The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOHN W. DARRAH, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, John W. Brewer, filed suit against Defendant, the City of
Evanston Fire Department. Plaintiff alleges a violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Presently before the Court is Cook County's
Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv.,
Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 150 (7th Cir. 1994). "One of the principal purposes of
the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses. . . ." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Thus, although the moving party on a motion for
summary judgment is responsible for demonstrating to the court why there
is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must go beyond
the face of the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file to
demonstrate, through specific evidence, that a genuine issue of material
fact exists and to show that a rational jury could return a verdict in
the non-moving party's favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-27; Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-56 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Waldridge v.
American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1994).
Disputed facts are material when they might affect the outcome of the
suit. First Ind. Bank v. Baker, 957 F.2d 506, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1992).
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view all
inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the
opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48; Popovits v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 185 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 1999). However, a metaphysical
doubt will not suffice. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. If the evidence is
merely colorable or is not significantly probative or is no more than a
scintilla, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
The undisputed facts, for the purposes of this motion, taken from the
parties' Local Rule 56.1(a) & (b) statements of material facts (referred
to herein as "Pl.'s 56.1" and "Def.'s 56.1") and exhibits, are as
Previous Promotion Postings
Plaintiff, an African-American, is a Captain in the Bureau of Fire
Prevention. PLs 56.1 ¶ 1. On or about November 4, 1998, the Defendant
posted an internal posting for the position of Division Chief in the Fire
Department/Administration Division. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 4. This posting
required that a candidate possess a State of Illinois Fire Officer I
Certification and State of
Illinois Instructor II Certification. PL's 56.1 ¶ 39. Plaintiff
was the only qualified applicant for the promotion. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶
Plaintiff was interviewed for the promotion on or about July 13, 1999.
Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 11. Plaintiff interviewed for the promotion before a panel
consisting of Fire Chief John Wilkinson; Division Chiefs Michael Whalen,
Alan Berkowsky, and Samuel Hunter; and the Director of the Department of
Human Resources, Judy Witt. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 11-14. Plaintiff also answered
a set of written questions for the panel. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 20. The panel
was an advisory panel, and Chief Wilkinson held the ultimate decision on
who should be appointed. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 15.
After the interview and the completion of the written exercise, none of
the members of the panel concluded that Plaintiff should be promoted to
the position of Fire Chief. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 21-27. Plaintiff did not
receive that promotion. Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 28.
On or about July 22, 1999, Defendant posted an internal posting for the
position of Division Chief, Fire Department/Operations Division. Def.'s
56.1 ¶ 30. This promotion required a candidate to possess a State of
Illinois Fire Officer I Certification and State of Illinois Instructor II
Certification. Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 74. Plaintiff and Ben Jaremus applied for
the promotion. Def.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 31-32.
On or about December 3, 1999, before Plaintiff was interviewed and
completed written exercises for the promotion, Plaintiff filed a
complaint with the City of Evanston Human Relations Commission. Def.'s
56.1 ¶ 33; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 77. After Plaintiff filed his ...