The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ruben Castillo, United States District Court
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff James O'Donnell filed this lawsuit against Defendant City of Chicago ("City") alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1001, 1621 and 1623; and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983 and 1985. O'Donnell claims that the City unlawfully retaliated against him by denying him a position with the Department of Health, discriminated against him by terminating his position and misrepresented his union number several times, causing him injury. O'Donnell also filed a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, alleging that the City made a false declaration in prior litigation between the parties by misrepresenting his union number to the court. Currently before this Court is the City's motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(3) motion. After careful consideration, we grant the City's motion in part and deny it in part. (R. 10-1.) We also deny Plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(3) motion. (R. 8-1,)
O'Donnell was employed by the City's Department of Health ("CDOH") as an osteopathic physician at various city clinics. After an event occurring on or about April 25, 2000, O'Donnell attended a predisciplinary hearing in connection with his alleged violation of the City's Violence in the Workplace policy. "The statement of charges filed in connection with the violation alleged, inter alia, tint on or about April 25, 2000, O'Donnell verbally abused and behaved in an intimidating manner toward another City employee." O'Donnell v. Daley, No. 01 C 5551, 01 C 5530, 01 C 4848, 01 C 4622, 2002 WL 100443, at *1 (ND. Ill. Jan. 25, 2002). The City terminated O'Donnell's employment on August 21, 2000. Id.
On or about October 20, 2000, O'Donnell applied and was rejected for the positions of medic& director of STD/HIV Prevention program and Commissioner of the Chicago Department of Health. Id. In March 2001 O'Donnell filed charges with the EEOC, alleging that his August 2000 discharge was based on his race, national origin, and religion and that his October 2000 rejection for the position of Commissioner of the CDOH was based on these factors, plus age and sex. Id.
After the EEOC investigations, O'Donnell sued the City of Chicago, Mayor Richard Daley, and Sheila Lyne, head of the CDOH, in a case before Judge Kocoras. Id. He also brought. a lawsuit against the AFSCME Union, a case originally before Judge Alesia but later consolidated with the action before Judge Kocoras. O'Donnell sued under Title VII, 29 U.S.C. § 185 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983 and 1985. On January 25, 2002, Judge Kocoras dismissed the suit. in its entirety for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted. Id. at *5
In October 2001, while the lawsuit before Judge Kocoras was proceeding, O'Donnell applied for a position as a medical director with the CDOH. (R. 8, Am. Compl. a(7.) He notified the "appropriate City of Chicago officials," including Mayor Daley, about his application. (Id.) On or about February 20, 2002, the City notified O'Donnell that he did not receive the position. (Id. at &) O'Donnell then filed another EEOC charge, alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII because of his failure to secure the CDOH position. (Id., Ex. Q, Charge of Discrimination at 78.)
O'Donnell filed the instant suit against the City on March 13, 2002. (R. 1, Compl.) On May 30, 2002, this Court granted the City's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint because the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred his claims. (R. 7, May 30, 2002 Order.) In addition, we found that Plaintiff failed to state any valid causes of action. (Id.) However, in deference to Plaintiff's pro se status, we dismissed without prejudice with leave to refile an amended complaint. (Id.) On or about November 15, 2002, O'Donnell filed an amended complaint alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII, intentional misrepresentation and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983 and 1985. (R. 8, Am. Compl.) He also filed a Rule 60(b)(3) motion, claiming that the City intentionally misrepresented his union number in previous litigation and made a false declaration before this Court by stating that res judicata barred this action. (Id.) Currently before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the amended complaint and Plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(3) motion.
O'Donnell filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) motion, alleging that the City made a false declaration in previous litigation by misstating his union number as Local 3368 when, in fact, his union was Council 31. (R. 8, Am. Compl. at 2.) As an initial matter, Rule 60(b) motions generally should be brought in the court in which the original judgment was rendered. See, e.g., Sec. Exch, Comm'n v. Gellas, 1 F. Supp.2d 333, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); see also Taft v. Donellan Jerome, Inc., 407 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1969). And, of course, O'Donnell cannot use the Rule 60(b)(3) motion before this Court to relitigate his prior lawsuit or as a substitute for proper appeal from that judgment. Bell v. Eastman Kodak Co, 214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that plaintiff cannot use Rule 60 to obtain reconsideration when the "ground for setting aside a judgment" could "have been used to obtain a reversal by means of a direct appeal."); Donald v. Cook County Sheriffs Dep't., 95 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1996); Plattner v. Strick Corp., 102 F.R.D. 612, 614 (N.D. Ill. 1984). Therefore, we question the propriety of O'Donnell's motion before this Court. Nevertheless, because we construe apt-a se litigant's claims liberally for purposes of a motion to dismiss, id. at 555, we will address O'Donnell's claim under Rule 60(b) that the City perpetrated a fraud on the court in the prior proceeding. Specifically, O'Donnell claims that the City knew Local 3368 represented county court workers and not health workers, (id. at 19), but instead falsely represented to Judge Alesia and Judge Kocoras that Union 3368 represented county health workers, (id. at 18, 29). Plaintiff further states that the City and the AFSCME union conspired to perpetuate this misstatement. (Id. at 10.) Finally, O'Donnell alleges that the City made a false declaration before this Court when, in April 2002, the City stated that res judicata applied to his claims in the first complaint. (Id. at 20.)
Rule 60(b)(3) provides in part that "on motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons . . . fraud. . ., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). To obtain relief under this subsection, the party mast prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the party maintained a meritorious claim at trial and (2) because of the fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct of the adverse party, (3) the party was prevented from fully and fairly presenting its case at trial. Provident Sav. Bank v. Popovich, 71 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1995). The district court has "great discretion in balancing the finality of judgment against the other salutary policies embodied in the alternate grounds for relief" under Rule 60. Plattner, 102 F.R.D. at 614.
O'Donnell fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the City's misstatement of his union number satisfies the requirements of Rule 60(b)(3). First, O'Donnell did not have a meritorious claim in his previous case against the City. Judge Kocoras granted Defendants' motion to dismiss in that case, noting that "none of the federally based claims of the complaint state a claim upon which relief can be granted." O'Donnell, 2002 WL 100443, at *5. Second, O'Donnell does not allege how the City's misstatement "unfairly prejudiced him by preventing him from fully and fairly presenting [his] case." Provident, 71 F.3d at 700 (internal quotations omitted). O'Donnell does not explain how the City's alleged misstatement of his union number prevented him from arguing his case but instead notes only that a false declaration is "a criminal offense." (R. 8, Am, Compl. at 7.) Because he does not show how the City's statements obstructed his case, his Rule 60(b)(3) motion fails.
In addition, O'Donnell's Rule 60(h)(3) motion should be denied because he knew or should have known that the union number presented to Judge Kocoras in the prior litigation was incorrect. The misidentification of the union number was not "a fraud that the losing party could not have discovered in time to have it rectified by the court of appeals." Bell. 214 F.3d at 801. O'Donnell clearly was ...