The opinion of the court was delivered by: Milton I. Shadur, Senior United States District Judge
In this admiralty action, brought by Daren Wagner ("Wagner") and Wagner Charter Co., Inc. ("Wagner Charter") — collectively "Wagner Plaintiffs" — against M/V Jamaica (the "Vessel"), A. Paul Knott, Jr. ("Knott") and Wagner Cruises, Ltd. ("Wagner Cruises"), the possible sale of the Vessel remains in an on-again, off-again posture because of uncertainty as to the ability to consummate a potential private sale to which the parties had stipulated at the end of January 2003.*fn1 In the meantime Wagner Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rule") 56 and, not to be outdone, Knott has not only responded but has brought his own Rule 56 motion.
Apart from their admiralty claim that seeks foreclosure of a preferred ship mortgage affecting the Vessel (see 46 U.S.C. § 31322), Wagner Plaintiffs assert claims under the supplemental jurisdiction auspices of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Those claims relate to three July 5, 2001 agreements that, as Wagner Plaintiffs would have it, are separate free-standing contracts to be evaluated in the same way as the interrelated contracts in Rosenblum v. Travelbyus.com, Ltd., 299 F.3d 657, 663 (7th Cir. 2002):
1. Purchase Agreement between Wagner Charter as the
Seller and Wagner Cruises and Knott collectively as the
2. Consulting Agreement between Knott and Wagner
Cruises as the hiring parties and Wagner as the hired
3. Non-compete Agreement between Knott and Wagner
Cruises on the one hand and Wagner on the other, by which
the latter is prohibited from engaging in various types of
activity for a period ending December 31, 2004.
There is no disputing the existence of defaults under each of the several agreements. Nor have either the Vessel or Wagner Cruises responded to Wagner Plaintiffs well-supported motion, so that judgment as a matter of law should clearly be entered against them. Only Knott seeks to avoid personal liability, but the analysis that follows reveals that those efforts must fail.
For one thing, Knott strives to argue that because the three agreements at issue "were all part and parcel of the same purchase agreement and this defendant believes that they were separated for the sole purpose of Daren Wagner, of [sic — should presumably be "as"] one of the shareholders of plaintiff, to avoid payment of a substantial portion of the proceeds [to] the remaining shareholders" (Knott Facts ¶ 5, pointing to his affidavit. Rosenblum really scotches any such recharacterization of the three agreements as a single contract to begin with. But only a little added thought is needed to see that Knott's contention, which is really unsupported factually as well as legally, is not a basis for any complaint on his part in any event.
What seems to underpin Knott's approach in that respect is a mistaken notion that consideration for the agreements was somehow lacking. That is of course wrong under the universal principle of contract law under which the simple exchange of promises suffices for enforceability. And even if the entire transaction were impermissibly recast, in contravention of the contractual terms, as a $1.15 million purchase of the Vessel (instead of $450,000 under the Purchase Agreement, $350,000 under the Consulting Agreement and $350,000 under the Non-compete Agreement), the presence of the requisite consideration, the existence of default and the amount due upon the default would remain the same.
At its core, then, Knott's defense is one of the claimed absence of personal liability on his part on the premise that he was a non-party to the agreements. That was a position that Knott had sought to advance much earlier by filing a summary judgment motion on November 7, 2002. This Court rejected that motion out of hand on November 8, by ruling orally that the contention was totally at odds with various of the contractual provisions.
It is true that the standard on Wagner Plaintiffs' Rule 56 motion differs from that on Knott's earlier and present motions, in that on Wagner Plaintiffs' motion any reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of nonmovant Knott (Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 2002)). But that provides Knott no comfort, for there are no genuine issues of material fact that would call for inference-drawing in any event.
Because each of the three agreements at issue involves slight differences in the factors that confirm Knott's personal liability, they call for separate discussion. But as will be seen, none requires extensive treatment.
As stated earlier, the introductory paragraph that identifies the parties expressly names both Wagner Cruises and Knott, labeling them collectively as "Buyer." Knott's argument that this was done because the corporation was not yet in existence does not help him — if true, he necessarily had to be liable personally at the outset, because the absence of any party at all on the buying side would have caused the agreement to be devoid of meaning — of any prospect of enforceability. If the parties' mutual goal had been as Knott now claims, the often-used locution of an individual reciting that he or she is entering into an agreement "solely on behalf of a corporation to be formed" could have accomplished that asserted purpose of Knott's avoiding personal liability when the corporation came into existence later,
Here nothing of the sort was done. Instead the signature portion of the document also listed (and was signed by) Knott individually, *fn2 as well as his signing separately as President of Wagner Cruises (whether it was then in existence or yet to be formed). Nothing in the document suggests that Knott's original personal responsibility was to drop out at any future date, and he cannot so claim in the face of the document's integration clause (Purchase Agreement ¶ 15) *fn3
Again the opening paragraph of the document lists both Knott and Wagner Cruises as contracting parties. But even more damning to Knott's position is that every substantive provision of the agreement, as well as the "WHEREAS" recital (which says that "Cruises and Knott desire to hire Wagner"), refers to both Wagner Cruises and Knott, this time eschewing any collective term to refer to both. Consulting Agreement ¶ 5 expressly reads "Cruises and Knott agree to ...