The opinion of the court was delivered by: ELAINE E. BUCKLO, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lisa M. Beard, an African-American female who suffers from
major depression, was employed as a paramedic for the City of Chicago
Fire Department ("CFD") from April 1, 1993 until her termination on
November 14, 2002. Ms. Beard's complaint against defendant City of
Chicago ("City") alleges violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a), (Count I); race discrimination in
violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., (Count
II); sex discrimination in violation of Title VII, (Count III); race
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count IV); violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count V); and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (Count VI). The City moves to dismiss Counts IV, V,
and VI, as well as the prayer for punitive damages. I grant the motion in
The City first moves to dismiss Counts IV and V, which allege
violations of § 1981 and § 1983, respectively. On a motion to
dismiss, I accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
true, Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d 1312, 1319 (7th
Cir. 1997), and grant the motion only if the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts to support the allegations in her claim. Strasburger v. Bd.
of Educ., 143 F.3d 351, 359 (7th Cir. 1998).
To allege a violation of her rights under either § 1981 or §
1983, Ms. Beard must allege "(1) the City had an express policy that,
when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) the City had a
widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or
express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; or (3) [her]
constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking
authority." McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th
Cir. 2000). Ms. Beard does not allege an express policy on the part of
the City. However, her allegations are sufficient under the third
McCormick factor to withstand a motion to dismiss.
The City also moves to dismiss Count VI, a state law claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The City argues that the
claim is preempted under the Illinois Human Rights Act ("IHRA"). 775 ILCS
5/1-101 et seq. "Under Illinois law, when the allegation on
which a state law is based constitute a civil rights violation under the
Illinois Human Right Act (IHRA), the tort is
preempted." Westphal v. City of Chicago, 8 F. Supp.2d 809,
811-12 (N.D. Ill. 1998). The City argues that Ms. Beard's claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress is based solely on her
allegations that the City discriminated against her on the basis of her
disability, her sex, and race.
The IHRA states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, no court
of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged
civil rights violation other than set forth in this Act." 775 ILCS
5/8-111(0). Discrimination based on a disability, race, or sex is
prohibited by the IHRA, 775 ILCS 5/1-102(A). The Illinois Supreme Court
has stated that if a state common law claim is "inextricably linked" to
the allegation of discrimination, it is within the purview of the IHRA
and must be brought in front of the Illinois Human Rights Commission.
Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 639 N.E.2d 1273, 1277
(Ill. 1994); accord Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21 (Ill.
1997). To ascertain whether a common law claim is "inextricably linked"
to a discrimination claim, I must determine whether Ms. Beard has alleged
the elements of the common law claim "without reference to the legal
duties created by the [IHRA]." Maksimovic, 687 N.E.2d at 23. In
other words, there must still exist a foundation for the emotional
distress claim even if the City's conduct was not discriminatory.*fn1
Silk v. City of
Chicago, No. 95-C143, 1997 WL 790598, at *16-17 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 17, 1997).
Ms. Beard alleges that the City inflicted emotional distress on her in
a number of ways: (1) presenting her with a "last chance agreement" after
she tested positive for cocaine; (2) requiring her to reside in a halfway
house for three months; (3) misleading her into thinking that if she
fulfilled the terms of the "last chance agreement," she would be
reinstated; (4) refusing to allow her to return to work; and (5) forcing
her to apply for a pension. The only factual allegations that Ms. Beard
presents solely for her emotional distress claims are that the City had
the intent to inflict emotional distress on Ms. Beard and that the City's
conduct was extreme and outrageous. Ms. Beard's claims depend on the
theory that she was discriminated against because of her disability,
race, and sex. If the conduct she alleges is not discriminatory, she has
no basis for her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Thus, Count VI is "inextricably linked" to her discrimination claims and
must be dismissed.
The City finally moves to strike Ms. Beard's prayer for punitive
damages, arguing that municipalities are immune from punitive damages
imposed under the civil rights laws. See, e.g.,
Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Ms.