The opinion of the court was delivered by: MATTHEW KENNELLY, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on Robert Simpson's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court dismisses all but three of Simpson's claims and
orders further briefing on those three claims.
The Court takes the following account from the decisions of the
Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Simpson, 172 11.2d 117,
665 N.E.2d 1228 (1996) ("Simpson I") and People v.
Simpson, 204 111.2d 536, 792 N.E.2d 265 (2001) ("Simpson
II"). The Court presumes these facts to be correct for purposes of
habeas corpus review. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981);
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Simpson was convicted of the armed robbery and murder of Barbara
Lindich at the Fairway Food store in Glenwood, Illinois. On May 22, 1992,
at approximately 10 a.m., Simpson and Carolyn
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LaGrone entered the Fairway Food store and robbed it while Lurlarn
Young waited in the car. As Simpson emptied the cash register from behind
the service counter, Barbara Lindich, a store customer, walked up behind
LaGrone and peered over her shoulder. Simpson turned and shot Lindich,
who later died as a result of the gunshot wound. Simpson then checked the
safe, left the store with LaGrone, and went to the car where Young
awaited.
LaGrone was arrested three days later, on May 25, 1992, and she gave a
statement to the police that detailed her participation in the crime as
well as that of Young and Simpson. Young was arrested the same day and
also gave an inculpatory statement. She signed a consent to search the
apartment where she and Simpson lived and gave the police the keys to the
apartment. Simpson was arrested in the apartment and was placed in a
lineup. He was identified by several eyewitnesses, including employees of
the Fairway Food store, as the man they saw rob the store and shoot
Lindich.
On May 26, 1992, the police took Young to the apartment building where
she and Simpson lived and, with her consent, searched a storage locker
that she and Simpson used. There the police found two guns, one of which
was later identified as the weapon used in the murder and robbery, as
well as other evidence.
At trial, three store employees identified Simpson as the man who was
behind the service counter with the gun. Forensic testing experts stated
that the cartridge case recovered from the scene was fired from one of
the pistols recovered from the storage locker and that a bullet recovered
from a door frame at the crime scene matched a test bullet fired from
that pistol.
During all phases of the pretrial and trial proceedings, Simpson
represented himself with the aid of a public defender acting as standby
counsel. Simpson called several witnesses who were present in
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the store at the time of the robbery to testify on his behalf. They
did not corroborate every aspect of the prosecution witnesses' accounts,
but they likewise did not contradict those witnesses' accounts of what
occurred in the store. Simpson also called Young to testify, but she
invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to testify. At Simpson's request,
and against the trial judge's advice, the statements that LaGrone and
Young had given to the police were published to the jury. At the close of
the evidence, the jury returned a verdict finding Simpson guilty of armed
robbery and the first degree murder of Lindich.
At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found Simpson eligible for
a death sentence because he had committed murder in the course of a
felony, see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6), and the case proceeded to the
second stage of the penalty phase. Simpson represented himself throughout
the penalty phase. The prosecution offered the testimony of various law
enforcement personnel regarding several prior arrest of Simpson, and it
also offered certified copies of his prior convictions for attempted
murder, aggravated battery, gun possession, several theft offenses, and
other crimes.
The trial judge inquired whether Simpson intended to call any witnesses
on his behalf in mitigation; Simpson responded that he wanted to call
Judges James Bailey, Richard Fitzgerald, and Lloyd Van Duzen as character
witnesses. The trial judge instructed Simpson's standby counsel to
investigate the matter and find out where the judges were currently
located and if they could recollect knowing Simpson.
At the next court date, the trial judge provided Simpson with three
transcripts he had previously requested. The judge informed Simpson that
he had contacted Judges Fitzgerald and Bailey and that neither judge
remembered Simpson. However, the judge also advised Simpson that both
judges would
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be willing to come to court. Simpson advised the trial judge that
since the judges could not remember him, he wanted to go to the law
library and prepare certain motions. The judge admonished Simpson that he
should be more concerned with persuading the jury on the question of the
death penalty, as the jury had not made a final determination regarding
that issue. In response, Simpson countered that if he was sentenced to
death, that sentence would allow him to "bypass the Illinois Appellate
Court" and go "directly to the Illinois Supreme Court." The trial court
stated, "[Y]ou have your own strategy and I have told you this before,
but I still wouldn't give up on the jury." Simpson acknowledged the
statement but again affirmed his decision: "I understand, your Honor, but
the law indicates if that does occur, the matter goes directly to the
Supreme Court."
In a final attempt to convince Simpson to reconsider his strategy, the
trial judge said that if he were in Simpson's position, he would
vigorously present mitigation evidence to the jury so that it would be
inclined not to impose a death sentence. Simpson asked if he could have
some time to contact the judges himself. When court resumed, Simpson
advised that after speaking to Judge Bailey, the judge still could not
recall Simpson. The trial judge again admonished Simpson that he should
not hinge his strategy on post-trial motions or on an appeal. He also
explained to Simpson that if one person on the jury panel disagreed with
the imposition of a death sentence, Simpson would not be sentenced to
death. Despite these admonishments, Simpson presented no mitigation
evidence. After the conclusion of the second stage of the sentencing
hearing, the jury found no mitigating factors to preclude imposition of
the death penalty.
The trial judge appointed counsel to represent Simpson on his
post-trial motion. In preparation for the post-trial hearing, counsel
requested Simpson's medical file from the Pontiac Correctional
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Center, which showed that Simpson had suffered from headaches,
dizziness, fainting spells, and bad eyesight and had survived a gunshot
wound to the head from a prior incident. At the post-trial hearing,
counsel argued that Simpson was not competent to represent himself during
either the trial or the sentencing phase. The trial court denied the
post-trial motion and sentenced Simpson to death for the murder and
thirty years imprisonment for the armed robbery.
On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Simpson's
conviction and sentence. Simpson then filed a pro se petition
for post-conviction relief and a motion to appoint counsel, which was
granted. Appointed counsel filed a motion to produce handwritten
statements from the Glenwood Police Department. The trial court ordered
production of the requested documents. After some records were produced,
counsel filed a motion to compel complete production of the documents and
a motion to take depositions. The trial court denied the motions.
Prior to the initial court date on Simpson's post-conviction petition,
the prosecution filed a motion for "clarification" of Simpson's
competence, asking the trial judge to determine if there was a bona
fide issue as to Simpson's competence. The trial judge determined
that Simpson's condition had not deteriorated and that he was coherent
and able to understand the proceedings.
The trial court eventually dismissed Simpson's post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing. Simpson then filed a pro se
petition for post-judgment relief. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401. The trial court
dismissed that petition as well, and Simpson appealed to the Illinois
Supreme Court. That court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of
Simpson's post-conviction petition and the dismissal of his petition for
post-judgment relief. Simpson then filed the present habeas corpus
petition, asserting thirteen separate claims.
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On January 11, 2003, Illinois Governor George Ryan commuted Simpson's
death sentence to a sentence of life without parole. Following the
commutation, this Court inquired whether Simpson wished to pursue his
habeas corpus petition in light of the risk that he could be again
subjected to the possibility of a death sentence if a new trial was
ordered. Simpson's counsel reported to the Court that Simpson wished to
pursue his habeas corpus petition.
1. Simpson's self-representation at trial (claims 1, 2 and 10)
Simpson's first, second, and tenth claims arise from his decision to
represent himself. In claim one, he asserts that his waiver of his right
to counsel was not knowing and intelligent because it was "based on his
misinformed choice of representing himself instead of being represented
by counsel who had only shown his ineffectiveness." Simpson Mem. at 29.
He claims that the assistant public defender who had been appointed to
represent him was never prepared, that he decided to represent himself
out of frustration with counsel's ineffectiveness, and that the public
defender then ignored the trial judge's order to assist Simpson as
standby counsel.
Simpson raised this claim on direct appeal, but the Illinois Supreme
Court rejected it. Simpson I, 172 Ill.2d at 132-37, 665 N.E.2d
at 1237-39. Our inquiry is limited to asking whether the state court's
decision was contrary to, or unreasonably applied, clearly established
federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, or was
based on an unreasonable ...