The opinion of the court was delivered by: HARRY LEINENWEBER, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Trish Wiggen (hereinafter, "Wiggen"), pro se, has brought
suit against defendant Leggett & Platt, Inc. (hereinafter, "Leggett")
alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (a)(3),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or
29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 12203.
Leggett moves to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
8(a)(2), 12(b)(6) and 12(f).
As Wiggen is a pro se plaintiff, the Court construes her complaint
liberally. McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7th Cir.
2000). After reviewing her amended complaint, the Court determines that
Wiggen really only alleges discrimination in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., (the "ADA") and
retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12203.
Although Wiggen claims to seek relief under other statutes, the Court
finds it clear from the face of the amended complaint that Wiggen does
not allege conduct that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et
seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act). To the extent that Wiggen asserts
any of these claims in her amended complaint, they are dismissed.
Wiggen was employed by Leggett & Platt from September 13, 1993
until August 31, 2001. As early as 1994, Wiggen claims that she began
suffering migraine (severe tension) headaches, and that Leggett knew of
her condition. On numerous occasions, Wiggen alleges that these headaches
severely impaired her physical abilities, such as by inducing noticeable
vomiting. As a result of these headaches, Wiggen claims she asked her
supervisor, Tina Robinson ("Robinson"), for permission to leave, but
Robinson told her to "get over it." Around the same time, Wiggen insists
that Leggett permitted another employee, who had undergone back surgery,
to lie down in the first aid room while still receiving pay.
Wiggen alleges that she complained unsuccessfully about her treatment
numerous times. In particular, Wiggen claims that on or around July 2001,
she complained to Leggett & Platt about disability discrimination,
but Leggett took no action. On
August 30, 2001, Wiggen informed Leggett & Platt officer "Mr. Zaerr"
that she had a medical condition that would require surgery, and again
complained about disability discrimination. Wiggen alleges that Zaerr
responded to this by telling her to keep personal matters out of the
office. Wiggen then wrote a letter requesting help from the Corporate
Office before leaving work on August 30, 2001. On August 31, 2001, Wiggen
Leggett states that it terminated Wiggen because she failed to get
along with others and caused frequent disruptions in the workplace.
Wiggen claims that her discharge violated a Leggett policy.
In an apparently unrelated incident, Wiggen claims that Robinson
threatened her with bodily harm on July 18, 2001. Wiggen responded to
this alleged threat by informing Leggett's Corporate Office and filing a
police report with the Batavia Police Department. Although Jeff Hugey
from the Corporate Office returned Wiggen's call at her home that
evening, he transferred her complaint to Leggett's Batavia branch office
and no action was taken.
On June 18, 2002, Wiggen filed a charge of disability discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") and the
Illinois Department of Human Rights (the "EEOC Charge"). The EEOC granted
Wiggen a right to sue letter on
December 20, 2002, and on March 20, 2003, Wiggen filed a complaint
in this Court against Leggett.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that "[a] pleading
which sets forth a claim for relief, . . . shall contain . . . (2) a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief[.]" A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests
whether the plaintiff has properly stated a claim upon which relief could
be granted, not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the
merits. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). In ruling on a
motion to dismiss, a court must construe all well-pleaded allegations of
the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. Id. A motion to dismiss will not be granted unless ...