The opinion of the court was delivered by: MARTIN ASHMAN, Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Helen Henning filed a one-count employment discrimination
complaint against Defendants Maywood Park Trotting Association, Inc.,
Associates Racing Association, Inc., and Horseman's Guarantee Corporation
of America (collectively "Defendants"), alleging retaliation under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (Title VH). Defendants
have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.*fn1 For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is
Before turning to the facts of this case, we find it necessary to
discuss the collective failure of all parties to follow the Local
Rules. Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(a)(3), a party moving
for summary judgment must file a separate statement of uncontested
material facts setting forth the facts that entitle the party to judgment
as a matter of law. This statement is not optional, and a failure to file
such a statement may result in the Court denying the motion. Local R.
56.1(a). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment is required
to file a response to the statement of uncontested facts as well as any
opposing affidavits. Local R, 56.1(b). Defendants failed to file a
statement of material uncontested facts, and only filed one affidavit in
support of their motion. Plaintiff could not have filed a response to a
non-existent fact statement, but should have brought Defendants'
remissness to the attention of the Court. Additionally, Plaintiff has
failed to file any affidavits or other supporting evidence to oppose the
motion. Both parties have failed to follow this very clear Local
Rule.*fn2 Nevertheless, rather than denying the motion for summary
judgment, the Court has decided to consider it since the decision appears
to be clear. The facts as set forth below have been gleaned from the
Plaintiff's complaint and any additions and amendments to the complaint
as well as Defendants' unopposed affidavit in support of their motion,
Henning is currently a pari-mutuel clerk at the Maywood Park Race
Track,*fn3 She has been employed at the track for over seventeen years.
In May 2001, Henning filed a charge of sex and race discrimination
against Defendants with the Illinois Department of Human Rights. The IDHR
dismissed these charges on August 28, 2001.
On October 17, 2001, Henning was present at the Maywood Park Race
Track. That night, a patron named William Webster complained to the
track's security that Henning had told him that she hated "Whites" and
that she wished that terrorists would hi-jack a plane and kill more white
people. The security officer reported the situation to General Manager
Ken Kiehn. Kiehn was concerned that the remarks would scare other patrons
at the track because the remarks came so soon after the terrorists
attacks of September 11th. Kiehn was also concerned that Henning might
somehow be involved in some sort of plan to attack a crowd. Kiehn decided
that he should exclude Henning from Maywood Park until he was able to
investigate the matter further.
Henning appeared in Kiehn's offices and was told that she must leave
the premises and would not be allowed to work at Maywood Park until an
investigation into the matter had been completed. Henning claims that her
name was announced over the loudspeaker "as though she was a terrorist"
and that Kiehn told her that she was suspended until further notice. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 3, 4.) Kiehn claims that Henning was excluded, pursuant to
state law, from the track. She was not "suspended" from work because she
was still allowed to participate in the Horsemen's Guarantee Corporation
of America's employee pool and work as a pari-mutuel clerk for other
racing associations in the Chicago area.
Kiehn completed his investigation over the next three to four weeks.
At the end of his investigation, he concluded that Henning was no longer
a threat to the orderly conduct of racing at the track, and he withdrew
her exclusion from the track. Kiehn called Henning to his office and,
according to Henning, told her that "they would pay her for four (4)
days and she had been suspended for a month. . . ." (Am. Compl. ¶
Henning filed an EEOC charge, claiming that Defendants suspended her in
retaliation for her complaints to the IDHR. The EEOC issued a right to
sue letter to Henning on November 30, 2001. This suit followed.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). When the Court rules on a motion
for summary judgment, it must view all evidence, and draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). When the
non-moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, however, she may
not simply rest on the pleadings, but instead must affirmatively set
forth specific facts establishing the existence of a genuine issue of
material feet Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-26. Summary judgment must
be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and
on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id
at 322. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue
for trial,'" and summary judgment must be granted. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Under Title VII, it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). There are two methods for a plaintiff to defeat
summary judgment when alleging retaliation the direct evidence
approach or the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method as applied to
the retaliation context. Stone v. Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div.,
281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2002). Henning does not meet the requirements
of the former method as she does not present any evidence that would
establish retaliation without resort to inferences from circumstantial
evidence. See id. (noting that "mere temporal ...