Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County. No. 02-CF-1001 Honorable George J. Bakalis, Judge, Presiding.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Gilleran Johnson
The defendant, James Jones, was charged with aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (aggravated DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), (c--1)(3) (West 2002)). Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood and urine tests based on the fact that the tests were administered without his consent. The State appeals the June 26, 2002, order of the circuit court of Du Page County granting the defendant's motion to suppress. We affirm.
The relevant facts are as follows. On April 3, 2002, the defendant was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The accident did not involve personal injury or death. As a result of this accident, the defendant was issued several traffic citations and charged with aggravated DUI (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), (c--1)(3) (West 2002)) and driving while his driver's license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6--303(a), (d) (West 2002)).
Prior to arresting the defendant on these charges, the arresting police officer had detected a strong odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath and asked the defendant to perform field sobriety tests. The defendant refused and complained of pain in his sternum area. The arresting officer then transported the defendant to Elmhurst Hospital.
At the hospital, the arresting officer read and issued the defendant the warning-to-motorist document. The arresting officer asked the defendant to consent to a collection of blood or urine. The defendant refused to voluntarily give a blood or urine sample. No blood or urine was required for the defendant's medical treatment. Over the defendant's objections, and at the direction of the arresting officer, hospital personnel took blood and urine samples from the defendant, which were analyzed for alcohol and drugs.
On June 6, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood and urine tests. In his motion, the defendant argued that the test results were inadmissible because his blood and urine were taken without his consent and not in the course of providing him medical treatment. On June 26, 2002, the trial court granted the defendant's motion, finding that the tests were statutorily prohibited by section 11--501.2(c)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/11--501.2(c)(2) (West 2002)). The State filed a certificate of impairment and timely appealed.
Before addressing the merits of the State's appeal, we note that the defendant has filed a motion to strike portions of the State's reply brief. The defendant argues that the State's reply brief contains arguments not made in its appellant's brief, contrary to Supreme Court Rules 341(e)(7) and 341(g) (188 Ill. 2d Rs. 341(e)(7), (g)). Rule 341(e)(7) provides that "[p]oints not argued are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing." 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). Rule 341(g) provides that "[t]he reply brief, if any, shall be confined strictly to replying to arguments presented in the brief of the appellee and need contain only [a]rgument." 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(g). After reviewing the State's reply brief, we believe that it sufficiently complies with Rules 341(e)(7) and 341(g). The majority of the State's reply brief is responsive to the arguments raised by the defendant in his appellee brief. Accordingly, we decline to strike any portion of the State's reply brief.
Turning now to the merits of the appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in suppressing the defendant's blood and urine test results. The State argues that, contrary to the trial court's ruling, section 11--501.2(c)(2) does not prohibit nonconsensual chemical testing of suspected impaired drivers. The State further argues that the common law specifically allows nonconsensual chemical testing of suspected impaired drivers.
The history of the legislation and case law relating to chemical testing in driving-under-the- influence cases is a necessary preamble to our resolution of the State's contention. Prior to 1982, the Illinois Vehicle Code required that a suspected impaired driver must consent to a chemical test to determine the alcohol content of his or her blood in order for such test results to be admissible at trial. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95½, par. 11--501(c)(3). Section 11--501(c)(3) of the Vehicle Code provided in pertinent part:
"Evidence based upon a chemical analysis of blood, urine, breath or
other bodily substance shall not be admitted unless such substance
was procured and such analysis made with the consent of the person
as provided by this Chapter ***." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 95½,
Effective January 1, 1982, through Public Act 82--311, the legislature deleted section 11--501(c)(3) of the Vehicle Code, removing the consent requirement, and added section 11--501.2. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95½, pars. 11--501(c), 11--501.2. In particular, section 11--501.2(c) states:
"If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test
***, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any civil or
criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have
been committed while the person under the influence of alcohol, or
other drugs, or combination of both was driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95
½, par. 11--501.2(c) (now 625 ILCS 5/11--501.2(c)(1) (West 2002)).
Subsequent to the enactment of Public Act 82--311, this court ruled in Village of Algonquin v. Ford, 145 Ill. App. 3d 19, 21 (1986), that absent a limiting statutory provision, there is no prohibition against the taking of an involuntary blood, urine, or breath sample from an alleged intoxicated driver. We relied on the principle enunciated in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 916, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1832 (1966), and People v. Todd, 59 Ill. 2d 534, 544 (1975), that a compulsory, nonconsensual chemical test does not violate any constitutional rights, so long as probable cause exists that the individual from whom the bodily sample is taken has committed the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both. Thereafter, several courts ruled conformably with Ford. See People v. Ayres, 228 Ill. App. 3d 277, 279 (1992) (consent is not a prerequisite to the admissibility of chemical test results in driving under the influence prosecutions); People v. Byrd, 215 Ill. App. ...