Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.


March 6, 2003


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Amy J. St. Eve, United States District Court Judge


Debtor-Plaintiff Marjorie Lynn Mungo appeals from the October 5, 2001 judgment of the bankruptcy court (as amended on March 22, 2002), and Creditor-Defendant Maureen Sullivan Taylor cross appeals. For the reasons discussed below, the bankruptcy court's order as amended is affirmed in part and reversed in part.


On July 14, 2000, Mungo filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and listed Taylor as a disputed creditor. Taylor was a disputed creditor by virtue of her representation of Mungo in state court divorce proceedings. Mungo objected to Taylor's proof of claim, alleging that Taylor had coerced Mungo into signing a marital settlement, and Mungo filed an adversary proceeding against Taylor, alleging legal malpractice. The bankruptcy court consolidated the objection to the claim and the adversary proceeding and held a four and a half day bench trial.

On October 5, 2001, Judge Wedoff held that Mungo had established a number of breaches of duty by Taylor, including her failure to complete discovery, failure to obtain complete financial information prior to completing the pretrial statement, failure to seek interim attorney's fees, failure to give thorough advice regarding the consequences of the settlement agreement, and her paralegal's instruction to Mungo to offer false testimony. Nonetheless, Judge Wedoff entered judgment in favor of Taylor in the adversary proceeding because he found that Mungo had failed to provide evidence of damages resulting from any of these breaches. (See R. 1-1, Record, Vol. VIII, October 5, 2001 Ruling.)

Mungo filed a motion for reconsideration, and on March 22, 2002, Judge Wedoff amended his ruling on the adversary complaint to award Mungo damages in the amount of $7,340.43. (See R. 1-1, Record, Vol. I, Mar. 22, 2002 Mem. of Decision.) Mungo and Taylor both filed a bill of costs in the adversary case, and on April 17, 2002, Judge Wedoff entered an order granting Taylor's bill of costs and denying Mungo's bill of costs. Taylor filed a timely notice of appeal from the amended ruling on the adversary action, and Mungo filed a timely appeal from the order denying her bill of costs.

On the claim objection, Judge Wedoff sustained Mungo's objection in part, reducing Taylor's proof of claim from $25,224.28 to $10,641.38. (See R. 1-1, Record, Vol. VIII, October 5, 2001 Ruling.) Mungo sought to amend or alter the allowance of Taylor's claim, but that motion was denied. Mungo subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal related to the amount of Taylor's proof of claim.


In accordance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8006, Mungo filed and served her statement of issues to be presented on appeal, which may be summarized in these terms:

1. Whether Mungo proved damages in excess of $7,340.43;

2. Whether Mungo waived the argument that Taylor's claim for attorney's fees should be disallowed where Mungo failed to make the request during closing argument;
3. Whether the bankruptcy court erred by failing to compel testimony concerning a gift received by Mungo's former spouse just days after the divorce settlement; and
4. Whether the bankruptcy court erred by failing to award Mungo costs where she was the prevailing party at trial.
In accordance with Rule 8006, Taylor filed and served her statement of issues to be presented on appeal. These issues are as follows:
1. Whether any of Taylor's negligent acts or omissions proximately caused Mungo any damages;
2. Whether the bankruptcy court's finding that Taylor failed to give thorough advice concerning the divorce settlement was clearly erroneous;
3. Whether the bankruptcy court's finding that Taylor and her former spouse were undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown in August 1997 was clearly erroneous;
4. Whether the bankruptcy court's finding that dissipated family assets were not used for legitimate family expenses was clearly erroneous;
5. Whether Mungo is entitled to damages based on a legal theory not raised until closing arguments; and
6. Whether the bankruptcy court erred by refusing to permit Mungo to testify contrary to her sworn testimony in the underlying state court divorce proceedings.

In the course of a district court's decision to affirm, modify or reverse an order of the bankruptcy court, "[f]indings of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." F.R.Bankr.P. 8013. Thus, a bankruptcy court's factual findings cannot be disturbed "simply because [the district court] is convinced it would have decided the case differently." In re Weber, 892 F.2d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). Both questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, however, are reviewed de novo. See In re Ebbler Furniture and Appliances, Inc., 804 F.2d 87, 89 (7th Cir. 1986).


In order to recover damages for a legal malpractice action in Illinois, a plaintiff must establish what the result would have been in the underlying action where the plaintiff's former attorney committed the alleged malpractice. See Eastman v. Messner, 721 N.E.2d 1154, 1158, 188 Ill.2d 404, 411 (Ill. 1999). A plaintiff need not prove to a certainty that she would have prevailed absent legal malpractice, but she must show that a victory of some sort was more likely than not in the underlying action. See Praxair, Inc. v. Hinshaw & Culbertson, 235 F.3d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 2000); Jones Motor Co. v. Holtkamp, Liese, Beckemeier & Childress, P.C., 197 F.3d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1999). In this case, the underlying action was a divorce action, and the measure of damages for Mungo's legal malpractice claim is the difference between her recovery under the settlement agreement and what she would have recovered in the divorce action but for Taylor's legal malpractice.

Mungo attacks Judge Wedoff's analysis of the value of her underlying divorce action, arguing that he undervalued the marital estate. In a divorce action, the issues of damages and the valuation of the marital estate are factual questions to be resolved by the trier of fact. In re Marriage of Lee, 615 N.E.2d 1314, 1321, 246 Ill. App.3d 628, 636 (Ill.App. Ct. 1993). Under the clearly erroneous standard, if the bankruptcy court's factual findings are plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, a reviewing court may not reverse even if it would have weighed the evidence differently. Matter of Love, 957 F.3d 1350, 1354 (7th Cir. 1992).

Judge Wedoff began his damages analysis by calculating the value of the marital assets and determining the value of Mungo's dissipation claim. Based on the record evidence, Judge Wedoff determined that the value of the estate was $301,075.73, including the value of the dissipation claim and the value of the marital assets. Judge Wedoff determined that Mungo would have received 60% of the marital property, or $180,645.43, had the case gone to trial. Judge Wedoff then ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.