United States District Court, N.D. Illinois
January 27, 2004.
Steadfast Insurance Company
Auto Marketing Network, Inc., et al
The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOAN H. LEFKOW, District Judge Page 2
(Resered for use by the Court)
On October 27, 2003, this court granted the motion of
defendant/counter-plaintiff Imperial Credit Industries, Inc.,
("Imperial"), for a new trial on its counterclaim of bad faith insurance
litigation against plaintiff/counter-defendant Steadfast Insurance
Company ("Steadfast"). Thereafter, on December 8, 2003, the court denied
Steadfast's motion to augment its expert witness list. Before the court
is Steadfast's motion to reconsider the December 8 memorandum opinion and
order. Steadfast believes that reconsideration is warranted because its
expert report, which was not available to the court when it issued the
December 8 opinion, demonstrates that Steadfast's motion should have been
granted. As stated below, the motion to reconsider is denied.
A motion for reconsideration serves the limited function to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.
Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251
(7th Cir. 1987), The motion also serves a valuable function where the
court "has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside
the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made
an error not of reasoning but of apprehension." Bank of Waunakee v.
Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990)
In the December 8, 2003 memorandum opinion and order, this court denied
Steadfast's motion to augment its expert witness list on grounds that
Steadfast never did designate its own experts within the time frame
allocated by the court. While true that the court did initially grant
Steadfast's motion to strike Imperial's expert witnesses, that came
nearly eight months after the close of expert discovery. This was not a
situation in which Steadfast relied on the striking of Imperial's experts
in not designating any of its own. Steadfast had ample opportunity to
designate its own experts but never did. Steadfast, however, asserts that
it "never imagined" that the court would allow Lubet and Diamond to
testify, But this goes far to confirm Imperial's view that Steadfast's
failure to designate an expert was merely a gamble by Steadfast that the
court would grant its motion to strike. Moreover, Steadfast claims that
had the court originally denied its motion to strike (which, once again,
was granted eight months after the close of expert discovery), it would
have promptly moved to augment its expert witness list at that time.
Therein lies the point. Because Steadfast had not designated an expert
witness during the proscribed time, the court would not have been
inclined to grant the motion then, and is not inclined to do so now.
Steadfast's motion to reconsider is denied [#336],
© 1992-2004 VersusLaw Inc.