Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.


March 22, 2004.

In re: RESOURCE TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, Debtor; PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ex rel LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Appellant, and STRYKER INTERNATIONAL, INC., Plaintiff, V. RESOURCE TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/Appellee

The opinion of the court was delivered by: WAYNE ANDERSEN, District Judge


This case is before the Court on plaintiff-appellant the State of Illinois* appeal from a decision rendered by the United States Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Illinois in which the Honorable Eugene R. Wedoff denied the State of Illinois' motion to dismiss certain of Resource Technology, Inc.'s counterclaims against the State based on sovereign immunity. For the following reasons, the decision of the bankruptcy court is affirmed. Page 2


  Resource Technology Corporation ("RTC") is in the business of extracting methane gas from landfills. After extracting the gas from the landfills, RTC either bums off the gas it collects or, in some instances, uses the gas to power engines located at the landfills from which energy is generated and sold. RTC does not own the landfills. Rather, it contracts with landfill owners to extract the gas. On December 21, 1995, RTC entered into a contract with Stryker International, Inc. in which Stryker assigned to RTC the right to extract methane gas at the Paxton Landfill and to sell the gas in exchange for royalties.

  Prior to entering into a contract with RTC, Stryker and various affiliates and related parties owning and operating the Paxton Landfill were sued by the State of Illinois to remedy numerous violations of Illinois environmental laws at the landfill. Thereafter, on August 25, 1997, Stryker notified RTC that their contract was terminated because of the parties' inability to obtain the required permits and licenses for a gas collection facility.

  On May 18, 1998, the State entered into a consent order with Stryker, Paxton Landfill Corporation and the beneficial owner of the trust that owns the real estate in which Stryker admitted to certain environmental violations. The consent order required, among other things, that Stryker assign the Paxton Landfill gas rights to the State, including the option to select the party who would provide methane gas extraction services at the landfill and the right to any proceeds from the sale of methane gas at the landfill.

  On November 15, 1999, an involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against RTC pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On February 1, 2000, RTC consented to an order converting the case to one under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On December 13, 2000, Page 3 the State and Stryker filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the bankruptcy court seeking a declaration that the contract between RTC and Stryker had terminated. RTC answered the complaint and filed affirmative defenses and counterclaims against both the State and Stryker. RTC denied that the contract had terminated and alleged that the 1997 notification of termination was neither timely nor in accordance with the terms of the contract. Also, in Count IV of its counterclaim, RTC alleged conversion of property by the State. Specifically, RTC alleged that the State had taken unauthorized control of RTC's property rights in the Paxton Landfill and sought damages as a result of the alleged conversion of RTC's property.

  On April 17, 2002, the bankruptcy court entered an order finding that the contract between RTC and Stryker had not terminated and remained in effect. Almost a year later, the State filed a motion for summary judgment on RTC's conversion counterclaim. On March 4, 2003, the bankruptcy court denied the State's motion for summary judgment. RTC then sought leave to file another counterclaim (Count V) against the State for tortious interference with RTC's contractual rights. The State objected on the grounds that the proposed counterclaim was untimely, would cause undue delay, and would prejudice the State. Over the State's objections, the bankruptcy court permitted RTC to file its amended counterclaim.

  Then, on May 3, 2003, the State filed a motion to dismiss Counts IV and V of RTC's counterclaims on the ground that they were barred by the Eleventh Amendment principles of sovereign immunity. In response to the State's motion to dismiss, RTC argued that the State had waived any claim of sovereign immunity by voluntarily availing itself of federal jurisdiction in bringing its declaratory judgment action in the bankruptcy court and through its litigation conduct. Page 4

  On June 26, 2003, the bankruptcy court denied the State's motion to dismiss, holding that the State had waived its sovereignty immunity in two ways. First, the State had waived its sovereign immunity by voluntarily invoking federal jurisdiction through the filing of its declaratory judgment action and by seeking a ruling on the merits of RTC's counterclaim for conversion. Second, both the Illinois Department of Revenue and the Department of Employment Security had filed proofs of claim in the RTC bankruptcy proceeding and by filing those proofs of claim, the State submitted to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction for purposes of collecting those claims and waived its sovereign immunity as to any amounts owed by the State that could be offsets to the claims. The State now appeals the bankruptcy court's decision to deny its motion to dismiss.


  This Court has jurisdiction over the State's appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), which vests a district court with jurisdiction over appeals from "final judgments, orders and decrees" of the bankruptcy court. Acting as an appellate court, we are bound to accept the bankruptcy court's findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous, and may only consider evidence presented before the bankruptcy court and made part of the record. In re Home Comp. Care, Inc., 221 B.R. 202, 205 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing In re Lefkas Gen. Partners, 112 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1997)); In the Matter of Neis, 723 F.2d 584, 588-89 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing F.R.Bankr.P. 8013). However, we review any questions of law de novo. In the Matter of UNR Indus., Inc., 986 F.2d 207, 208 (7th Cir. 1993).

  The issue on appeal is whether the State waived its sovereign immunity as to the counterclaims filed by RTC through its litigation conduct in the bankruptcy court. The Page 5 bankruptcy court initially recognized that the State acknowledges that it had waived its sovereign immunity as to its own claims in the adversary action. However, the State disputed that it had waived its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity as to RTC's counterclaims by bringing the declaratory judgment action in this case, or by moving for summary judgment on Count IV of RTC's counterclaim for conversion.

  The bankruptcy court first considered whether the counterclaims filed by RTC were compulsory counterclaims or permissive, noting that if the counterclaims were compulsory then the State's sovereign immunity would be deemed waived. The bankruptcy court determined, and we agree, that RTC's counterclaims were permissive and therefore the State did not waive its immunity when it pursued the adversary action. In reaching this conclusion, the bankruptcy court correctly recognized that the adversary action involved resolution of whether the RTC/Stryker contract remained in effect while the counterclaims asserted by RTC arose out of the consent order entered into between Stryker and the State. Thus, the ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.