United States District Court, N.D. Illinois
January 21, 2004.
ANDRE MOORE, a minor; IDA DOYLE, mother/guardian, Plaintiff's, v., BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO; ARNE DUNCAN, Chief Executive Officer, individually and in his official capacity, MELVERLENE V. PARKER, Principal Hirsch High School, individually and in her official capacity; NORMAN THOMAS, Vice Principal, individually and in his official capacity; JIMMIE BUSCH, Teacher, Hirsch High School, individually and in his official capacity, Defendants
The opinion of the court was delivered by: ROBERT GETTLEMAN, District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff's Andre Moore ("Andre"), a minor, and his mother, Ida
Doyle, filed an eight-count complaint against the Board of
Education of the City of Chicago ("Board"), Arne Duncan, Chief Executive
Officer of the Board, Melverlene Parker, principal of Hirsch High School,
Norman Thomas, vice-principal of Hirsch High School, and Jimmie Bush, a
teacher at Hirsch High School, arising from Bush's alleged mistreatment
of Andre while he was a student at Hirsch High School. The instant case,
although initially filed in state court, was removed to this court in
Plaintiff's' complaint alleges that Bush committed battery (Count I)
and intentionally inflicted emotional distress against Andre (Count II).
Further, plaintiffs allege that the Board, Parker, Duncan, and Thomas are
liable for the battery (Count III), and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (Count IV), and that the Board, Parker, Duncan,
and Thomas failed to supervise (Count V) and negligently retained (Count
VI) defendant Bush. Finally, plaintiffs allege racial discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
against Bush (Count VII) as well as the Board, Parker, Duncan, and Thomas
(Count VIII) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants Board, Parker, and Thomas*fn1 have moved pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss Counts III, IV, V, VI and VIII for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated
below, defendants' motion is granted in its entirety.
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court accepts all
well-pleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences
in favor of the plaintiff. Travel All Over the World, Inc. v.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996).
According to the complaint, Andre, an African-American/Caucasian mixed
race male, was enrolled at Hirsch High School. Plaintiff's allege that
all of the defendants were aware that Andre was a special education
student who was diagnosed with atlantoaxial instability (i.e.
abnormalities of the upper cervical spine). Andre has a visible scar
at the nape of his neck and at the base of his scull resulting from
surgery fusing some of his cervical vertebrae.
During his junior year at Hirsch High School, Bush was Andre's
chemistry instructor. Bush allegedly made several public statements
concerning Andre's mixed Caucasian and
African-American ancestry.*fn2 In connection with the
above-described incidents, Andre's mother, Ida Doyle, went to
Hirsch High School to complain to defendant Parker, the principal, but
was redirected to defendant Thomas, the vice-principal. Plaintiff's
claim to have reported the statements made by Bush to Thomas, who
admitted that such comments should not have been made. In response,
Thomas removed Andre from Bush's classroom. After this discussion, Bush
allegedly continued making similar statements.
On October 25, 2001, Andre, then a senior, was in a history class
taught by a Mr. Wilson in which Bush was also present. Andre made a
comment that Bush was distracting him with his "interruptions" to which
Bush responded, "That's the Caucasian blood in him makes him think he can
say whatever he wants." When Wilson directed Andre to leave his class,
Bush allegedly blocked Andre's exit from the door. According to the
complaint, when Andre tried to get around Bush, Bush, without
provocation, grabbed Andre and put him in a choking headlock. Shortly
thereafter, Andre, complaining of neck pain, was taken to Providence
Hospital Emergency Room and later to Fantus Health Center, Cook County
Hospital. There it was determined that two wires from Andre's cervical
spine surgery were broken, and there was evidence of vertebrae and/or
nerve compression or instability. As a result, Andre was required to wear
a neck brace for two hours at a time and was restricted from physical
activity for six weeks.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the
court considers "whether relief is possible under any set of facts that
could be established consistent with the allegations." Bartholet v.
Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992). A claim may be
dismissed only if it is beyond doubt that under no set of facts, would
the plaintiff's allegations entitle him to relief. Travel All Over
the World. Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1429-30
(7th Cir. 1996). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the
sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide its merits. Gibson v.
City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990).
1. Counts III-VI: Battery, Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress. Willful and Wanton "Mis-Supervision" of Bush,
and Willful and Wanton Retention of Bush
In Counts III and IV of their complaint, plaintiffs assert that "[i]n
failing to recognize the impending danger, as to being put on notice as
to Defendant, Jimmy Bush's, rabidly racial discriminatory anti-bi-racial
(Caucasian/African-American) statements as to Plaintiff," defendants
Board, Parker, and Thomas failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent
injury to Andre and thus are liable for the alleged battery and
intentional infliction of emotional distress committed by defendant Bush.
In Count V, plaintiffs assert that defendants Board, Parker, and Thomas
breached their "duty of supervision" by failing to, (1) monitor Bush's
behavior toward Andre, (2) follow up with plaintiffs regarding Bush's
behavior, (3) send Bush to sensitivity training, and (4) contact other
students regarding Bush's alleged statements. In Count VI, plaintiffs
allege that defendants Board, Parker, and Thomas breached their duty of
competent, qualified and safe teachers by failing to fire Bush
after learning of his allegedly racist statements.*fn3
In response, defendants Board, Parker, and Thomas maintain that they
are immune from liability under Section 2-201 of the Illinois Local
Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS
10/1-101 et seq. ("Tort Immunity Act"). According to
defendants, even if their supervision and/or retention of Bush was
willful and wanton as alleged by plaintiffs, they are not liable for
plaintiffs' injuries because their handling of plaintiffs' complaints
against Bush involved the determination of policy and the exercise of
Section 2-201 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public
employee serving in a position involving the
determination of policy or the exercise of
discretion is not liable for an injury resulting
from his act or omission in determining policy
when acting in the exercise of such discretion
even though abused.
A defendant will not be immune under Section 2-201 "unless the
plaintiff's injury results from an act performed or omitted by the
[defendant] in determining policy and in exercising
discretion." Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd.
Partnership, 181 Ill.2d 335, 341 (1998) (emphasis in original).
"Policy decisions" are those decisions which require the municipality to
"balance competing interests and to make a judgment call as to what
solution will best serve each of those interests." Id. at 342 (quoting
West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill.2d 1
(1992)). "Discretionary acts" are
those which are "unique to a particular public office," whereas
"ministerial acts" are those which "a person performs on given state of
facts in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority, and without reference to the
official's discretion as to the propriety of the act." Id. at
Notwithstanding plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, defendants'
handling of plaintiffs' complaint against Bush, as well as the decision
to retain him as an employee, constitute policy decisions and acts of
discretion. In the instant case, rather than fire Bush, defendants opted
to remove Andre from his classroom. Without expressing an opinion as to
the propriety of that decision, the court notes that the defendants'
resolution of the situation required the balancing of competing
interests, including those of the students, faculty, and public at large.
Further, plaintiffs have not identified any law or regulation that
suggests that the Board, Parker, and Thomas lacked discretion to resolve
the dispute in the manner described above. Although the Board has adopted
a rule prohibiting "corporal punishment of any kind upon persons
attending the public schools of the City of Chicago," the court notes
that the alleged battery giving rise to Andre's injuries occurred
after defendants' decision to retain him.
Further, the Chicago Public Schools Uniform Discipline Code (attached
to defendants' motion to dismiss and referenced by plaintiffs in their
response brief) does not dictate or prescribe the manner in which the
Board, Parker, and Thomas were expected to handle plaintiffs' complaint
against Bush. Rather, the Uniform Discipline Code speaks of the
principal's duty to, among other things, (1) provide "continuing
assistance to all school personnel to resolve problems as they arise,"
(2) "seek the assistance of appropriate staff, parents, and community
agencies as needed to provide for the welfare of the students," and (3)
"demonstrate by attitude and actions genuine concern and respect for
all." In the absence of any legal authority to the contrary, the court
concludes that the defendants!, handling of the complaint against Bush
act of discretion, rather than a ministerial act. Cf. Johnson
v. Mers, 279 Ill. App.3d 372 (2d Dist. 1996) (characterizing a
hiring decision as discretionary because "[t]he hiring decision is not
one which is made when certain specific factors are present, with no
regard to the hiring officials' discretion.").
That defendants may have owed a "special duty" to Andre does not compel
a contrary result. As noted in Harinek, 181 Ill.2d at 347, "the
special duty doctrine may not operate to impose liability upon a public
entity after a court has found that entity immune from liability under
the Tort Immunity Act." Moreover, willful and wanton conduct cannot
deprive a local public entity of immunity granted by section 2-201 of the
Act. In re Chicago Flood Litigation. 176 Ill.2d 179, 196
(1997). Accordingly, defendants Board, Parker, and Thomas are immune from
liability for plaintiffs' injuries under Section 2-201, and Counts III,
IV, V, and VI are dismissed against them.
2. Count VIII: Section 1983 Against the Board, Parker, and
Plaintiff's also claim that defendants Board, Parker, and Thomas
somehow violated Andre's equal protection rights when these defendants
acquiesced to Bush's racially discriminatory behavior by failing to
supervise, instruct, control or discipline Bush after learning of his
A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of
respondeat superior. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
385 (1989). Instead, a plaintiff must show that the deprivation of civil
rights was caused by some official custom or policy of the municipality.
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978). To state a valid § 1983 claim against the Board, plaintiffs
must allege: 1) an express policy, that, when followed,
deprives a person of his or her constitutional rights; 2) a
widespread practice that, though not authorized by an express policy or
written law, "is so permanent and well settled" as to constitute a
"custom or usage" with the force of law; or 3) an allegation
that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with "final
policymaking authority." Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County School
Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 734-35 (7th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff's have not alleged that their civil rights were violated by
an express policy or that any of the defendants was a final policymaker
for purposes of imposing liability on the school. Instead, plaintiffs
essentially allege that the defendants' acquiescence to Bush's behavior
establishes it as a custom or policy. Plaintiff's have misunderstood the
burden they must carry in alleging that a constitutional injury was
caused by a "custom" of the school district.
Plaintiff's have failed to allege that the Board had a practice or
custom of racial discrimination in this case. Because plaintiffs'
allegation of a single incident in which the Board may have failed to
instruct, supervise, control, or discipline a teacher cannot be construed
as a widespread custom of racial discrimination, this allegation is
insufficient to support a claim under Monell. Absent any
allegation that the Board was acting on an official custom or policy, the
Board's motion to dismiss is granted.
Plaintiff's claims against the individuals in their official
capacities are redundant because suits against municipal agents in their
official capacities are actually suits against the municipality.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Having concluded
that plaintiffs have failed to allege a civil rights violation by the
Board, the court dismisses plaintiffs' claims in Count VIII against the
individual defendants in their official capacities, as well
This leaves plaintiffs' claims § 1983 claims against Parker and
Thomas in their individual capacities under some sort of "equal
protection" theory. After reading the complaint liberally, and drawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, the court finds that
plaintiffs' allegations of "deliberate indifference and callous disregard
of plaintiffs' rights" are too vague to state a recognizable theory of
liability against these individuals. Accordingly, Count VIII is dismissed
against Parker and Thomas in their individual capacities, as well,
without prejudice, and plaintiffs are given leave to amend their
complaint to articulate more clearly their theory of liability against
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion to dismiss is
granted in its entirety. Plaintiff's are directed to amend their
complaint to conform to this opinion by February 11, 2004. Defendants
shall respond thereto by March 3, 2004. The parties are directed to
appear for a status report on March 4, 2004, at 9:00 a.m.