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Adcock v. Snyder

February 03, 2004

MARSHAL ADCOCK, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
DONALD N. SNYDER, JR., JAMES M. SCHOMIG, PATTY REIDER, ALBERT ESQUIVEL, BENNY DALLAS, AND RICHARD ROBINSON. DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.



Appeal from Circuit Court of Livingston County No. 03MR22 Honorable Harold J. Frobish, Judge Presiding.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Steigmann

PUBLISHED

In July 2002, plaintiff, Marshal Adcock, an inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center, pro se filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that defendants, Donald N. Snyder, Jr., Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC), and James M. Schomig, the former warden of Pontiac, violated his due process rights in numerous disciplinary proceedings in 2000 and 2001. In September 2002, Adcock pro se filed an amended petition, adding as defendants Patty Reider, Albert Esquivel, Benny Dallas, and Richard Robinson, all members of the adjustment committee at Pontiac. In February 2003, the trial court dis-missed Adcock's petition, upon finding that it did not state a habeas corpus cause of action. Adcock appeals, and we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

The record shows that in January 2000, Adcock began serving a five-year prison sentence for burglary. The record includes a DOC form showing a projected release date of May 9, 2002, factoring in time served prior to custody and good-conduct credits.

In his September 2002 amended habeas corpus petition, Adcock alleged that the procedures under which his good-time credit was revoked violated both DOC rules and minimum due process requirements under the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Specifically, he (1) identified 11 disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the revocation of good-time credit totaling approximately three years and six months; (2) alleged that defendants had violated DOC rules by (a) failing to provide him with an adequate written record, including a basis for disregarding exonerating evidence presented by him (see 20 Ill. Adm. Code §504.80(l)(2) (Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2000)), (b) arbitrarily subjecting him to discipline that was not supported by "some evidence" of the chargeable conduct in the written record (see 20 Ill. Adm. Code §504.80(l) (Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2000)), (c) failing to state the disposition of the charges, the disciplinary action recommended and the reasons for recommending the disciplinary action (see 20 Ill. Adm. Code §504.80(l)(3) (Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2000)), and (d) failing to review all adjustment committee dispositions recommending that he lose good-time credit (see 20 Ill. Adm. Code §504.80(p) (Conway Greene CD-ROM January 2000)); and (3) sought as relief the restoration of his wrongfully revoked good-time credit and his immediate release from DOC custody.

In February 2003, the trial court ruled on Adcock's habeas corpus petition in a docket entry that states as follows: "The [c]court, having reviewed the submissions of [Adcock], wherein he complains about the result of numerous disciplinary proceedings, and is seeking relief through habeas corpus. The [c]court finds that [Adcock] has wholly failed to state a cause of action in [h]abeas [c]orpus and therefore, the [p]etition is dismissed." This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Adcock argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition because it stated a claim for habeas corpus relief. We agree.

A petition for writ of habeas corpus may not be used to review proceedings that do not exhibit one of the defects set forth in section 10-124 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/10-124 (West 2000)), even if an alleged error involves a denial of constitutional rights. Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 430, 704 N.E.2d 350, 351 (1998). Section 10-124 of the Code provides as follows:

"If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted, he or she may be discharged only for one or more of the following causes:

1. Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the matter, place, sum[,] or person.

2. Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, nevertheless, by some act, omission[,] or event which has subsequently taken place, the ...


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