United States District Court, N.D. Illinois
February 12, 2004.
SABRINA HARPER and OTIS EMERSON, Plaintiffs
ROBERT WILSON, TAMMY WILSON and PROFESSIONAL PROTECTION SPECIALISTS, L.L.C., Defendants
The opinion of the court was delivered by: MORTON DENLOW, Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Court conducted a two-day bench trial on January 14 and 15, 2004,
to consider the claims of Sabrina Harper ("Harper") and Otis Emerson
("Emerson") (collectively "Plaintiffs") against Robert Wilson ("Mr.
Wilson"), Tammy Wilson ("Mrs. Wilson") and Professional Protection
Specialists, L.L.C., ("Protection") (collectively "Defendants") for
overtime pay, unpaid wages and retaliatory discharge under the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Illinois Wage Payment and
Collection Act and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, The Court has carefully
considered the testimony of the six witnesses who appeared at trial, the
exhibits introduced into evidence, and the closing arguments of counsel.
The following constitute the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To
the extent certain
findings of fact may be deemed conclusions of law, they shall also
be considered conclusions of law. Similarly, to the extent matters
contained in the conclusions of law may be deemed findings of fact, they
shall also be considered findings of fact
I. ISSUES PRESENTED
This case raises the following issues regarding Harper's claims:
1) Whether Harper began work the week of December
9, 2002, or the week of December 16, 2002.
Answer: The week of December 16, 2002.
2) Whether Harper was a salaried or an hourly
employee. Answer: Salaried.
3) Whether she worked more than 40 hours per week
during her employment with Defendant. Answer:
4) Whether she was an employee or an independent
contractor. Answer: Employee.
5) If she was an employee, whether she was exempt
from overtime because she was an executive or
an administrative employee. Answer: She was
exempt as an executive employee.
This case raises the following issues regarding Emerson's claims:
1) Whether he was compensated at the rate of time
and one-half for all of the overtime he worked.
2) Whether he was terminated in retaliation for
complaints he made regarding Defendants'
failure to pay him proper overtime. Answer: No.
3) Whether Robert Wilson and Tammy Wilson were
corporate officers of Protection. Answer: Yes.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. SABRINA HARPER'S CLAIM
1. Sabrina Harper was employed by Professional Protection Specialists,
L.L.C., as a Lieutenant for less than two months. She claims that she
worked and was not paid for the week of December 9, 2002, and that she
was not paid for approximately thirty-seven hours of overtime in January
2003. Defendants contend that Harper did not commence work until the week
of December 16, 2002, that she did not work any overtime, that she was an
independent contractor, and that if she was an employee, she was exempt
from overtime as an executive or an administrative employee.
2. Harper did not begin work the week of December 9, 2002, as she
contends, but rather she began work on December 16, 2002. The Court does
not find Harper to be a credible witness. On December 9, 2002, she was in
court in connection with a foreclosure proceeding in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, Case No. 02 CH 9798. Dx 7 and Px 3 (see calendar entry for
December 9, 2002).*fn1 This is further corroborated by her failure to
claim unpaid wages for the week of December 9, 2002, in her complaint
before the Illinois Department of Labor filed on March 4, 2003, in which
she claimed unpaid wages for the period of January 16, 2003, through
January 31, 2003. Dx 3. There is no reason why she
would not have made a claim for the week of December 9, 2002, if
she believed that she was not paid for that week.
3. Harper was paid as a salaried employee on the basis of $700.00 every
pay period. The pay periods were the 1st and 15th of each month. She
received a check for $550.00 on January 15, 2003, that was reduced by
reason of the repayment of a $150.00 loan from Protection. Px 3 (check
no. 2210 dated 1/15/03 and check deduction agreement dated December 31,
2002). She received a $700.00 check on January 31, 2003. Dx 6.
4. Harper did not work more than 40 hours per week. Her purported time
sheets are self-serving and were never verified and confirmed by anyone
at the company. Px 4. In addition, her time records are totally
inconsistent with the time records maintained for her at the company. Px
5. Harper was an employee of Protection and not an independent
contractor. She was hired as a Lieutenant. She was hired to work
6. Harper was an executive employee of Protection. She was a Lieutenant
who was responsible for up to five work sites. Her duties included
supervising security operations on assignment shifts, supervising
activities and training of assigned personnel, establishing regular
inspections on all accounts and dealing with client issues. Dx 1, 5. She
also set up work schedules for guards, met with sergeants and performed
administrative duties. She did not perform any guard duties. She was part
of Protection's management. Dx 3.
B. OTIS EMERSON'S CLAIM
7. Otis Emerson was employed by Protection as a security guard from
approximately October 1, 2001, through January 15, 2003. His rate of pay
increased during that time from $7.00 per hour to $10.00 per hour.
8. Protection's time keeping procedures were as follows: once a guard
arrived at a site, he would call in to the dispatcher who would stamp in
the time. Once the replacement guard reported, the dispatcher would log
out the first guard and log in the second guard.
9. Emerson worked 268 hours of overtime during the period in dispute,
January 23, 2001, through June 29, 2002. Px 1, 5. Emerson acknowledges
receiving straight time for the overtime he worked. Protection paid
Emerson not less than straight time for the overtime he worked. Px 1.
Protection has failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
it paid him time and one-half for all of the overtime. The evidentiary
issue was created in part by Emerson's failure to itemize his damages
until the day before trial and the failure to provide that information to
Defendants as part of the final pretrial order process.
10. Emerson is owed 268 hours of overtime at $5.00 per hour for a total
of $1,340.00. Protection did not knowingly underpay Emerson for his
11. On or about December 21, 2002, Emerson was found intoxicated and
sleeping on the job at the Robert Taylor Homes by Mr. Wilson,
Protection's Vice-President and Henry Nickson, Protection's Field
Supervisor. Shortly thereafter, Protection lost its security contract at
the Robert Taylor Homes.
12. Emerson was not called back to work after December 23, 2002,
because Protection lost the Robert Taylor contract.
13. Emerson was requested to turn his badge in on January 15, 2003, at
which time he was terminated. Emerson was not terminated in retaliation
for complaining about the failure of Protection to properly pay overtime.
14. Mr. Wilson was a Vice President of Protection. Px 3 (1tr. dated
15. Mrs. Wilson was the President and CEO of Protection. Px 3 (1tr.
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
16. This Court has federal question jurisdiction founded on
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over the claims arising under the
FLSA. Jurisdiction for the state law claims arises under supplemental
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
B. HARPER WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF PROTECTION, AND NOT AN
17. The FLSA does not apply unless there is a valid employer-employee
relationship. See 29 U.S.C. § 206-207. The Act defines an
employee as "any individual
employed by an employer." Id. § 203(e)(1). "Employ" is
defined by the Act as to "suffer or permit to work." Id. §
203(g). Defendants argue that Harper was an independent contractor for
Protection and is not subject to the FLSA. Harper contends that she is an
employee and falls within the scope of the Act. The determination of a
worker's status is a legal rather than a factual issue. Karr v.
Strong Detective Agency, Inc., 787 F.2d 1205, 1206 (7th Cir. 1986).
This Court concludes that Harper is an employee under the FLSA.
18. The "economic reality test" is used to determine employment status.
Sec'y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir.
1987); Karr, 787 F.2d at 1207. Generally, "employees are those
who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to
which they render service." Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1534 (quoting
Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947)). Economic
reality of the employment relationship is not derived from one isolated
factor, but from all "the circumstances of the work activity."
Hefferman v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, No. 00 C 079, 2000
WL 631309, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2000) (quoting Sec'y of Labor v.
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir. 1987)). The Seventh Circuit
describes six factors as a guide when looking at the totality of the
circumstances of the work activity. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1535.
These factors are as follows:
1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer's
control as to the manner in which the work is to
2) the alleged employee's opportunity for profit
or loss depending upon his managerial skill;
3) the alleged employee's investment in equipment
or materials required for his task, or his
employment of workers;
4) whether the service rendered requires a special
5) the degree of permanency and duration of the
6) the extent to which the service rendered is an
integral part of the alleged employer's business.
Id. Each factor will be discussed in turn.
1. Degree of Employer's Control as to Manner of Work
19. To determine degree of control under the economic reality test,
courts focus on what work an employee actually performed and not what
work he or she could have performed. Stone v. Pinkerton Farms,
Inc., 741 F.2d 941, 943 (7th Cir. 1984). Evidence tends to show
control by an employer when it reflects the employer's dominance over the
"manner and method" of how work is performed. Carrell v. Sunland
Constr., 998 F.2d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 1993).
20. Defendants had full control over their business and every task that
Harper was assigned. Protection was organized and operated in a
quasi-military fashion with a clear chain of command. Harper was a
"Lieutenant" in the organization. Defendants assigned designated tasks to
Harper. Although she was permitted to exercise discretion, control
remained with the Defendants. See EEOC v. Century Broad. Corp.,
No. 89 C 5842, 1990 WL 43286, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 1990) (deeming
management to have retained control over radio announcers because
broadcasts were supervised by controlling the length of time news
broadcasts could run, marketing devices, and even when announcers could
announce the time of day). Defendants imposed their expectations on their
managers and would fire those who did not meet their expectations. These
facts demonstrate that Defendants controlled Harper's manner of work.
2. Employee's Opportunity for Profit or Loss Depending Upon
Her Managerial Skill
21. Harper invested nothing in Protection other than her time. She made
no financial investment. "An independent contractor risks loss of an
investment and has the opportunity to increase profits through managerial
discretion." Id. at 4 (citing Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at
1536). Harper was paid on a salary unrelated to Protection's profit or
loss. Regardless of Harper's performance, she would still receive the
same bi-monthly salary and did so up until her termination. Any poor work
performance by Harper may have led to her termination, but it did not
lead to any loss in profit to her. Her job performance did not impact her
opportunity for profit or loss.
3. Employee's Investment in Equipment or Materials
22. Harper made no financial investment for any equipment or materials.
She was only to receive a salary for the work that she performed.
4. Special Skills Required
23. Harper did not have any special management skills when she was
hired. Harper required on-the-job training to develop the skills she
needed to perform her required tasks in her short time at Protection. One
of Harper's most important tasks was scheduling employee work-time, and
Harper was trained by Defendants to do this. Any employee has to develop
specialized skills to perform his or her work. Lauritzen, 834
F.2d at 1537 (finding that migrant workers had to develop skills to
recognize which crops to pick). Yet, "[s]kills are not the monopoly of
independent contractors." Id. The fact that Harper
developed special skills to perform her job does not alter her
employment status. Harper was brought in with no management skills and
was being trained by Defendants to do her job.
5. Permanency and Duration of the Working Relationship
24. Harper only worked for a period of six weeks before she was
terminated. No contracts existed to define Harper's position or
permanency, and Harper was an "at will" employee. However, there is
nothing to indicate that both Harper and Defendants did not see the
position as permanent at the time Harper was hired. Harper testified that
she was being hired to head up two new sites Protection would be
acquiring under contract and that it was her intention to perform her job
to the best of her capabilities to prove that she could do the work that
Protection needed her to do. In Lauritzen, migrant workers who
did not work year round, but returned from season to season were
considered to have enough permanency and duration to be deemed employees
rather than independent contractors. 835 F.2d at 1537. The key fact in
that case was that the workers returned year after year. Id. In
this case, Harper and Defendants intended the relationship to be
permanent, and this fact is evidenced by Harper's rapid increase in
responsibilities during her short time at Protection.
6. Integral Part of Operation
25. The factor, "integral part of operation," looks at "the nature of
the work performed by the workers: does that work constitute an
`essential part' of the alleged employer's business? In other words,
regardless of the amount of work done, workers are
more likely to be `employees' under the FLSA if they perform the
primary work of the alleged employer." Donovan v. DialAmerica
Mktg., 757 F.2d 1376, 1385 (3d Cir. 1985). Protection is in the
business of providing security guards. This is its primary business.
Harper was hired as a "Lieutenant" and given the position of Field
Supervisor. Harper was responsible for supervising the security guards,
making schedules, and being a primary contact between the guards and
Protection. In this role, a Field Supervisor basically facilitates the
business and makes sure guards are doing their jobs. See
Lauritzen, 835 F.3d at 1538-39 (deeming migrant pickle pickers to be
an integral part of the business because they were necessary in the chain
that made the crop available for sale). Without such a person, the
business would be very difficult to maintain. Harper was an "essential
part" of Defendants* business.
26. This Court finds, based on the above factors, that Harper was an
employee of Protection and falls under the scope of the FLSA.
C. HARPER IS EXEMPT FROM OVERTIME PAY UNDER THE EXECUTIVE
27. The FLSA does not apply to "any employee employed in a bona fide
executive, administrative or professional capacity."
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Overtime pay is not available to a worker who
is exempt under the FLSA. Demos v. City of Indianapolis,
302 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2002); Bankston v. Illinois,
60 F.3d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1995). 28. Harper argues that, as an
employee of Protection, she should qualify for time and one-half pay
for overtime hours that she worked during one week in December 2002 and
several weeks in January 2003. Defendants argue that if Harper is
deemed an employee then she is exempt from overtime pay available under
29 U.S.C. § 207 as an executive under 29 U.S.C. § 213(1)(a). This
Court holds that Harper falls under the executive exemption.
29. The executive exemption can be satisfied in either of two ways,
commonly referred to as the Long Test and the Short Test, which are set
forth in the regulations promulgated by the Department of Labor. The
burden of proof is on the employer to show that an employee falls within
one of the exemptions, all of which are to be construed narrowly.
Bankston, 60 F.3d at 1252. This Court finds that Harper is an
exempt executive under the Short Test.
The Short Test states that
an employee who is compensated on a salary basis
at a rate of not less than $250 per week . . . and
whose primary duty consists of the management of
the enterprise in which the employee is employed
or of a customarily recognized department or
subdivision thereof, and includes the customary
and regular direction of the work of two or more
other employees therein, shall be deemed to meet
all the requirements of the [executive exemption].
29 C.F.R. § 541.1(f). The elements of the test are discussed in
1. Compensated on a Salary Basis of $250.00 or More Per
30. Harper was paid a salary of $700.00 every two weeks on the 1st and
15th of each month. This is in excess of the statutory minimum
requirement of $250.00 per week.
2. Primary Duty Is Management of a Customarily Recognized
31. The regulations set forth typical examples of management duties.
These duties include: (1) interviewing; (2) selecting and training
employees; (3) setting and adjusting
employees hours of work; (4) directing employees' work; (5)
recommending promotions or other changes in employees' status; (6)
handling employees' complaints, grievances, and discipline when
necessary; (7) and apportioning work among employees.
29 C.F.R. § 541.102(b). Though not all work duties in this list must
be performed, the fewer managerial duties an employee has, the more
likely that employee will not be considered a manager. Dalheim v.
KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 1220, 1231-32 (5th Cir. 1990).
32. Performing managerial tasks was Harper's primary duty. Harper
testified that she was specifically hired to head up two new sites.
Further, in her short time at Protection, Harper found herself "in charge
of five sites where she was responsible for making sure that security
services were provided. An executive employee's primary duty also may be
something of "principal importance to the employer, rather than
collateral tasks." Baudin v. Courtesy Litho Arts, 24 F. Supp.2d 887,
893 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (quoting Reich v. Wyoming,
993 F.2d 739, 742 (10th Cir. 1993)). Harper performed necessary
managerial tasks to enable Protection to provide its services.
33. Harper exercised managerial discretion in the performance of her
duties. She was "in charge of five sites. She was responsible for
scheduling employees, interviewing potential employees, requesting
disciple for employees, going out to a site if necessary to answer
complaints, and sometimes running "Sergeant" meetings. Harper was not
directly supervised at all times when she performed these duties. In
order to execute the tasks that Harper was required to perform, it was
necessary for her to exercise discretion. See id. at 893
(finding that Baudin handled several tasks including taking
inventory and ordering supplies, and "all of those tasks necessarily
involved the exercise of discretion").
34. Even if Harper's executive duties did not take up more than fifty
percent of her time, her primary duty was still management, especially
because the management duties she performed were more important to the
employer than her other work. Id. at 892.
2. Customary and Regular Direction of Two or More
35. "Customary and regular" means "a frequency which must be greater
than occasionally but which, of course, may be less than constant."
29 C.F.R. § 541.107(b). Harper customarily and regularly directed the
work of at least two employees. Harper was the first contact the guards
had if there was a problem. See Baudin, 24 F. Supp.2d at 893
(noting that workers contacted Baudin if they had questions or concerns
about their work). The guards at Harper's sites contacted her directly
instead of going to anyone else in the company if they had concerns.
Harper was a supervisor to the employees under her, and a direct result
of that was that she had multiple employees under her direction.
36. For the foregoing reasons, Harper is exempt under the Short Test.
She is not entitled to overtime pay as an executive employee.
D. EMERSON WORKED OVERTIME HOURS FOR WHICH HE WAS COMPENSATED
AT STRAIGHT TIME
37. The FLSA mandates that an employee is entitled to overtime pay at a
minimum rate of time and one-half for any hours worked over forty hours
per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). It is a longstanding rule that "an
employee who brings suit under [Section 217(a) of
the FLSA] for unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation,
together with liquidated damages, has the burden of proving that he
performed work for which he was not properly compensated." Anderson
v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-87 (1946). The burden
of production shifts to the employer when the employer fails to keep
adequate and accurate records. Id. at 687.
38. Courts must give due regard "to the fact that it is the employer
who has the duty under § 11(c) of the Act to keep proper records of
wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment and who is
in position to know and to produce the most probative facts concerning
the nature and amount of work performed." Id. at 687. If an
employer fails to keep accurate or adequate records, then an employee
has carried out his burden if he proves that he
has in fact performed work for which he was
improperly compensated and if he produces
sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent
of that work as a matter of just and reasonable
inference. The burden then shifts to the employer
to come forward with evidence of the precise
amount of work performed or with evidence to
negative the reasonableness of the inference to be
drawn from the employee's evidence. If the
employer fails to produce such evidence, the court
may then award damages to the employee, even
though the result be only approximate.
Id. at 687-88.
39. Emerson has met his minimum burden of proof in order to cause the
burden of production to shift to Defendants. At trial, undisputed
timecards were admitted into evidence to show that Emerson worked a
certain amount of overtime hours. Checks were also admitted to show that
he was paid each pay period. Emerson testified that he worked 268
overtime hours that were uncompensated at the statutorily required rate
of time and one
half. Defendants did not produce all the items employers are
required to keep for employees under 29 C.F.R. § 516.2. This was in
part due to Emerson's late explanation of his precise damages claim on
the eve of trial.
40. In Walton v. United Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303,
314 (7th Cir. 1986), the Court allowed "imprecision in the plaintiffs
testimony" to fall on the defendant. In Walton, an overtime wage
dispute case, "the district court was entitled to credit the testimony
that the defendant had instructed plaintiffs not to keep accurate
records." Id. The defendant had to "suffer the consequences" for
any inaccuracy that made it difficult to discover the truth about hours
worked because it was defendant's burden to keep accurate records.
Id. at 314-15. Emerson's case is no different. The Defendants
failed to keep accurate records and blamed Emerson for not keeping his
pay stubs. The only evidence that pay stubs were ever given to employees
was based upon the testimony of Bernata Lowe, Protection's bookkeeper.
She testified that pay stubs were given. However, it was clear that
Protection no longer used a payroll service to pay its employees and that
personal checks were handwritten and given out on payday. Almost all of
Emerson's checks were handwritten checks with no information other than
the amount paid. There was no information on the checks that showed hours
work or any deductions. Defendants did not produce sufficient evidence of
what he was paid in correlation with his hours worked. All that was put
forward were paychecks with some amount paid to Emerson and timecards for
each week worked. This data remains ambiguous.
41. Since Emerson can prove uncompensated work by his testimony, the
burden of production shifts to the Defendants to prove "the precise
amount of work performed or . . . evidence to negative the reasonableness
of the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence."
Anderson, 328 U.S. at 687. Defendants offered no evidence to
explain precisely how Emerson's pay was computed, what rate he was paid
for overtime and what deductions were made.
42. Because Defendants were unable to produce the required evidence,
the Court "may then award damages to the employee, even though the result
be only approximate." Id. at 688. Emerson is awarded damages in
the amount of $1,340.00. This figure represents the 268 hours of
overtime multiplied by $5.00, which is one-half of the premium amount
that Emerson was paid during his employment with Protection. Emerson
acknowledged receiving his regular hourly rate of $10.00 for the overtime
E. EMERSON WAS NOT TERMINATED IN RETALIATION FOR COMPLAINTS HE
MADE REGARDING DEFENDANTS' FAILURE TO PAY HIM PROPER OVERTIME
43. Under the FLSA, it is unlawful for an employer to "discharge or in
any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
Emerson argues that he was fired from Protection in retaliation for
complaining to his superiors that he was not receiving proper overtime
pay. Defendants argue that Emerson was fired because no more work was
available and for poor job performance;
specifically, he was found drunk and passed out while on duty. This
Court holds that Emerson failed to prove retaliatory discharge, and that
his termination was not in any way related to the issue of claims by him
regarding overtime pay.
44. Protection lost its "Robert Taylor" contract which was the site
where Emerson was employed. Emerson was told on December 31, 2002 that
there was no more work available and he was not scheduled up until his
official termination on January 15, 2003. It is a legitimate reason to
fire employees if there is no work available for them. In addition,
Emerson had a history of poor job performance which was also a
contributing factor in the decision to terminate him.
F. DEFENDANTS MR. AND MRS. WILSON ARE PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR
EMERSON'S OVERTIME WAGE CLAIM
45. This Court has already found Mr. and Mrs. Wilson to be corporate
officers of Protection. Further, Protection as an entity is liable to
Emerson for his wage dispute. Corporate officers may be held personally
liable "for the corporation's statutory wage obligations," and the FLSA
is given a broad interpretation on this point. Scarbrough v.
Perez, 870 F.2d 1079, 1082 (6th Cir. 1989). Emerson has named both
Robert and Tammy Wilson, along with Protection, as individual defendants
in this case. Protection and its officers had an obligation to ensure
that Emerson was paid properly for the overtime mat he worked. This Court
finds that both Robert and Tammy Wilson are personally liable, along with
Protection, for Emerson's overtime claim.
G. STATE LAW CLAIMS
46. Plaintiffs Harper and Emerson also brought their overtime wage
claims under an Illinois state law cause of action. 820ILCS 105/1-15.
47. This Court finds that Harper has failed to satisfy her state law
overtime claim because an employee who is deemed an a bona fide executive
under the FLSA is exempt from overtime under the Illinois statute. 802
48. Emerson has satisfied his Illinois state law claim for overtime.
The Illinois statute, like the FLSA, requires that adequate records be
kept by the employer. 820 ILCS 105/8. It has already been established
that Defendants have failed to keep and to provide adequate records to
disprove Emerson's overtime claim.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, judgment is entered in
favor of Defendants, Robert Wilson, Tammy Wilson and Professional
Protection Specialists, L.L.C., and against Plaintiff, Sabrina Harper on
all of her claims in her amended complaint. Judgment is entered in favor
of Plaintiff, Otis Emerson, and against Defendants Robert Wilson, Tammy
Wilson, and Professional Protection Specialists, L.L.C., in the amount of
$1,340.00 for his claim for overtime pay, and in favor of Defendants and
against Plaintiff, Otis Emerson, for his claim of retaliatory discharge
in the amended complaint. Each party shall bear its own court costs.