, another employee, wounded and lying in the south corridor. Geever
subsequently died of a gunshot wound. After the shooting, King detained
Marlow, the individual who accompanied Guest to the store. Marlow
provided the police with information that established Guest's identity as
the gunman.
At trial, Bailey testified that she saw Geever exit the cafeteria
shortly before King and Guest arrived. The parities stipulated that if
Washington were to testify she would state that she was in the cafeteria
with Baily and Henderson when Guest fired the first shot. The parties
also stipulated that on the day after the shooting, employees Henderson,
King, Bailey, and Washington identified Guest's picture from a photo
array, and that King and Washington identified Guest from a lineup before
trial. The parties also stipulated that the bullet recovered from
Geever's body was not fired from King's gun.
II. MOOT SENTENCING CLAIMS
On January 11, 2003, former Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted
Guest's death sentence to natural life in prison without the possibility
of parole. Since Guest's commutation, the Illinois Supreme Court has
issued decisions on direct appeal and modified decisions on the denial of
rehearing in other capital cases. In each case, the Illinois Supreme
Court concluded that former Governor Ryan's commutation of the
defendant's death sentence rendered moot any capital sentencing claims.
See, e.g., People v. Ceja, 204 Ill.2d 332 (2003) (commutation removes
judicially
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imposed sentence replacing it with a lesser, executively imposed
sentence); People v. Lucas, 203 IIL2d 410 (2003) (same); People v. Miller,
203 IIL2d 433 (2003) (same). The Seventh Circuit has similarly decided
the issue. See, e.g., Wilson v. Mote, No. 03-1943, slip. op. at 1 (7th
Cir. June 18, 2003) (commutation mooted prisoner's habeas claims based on
his death sentence). Accordingly, Guest has amended his habeas petition
to delete the claims challenging his death sentence and leaves only two
claims for the court to address, each relating to the guilt phase of
Guest's trial. The court considers the merits of these claims under the
following standards.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA"), a habeas petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus
unless the challenged state court decision is either "contrary to" or "an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined
by the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1); see also
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000). A state court's decision
is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court law "if the state
court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Court on a
question of law" or "if the state court confronts facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and
arrives at a result opposite to ours." Id. at 404. To demonstrate an
"unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law, a habeas
petitioner must establish that the state court unreasonably applied the
controlling legal rule to the facts of the case. Id. at 407. Moreover,
the state court's unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent
must be more than ...