United States District Court, N.D. Illinois
January 26, 2004.
CITY INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS, INC., Plaintiff
VEHICLE INSPECTION SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant
The opinion of the court was delivered by: MILTON SHADUR, Senior District Judge
Shortly after removing this action from the Circuit Court of Cook
County to this District Court, Vehicle Inspections Systems, Inc.
("Vehicle Inspection") has noticed up a Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rule") 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss the Complaint brought against it by City International
Trucks, Inc. ("City International"). But because the motion misperceives
the basic concepts of such a facial challenge, it is denied out of hand,
without requiring either a response from City International or anyone's
appearance at the specified January 30, 2004 presentment date.
Vehicle Inspection charges that the asserted contract on which City
International sues an agreement by Vehicle Inspection, as the
seller of certain vehicle diagnostic equipment, that City International
has an option to require its repurchase by Vehicle Inspection
violates the statute of frauds (UCC § 2-201(1), found in the Illinois
statutes at 810 ILCS 5/2-201(1)). But even on the arguendo premise that
the alleged agreement is one for the "sale of goods" within the meaning
that statute,*fn1 Vehicle Inspection's position would require this
Court to go outside of the Complaint to determine that the contract is
not in writing (if that were so, of course).
That does violence to the basic principles underlying Rule 12(b)(6).
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-14 (2002) has
reconfirmed the propriety of notice pleading such as that in the
Complaint, and Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73
(1984) has reconfirmed the test for the sufficiency of a complaint:
A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is
clear that no relief could be granted under any
set of facts that could be proved consistent with
the allegations. Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Accordingly, as stated at the outset, Vehicle Inspection's motion is
denied. This Court's previously scheduled initial status hearing date of
February 13, 2004 remains in effect, and the parties are expected to
comply with the prehearing requirements of the memorandum order that
established that date.