Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.


United States District Court, N.D. Illinois

January 6, 2004.

DEAN E. GILBERT, Plaintiff, v., AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., et al. Defendants

The opinion of the court was delivered by: NAN NOLAN, Magistrate Judge


Plaintiff Dean Gilbert, acting pro se, has sued his former employer, American Airlines, Inc. ("American"), as well as Ann McNamara, American's general counsel, and Neil Holman, Cardelle Braxton, and Denise Kraujalis, who are, respectively, a partner, an associate, and a legal assistant from Winston & Strawn, the law firm that represented American in previous lawsuits filed by Gilbert. In this litigation, Gilbert alleges that defendants unlawfully retaliated against him for filing an employment discrimination lawsuit against American, thus violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.*fn1 Additionally, Gilbert claims defendants unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his race. The Page 2 parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons explained below, the court grants summary judgment in favor of defendants.*fn2

I. Summary Judgment Standard & Local Rule 56.1

  Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, Page 3 and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Once the movant sets forth its argument, properly supported by the record, that there is no genuine issue of material fact requiring trial, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to identify specific facts that preclude summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). "[U]nless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party," there is no issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

  Further, in this district, all parties must comply with Local Rule 56.1 which governs motions for summary judgment. Local Rule 56.1 requires the movant to file a statement of material facts demonstrating why the movant believes it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This statement "shall consist of short numbered paragraphs, including within each paragraph specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts set forth in that paragraph." L.R. 56.1(a)(3). The opposing party must respond to each numbered paragraph in the movant's L.R. 56.1(a)(3) statement. L.R. 56.1(b)(3). If the opposing party contests any fact set forth by movant, the opposing party must expressly state its disagreement and include "specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials" that establish the basis for the disagreement. Id. "All material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party." Id. The opposing party may also file a statement of any additional material facts demonstrating why summary judgment cannot be granted. Id. If the movant fails to properly controvert those additional material facts, they are Page 4 also deemed admitted. L.R. 56.1(a)(3).

  Here, American properly filed its L.R. 56.1(a)(3) statement of material facts ("American's SUF" or "Am. SUF"). Although Gilbert filed a response, his response failed to comply with L.R. 56.1(b)(3). Rather than responding to each numbered paragraph with an admission or a denial supported by the record as required, Gilbert submitted an affidavit consisting of twenty numbered paragraphs asserting various "facts" without a single citation to support in the record. Even overlooking Gilbert's failure to comply with the rule and examining the substance of Gilbert's response, as it turns out, Gilbert's response lacks much substance. With the exception of paragraph 11, which sets forth Gilbert's version of a statement McNamara made to him in August 1998 (and effectively disputes paragraph 12 in American's SUF, setting forth McNamara's version of that same conversation), nothing in Gilbert's response serves to dispute any material fact in American's SUF. Indeed, many of the "facts" asserted in Gilbert's response, even if they were properly supported, are immaterial to the case at bar. (See, e.g., Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Statement ("Pl.'s SUF Resp."), ¶¶ 2, 5-10, 12-13, 19.)

  Because of Gilbert's failure to adequately respond to American's SUF, with the exception of paragraph 12, all of the material facts set forth American's SUF are deemed admitted, provided they are properly supported by the record.*fn3 N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1(b)(3); Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 682-83 (7th Cir. 2003). To the extent any statement in Gilbert's response can be Page 5 considered a statement of additional fact,*fn4 the court will address such facts as necessary.

  II. Background*fn5

  Gilbert, who worked for American for less than nine months,*fn6 has not been employed by American since September 1986.*fn7 In March 1987, Gilbert filed a race discrimination charge with both the Illinois Department of Human Rights ("IDHR") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that American terminated him because he is African — American. In June 1989, Gilbert filed a complaint before the IDHR based on the 1987 charge. That proceeding was voluntarily dismissed in June 1996, over American's objection, before any ruling was issued on American's motion for summary decision. Gilbert subsequently obtained a right to sue letter from the EEOC, and initiated a Title VII claim for racial discrimination and retaliation in the Northern District of Illinois on May 28, 1998, Gilbert v. American Airlines, Inc., 98 C 3263. On January 25, 1999, Judge Lindberg granted summary judgment in favor of American, finding that in addition to being time — barred, Gilbert was unable to establish a prima facie case of either racial discrimination or retaliation, and was also unable to show that American's articulated, non — discriminatory reason for its actions was pretextual. When Gilbert appealed that ruling, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Judge Lindberg's decision. Gilbert v. Page 6 American Airlines, Inc., 234 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir. 2000).*fn8

  Events that occurred during the litigation before Judge Lindberg and the subsequent appeal form the basis of the present litigation. In the summer of 1998, Judge Lindberg ordered the parties to participate in a settlement conference. After the first settlement conference failed, Judge Lindberg ordered McNamara, American's general counsel, to participate in a second settlement conference. According to Gilbert, at that second settlement conference "McNamara told [him] that American would obtain its costs and attorneys fees from him and use its vast resources to ruin his life the way it had ruined the lives of other female plaintiffs who were unsuccessful [in their claims]." (Pl.'s SUF Resp., ¶ 11.) Although McNamara's version of her statement to Gilbert differs significantly, for purposes of summary judgment, defendants concede Gilbert's version of the facts concerning that conversation. (Am.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Add'l Facts, ¶ 11.)

  Later, while Gilbert's appeal of the summary judgment ruling was pending, he was erroneously billed for two Non — Revenue Space Available ("NRSA") flights that had actually been taken by two American employees. The first invoice Gilbert received, dated July 31, 2000, was for $20.54, The second invoice, dated September 30, 2000, was for the previously billed $20.54, plus a $7.53 charge for another trip, totaling $28.07.

  The NRSA system, as relevant to this case, works as follows. American provides NRSA tickets to American employees and some former American employees.*fn9 Even though individuals Page 7 using NRSA tickets may fly for free or at a reduced rate depending on various factors, they are generally assessed certain service charges, fees, and taxes. Former employees who retain their NRSA privileges are identified by their former employee identification numbers. Accordingly, American's computer system includes employee identification numbers for all former employees who are off — payroll, regardless of whether they have NRSA privileges. Recognition of a former employee's identification number by American's computer system does not depend on that individual having "active" employment status with the airline.

  NRSA travelers use either paper or electronic tickets. During 2000, the paper tickets were sent for processing to a third — party vendor in Mexico, National Processing Company ("NPC"). Once the ticket information (employee identification number, ticket number, flight segment origin and destination, etc.) is entered into the computer, the information is transferred electronically to the NRSA facility in Tulsa, where the computer system determines the amount the employee or former employee should be charged. If the NRSA traveler is a former employee, a paper invoice is then sent to the last known address.

  Gilbert's former employee identification number is 014732.*fn10 The first invoice he received, for $20.54, was for a flight taken by American employee S. Caballero, whose employee identification number is 414732. The second charge misbilled to him, for $7.53, was for a flight Page 8 actually taken by American employee L. Marchand, whose employee identification number is 014733. In the Fall of 2000, while the appeal was pending, Gilbert raised the issue of the NRSA invoices with Holman, who in turn advised his client. American subsequently issued a third invoice to Gilbert, dated December 31, 2000, which showed a zero balance.

  Gilbert believes that the invoices were not errors at all, but rather, were part of McNamara's threat to ruin his life — a threat which Gilbert also attributes to Holman. As explained in his complaint, to follow through on that threat, McNamara, Holman, Braxton and Kraujalis


returned plaintiffs identity to American's payroll and fraudulently used it to create a fictitious record of plaintiff's travel on American Airlines. If the plaintiff was no longer employed by American Airlines, their record of plaintiff s [NRSA] travel on [American], as an employee, would have evinced an allegation of his theft of their services. Meanwhile, American threatened plaintiff with legal action and negative credit reports against him for not paying their manufactured billing of his travel on their airlines.
(Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.) On December 28, 2000, Gilbert filed a charge with the EEOC based on the erroneous NRSA billings, alleging unlawful retaliation and racial discrimination. The EEOC issued a right — to — sue letter on January 29, 2001. On April 30, 2001, Gilbert commenced this litigation.

  III. Analysis

  Summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendants.*fn11 This decision is not even a Page 9 close call. Gilbert has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation or racial discrimination, and even had he not failed that critical step, he also has failed to show that the legitimate reason proffered by American for its actions is pretextual.

  A. Retaliation

  The same liability standard applies to retaliation claims under Title VII and Section 1981. Walker v. Abbott Labs., 340 F.3d 471, 474 (7th Cir. 2003). "[U]nlawful retaliation occurs when an employer takes an adverse employment action against an employee for opposing impermissible discrimination." Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2003). In a retaliation case, a plaintiff has two routes to prevent summary judgment: the direct method and the indirect method (i.e., the McDonnell Douglas method). Id. Under the direct method, there are two forms of permissible evidence, direct and circumstantial. Id. Direct evidence "essentially requires an admission by the decision — maker that his actions were based upon the prohibited animus." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no such admission here. Circumstantial evidence, "i.e., evidence that allows a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker," id., is also lacking. Gilbert filed his discrimination charge in 1987, followed by the employment discrimination lawsuit in 1998, yet it was not until the Fall of 2000 that any of the allegedly retaliatory conduct occurred. "[M]ere temporal proximity" between filing a discrimination charge and the alleged retaliation is rarely sufficient to defeat summary judgment, Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Util. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2002) — and here, Gilbert cannot even claim temporal proximity, given the more than two year gap between initiating litigation and the alleged retaliation (not to mention the thirteen year gap between filing Page 10 his initial complaint and the alleged retaliation).*fn12 Clark County Sch, Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (20 month gap insufficient: "temporal proximity must be `very close'); Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (4-month period insufficient).

  Because Gilbert cannot defeat summary judgment under the direct method, he is left with the McDonnell Douglas method, which is "designed to give plaintiff a boost when he has no actual evidence of [retaliation] but just some suspicious circumstances." Stone, 281 F.3d at 643, To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas method, a plaintiff normally must show that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) his job performance met his employer's legitimate expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated employees who did not engage in statutorily protected activity received more favorable treatment than he did. Hilt — Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2002). Because Gilbert alleges post — discharge retaliation, however, the job — performance element seems inapplicable (as American suggests). See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (allowing post — discharge retaliation claims under Title VII); Collier v. Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that prima facie case is a flexible standard). As for the adverse — employment — action element, although Gilbert was no longer an employee at the time the alleged retaliation occurred, post — discharge retaliation claims are actionable when the complained of conduct "impinges on [a plaintiff's] future employment prospects or otherwise has a nexus to Page 11 employment[.]"*fn13 Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 891 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, for example, a criminal complaint filed by an employer against a former employee can constitute the requisite adverse action. Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996).

  Failure to establish any element of a prima facie case dooms a plaintiff's retaliation claim. Hilt — Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465. In the event a plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case, "the employer must offer a legitimate, noninvidious reason for the adverse employment action." Id. "Once the employer has done so, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate the pretextual nature of the proffered reason." Id. In this context, pretext means "a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action." Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 190 F.3d 799, 807 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the plaintiff is unable to establish pretext, his retaliation claim cannot get past summary judgment. Hilt — Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465.

  Here, Gilbert has failed to establish a prima facie case. American concedes for purposes of this motion that Gilbert engaged in protected activity when he filed his original complaint of discrimination in 1987 and again when he initiated litigation in 1998. But the adverse actions he complains of are not sufficiently severe to be actionable. See Oest v. III. Dep't of Con., 240 F.3d 605, 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (adverse action must be "materially adverse" to be actionable). Gilbert's theory is that after McNamara and Holman threatened to ruin his life in the summer of Page 12 1998, they followed through on the threat by arranging to have him misbilled for MRS A travel two years later. The undisputed facts, however, fail to support his theory. The undisputed evidence shows that neither McNamara nor Holman knew anything about the misbilling until after it occurred. (Am. SUF, ¶¶ 54-55). Likewise, the undisputed evidence shows that neither Bratton nor Kraujalis had anything to do with the misbillings. (Id. at ¶¶ 59-63.) Indeed, it is undisputed that they did not know about the misbillings until after Gilbert filed this lawsuit. (Id. at ¶ 64.) So even assuming that McNamara and Holman made the alleged threat, Gilbert has offered no evidence that McNamara or Holman (or anyone else, at their direction) ever acted on that threat. An unfulfilled threat is insufficient to constitute an actionable adverse action. See Stutter v. III. Dep't of Corr., 263 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2001) (threats that "never materialized or resulted in any harm" were "too petty and tepid" to be actionable); Glaser v. Levitt, No. 98 C 210, 2000 WL 1038135, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2000) ("unfulfilled threat . . . not an actionable adverse employment action").

  Similarly, Gilbert cannot ground his claim on the fact that he was misbilled for $28.07. The misbilling — which was rectified long before Gilbert filed suit — was a mere inconvenience. See Oest, 240 F.3d at 612 ("mere inconvenience" does not rise to level of an actionable adverse action). This is "not the sort of employee grievance[] with which the . . . federal courts should be burdened." Drake v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 886 (7th Cir. 1998). Moreover, the court fails to understand how the misbilling "impinges on [Gilbert's] future employment prospects or otherwise has a nexus to employment[.]" Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 891. Gilbert also claims in his complaint that American "threatened plaintiff with legal action and negative credit reports against him for not paying [its] manufactured billing of his travel on [the airline]." Page 13 (Compl. ¶¶ 12-13.) However, even assuming such a threat has the requisite employment nexus (which is unlikely), Gilbert offers no evidence to substantiate his allegations.*fn14 For that matter, even if there were evidence that such a threat had been made, at best, it would constitute another unfulfilled threat: it is undisputed that American neither reported Gilbert to any credit agencies nor instituted legal action against him to collect the $28,07. Gilbert has nothing to substantiate his belief that he suffered an adverse action. Additionally, he makes no attempt to show that other similarly situated employees who did not engage in protected activity received better treatment than he did. Gilbert thus fails to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

  Furthermore, even if Gilbert could set forth a prima facie case, American proffers a legitimate, noninvidious reason for the misbilling: it was a mistake. Gilbert was billed for flights taken by two American employees as a result of human error that occurred when NPC, the third party vendor, processed the NRSA tickets. The burden thus shifts back to Gilbert to show that the proffered explanation is pretextual — i.e., that it is a lie. Hilt — Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465; Vakharia, 190 F.3d at 807. Gilbert can survive summary judgment only if he shows there is a disputed issue of material fact on the issue of pretext. To do so, he must either provide direct evidence showing that defendants were more likely than not motivated by a retaliatory reason, or indirect evidence "showing that the defendants' stated reasons are not credible." Alexander v. Wisc. Dep't of Health & Family Servs., 263 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2001).

  Gilbert believes American is lying. Lacking any direct evidence to support his belief, he Page 14 must come forward with indirect evidence which shows either that defendants are lying or that their stated reason has no basis in fact. Id. at 683. In an attempt to meet his burden, Gilbert asserts that it is incredible to think that he was erroneously billed twice "when the accuracy level of billing of NSRA ticketing was 98.5%."*fn15 (PL Resp. at 3.) The fact that errors are relatively rare, however, does not establish that American's proffered reason is a lie. See Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2001) (pretext means "more than an unusual act"; it "means deceit to cover ones tracks"). It is undisputed that: (1) during 2000, NPC processed an average of 225,000 tickets per month; (2) entering the relevant information into the database requires an average of 24 keystrokes, for a total of approximately 5,400,000 keystrokes per month; (3) entering the employee identification number requires six keystrokes, resulting in approximately 1,350,000 keystrokes (out of the total 5,400,000 keystrokes); and (4) five of the six digits in both Marchand's and Caballero's employee identification numbers (014733 and 414732, respectively) match the corresponding digits in Gilbert's former employee identification Page 15 number (014732). As American points out, an average accuracy rate of 98.5% still allows for 243,000 errors in inputting employee identification numbers over a one year period.*fn16 Given Gilbert's failure to offer any substantive evidence to rebut American's proffered explanation, no rational trier of fact could conclude that American's stated reason for the misbilling — i.e., that it was a mistake — is a lie. Alexander, 263 F.3d at 683. Summary judgment is therefore granted in favor of defendants on Gilbert's retaliation claim.

  B. Racial Discrimination

  In opposing the motion for summary judgment, however, Gilbert asserts that he also raised a racial discrimination claim. The court assumes that Gilbert's intended point is that even if his retaliation claim does not survive summary judgment, he still has a racial discrimination claim. That is not the case. Although Gilbert's EEOC charge and complaint assert racial discrimination in addition to retaliation, his factual allegations can be reasonably construed only as a claim for unlawful retaliation against Gilbert for pursuing the prior litigation. A plain, unconstrained reading of the complaint simply offers no basis for an employment discrimination claim based on race. See Cable v. Ivy Tech State Coll., 200 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 1999) (body of complaint failed "even to hint at retaliation, much less develop a factual basis for such a claim"). It is undisputed that Gilbert has not been an American employee since 1986.*fn17 Events that took place between 1998 and 2000 — time when he was neither an employee nor an Page 16 applicant for employment — cannot support a claim that Gilbert suffered an adverse employment action because of his race,

IV. Conclusion
  The court therefore grants summary judgment in favor of defendants and against Gilbert, and terminates this case. Finally, given the frivolous nature of this litigation, and the fact that Gilbert has been litigating issues relating to his employment with American since 1987 without any evidentiary support for his claims, the court asks the Executive Committee to consider barring Gilbert from filing further pro se complaints against American, its employees, its lawyers, or anyone else relating to the set of facts that formed the basis for either this case or Gilbert v. American Airlines, Inc., 98 C 3263 (his original litigation against American) unless he first obtains leave of court to do so.

  (Reserved for use by the Court)


  Plaintiff Dean Gilbert filed a motion to strike certain matters from defendants' summary judgment pleadings. The material he wants stricken includes various statements in the defendants' memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment and/or defendants' statement of material facts relating to prior litigation between the parties. Gilbert contends that because he was not allowed discovery in this case relating to the prior litigation, it is unfair for defendants to now raise facts relating to the prior litigation in the motion for summary judgment. He further contends that by including such materials, "defendants are demonizing the plaintiff and making an emotional appeal to the trier of fact." (Pl.'s Mot. to Strike at 1.) Defendants oppose the motion to strike. First, defendants state that alt challenged statements were culled from public documents filed or issued in connection with the prior litigation, and thus, Gilbert had complete access to information relating to them. Second, they argue (among other points) that the public facts about the prior litigation are material both to show (1) what statutorily protected activity Gilbert claims to have engaged in, and (2) the temporal proximity (or lack thereof) between Gilbert engaging in protected activity and the alleged retaliation.

  The court finds no reason to strike the challenged material, and thus denies plaintiff's motion. As an initial matter, plaintiff's motion to strike purports to be a Rule 12(f) motion, but that rule is inapplicable. Rule 12(f) authorizes a court to strike "from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous material." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) (emphasis added). Rule 12(f) applies only to pleadings, however, and neither motions for summary judgment nor statements of material fact constitute pleadings. See, e.g., Deboer v. Vill. of Oak Park, No. 98 C 2437, 1999 WL 691845, at * I (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 1999); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Admiral Maint. Serv. L.P., 174 F.R.D. 643, 646 (N.D. III. 1997) (collecting cases). Thus, Rule) 2(0 is "not the proper vehicle" for Gilbert's request. Deboer, 1999 WL 691845, at *1. Of course, it is not unusual for parties to file motions to strike materials relating to summary judgment — just not under Rule 12(f).

  Regardless, for any motion to strike, the court has discretion to grant or deny the motion. See Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Cottec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, (7th Cir. 2003) (refusal to strike summary judgment materials reviewed for abuse of discretion); Videojet v. Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Inkjet, Inc., No. 95 C 7016, 1997 WL 124259, at *3 (N.D. III. Mar. 17, 1997) (court has "considerable discretion . . . and, as a general matter, motions to strike . . . under Rule 12(f) are disfavored"). The court finds many of the challenged fads relating to the prior litigation arc indeed material, for the reasons set forth by plaintiffs. More importantly, there is nothing scandalous or prejudicial in the challenged material. Even if some of the challenged facts are redundant or superfluous, this court is capable of considering, and indeed has considered, only those facts necessary to resolve the summary judgment motion.

  Plaintiff also filed a motion (and supplemental motion) for sanctions, asserting that defendants, through their attorney: (1) failed to submit a privilege log; (2) failed to include in the Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosures the addresses and phone numbers for all individuals likely to have discoverable information; (3) improperly categorized documents in the Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures; and (4) made improper objections and otherwise obstructed the deposition of Robert Taylor. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the motion for sanctions.

  Regarding the privilege log, according to defendants no privileged documents were withheld, other than documents created by litigation counsel after litigation commenced. Defendants contend they had no obligation to provide a log regarding those post — litigation documents created by litigation counsel, relying on Sphere Drake Insurance Ltd. v. All American Life Insurance Co., 221 F. Supp.2d 874, 886 (N.D. Ill. 2002), a case in which the court allowed a party to omit from the privilege log any documents authored by litigation counsel during the case. This court need not, and does not, address whether the Sphere court created a general rule applicable to all cases. But given Sphere, defendants at least had a reasonable basis to believe a privilege log was not necessary. Accordingly, if the court were inclined to provide relief to plaintiff, it would order defendants to produce a privilege log, not sanction them. At this point, it would be pointless to order production of a privilege log because the court has granted summary judgment for defendants.

  As for the home addresses and phone numbers of witnesses plaintiff claims were withheld, Rule 26(a)(1)(A) requires only disclosure of contact information (if known), not disclosure of home contact information. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(I)(A). Here, defendants identified two categories of witnesses in their Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosures: American employees and employees/partners at Winston & Strawn. Defendants provided a business address for each witness, and further indicated that the witnesses could be contacted through defendants' counsel. Plaintiff was given a means to contact all witnesses, which is both sufficient and shows the lack of prejudice to plaintiff. Nor is there a problem with the way defendants categorized documents identified in their Rule 26(a) disclosures, despite plaintiff's contention to the contrary. As for plaintiff's last complaint, regarding the Taylor deposition, plaintiff offers no evidence of any sanctionable conduct by defendants' counsel.

  The motion for sanctions is therefore denied.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Official citation and/or docket number and footnotes (if any) for this case available with purchase.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.