The opinion of the court was delivered by: John W. Darrah, Judge, United States District Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Oneta S. Cole ("Plaintiff"), moves for reconsideration of the Court's October 24, 2002 decision granting Defendants', U.S. Capital, Inc.; AutoNation USA Corporation; and Jerry Gleason Chevrolet, Inc.'s ("Defendants"), motion to dismiss on the ground that Defendants had made a "firm offer of credit" within the meaning of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. ("FCRA"). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is denied, and Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend is granted.
Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or presenting newly discovered evidence or an intervening change in the law. Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 1998). Reconsideration is appropriate when "the Court has patently misunderstood a party . . . or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties . . . or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension." Spearman Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 139 F. Supp.2d 943, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (quoting Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990)). A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to introduce new legal theories for the first time, to raise legal arguments that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion, or to present evidence that could have been adduced during the pendency of the original motion. Publishers Res., Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publ'ns, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Oil Spill by the "Amoco Cadiz" off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 794 F. Supp. 261, 267 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Movants should not use a motion for reconsideration to rehash arguments previously rejected by the court. Sikora v. AFD Indus., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 841, 844 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
Plaintiff requests that this Court reconsider its decision of October 24, 2002. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order, this Court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, holding that the allegations in the amended complaint reasonably supported the inference that Defendants had obtained Plaintiff's credit report for the purpose of extending her a "firm offer of credit", a permissible purpose under the FCRA. Plaintiff argues that (1) the Court failed to address her principal argument that no offer was made because the terms were insufficient to permit acceptance and that the offer was inherently ambiguous, (2) the offer was not "clear and conspicuous", and (3) the offer of a credit line of $300.00 or more was too small to constitute a "firm offer of credit". Plaintiff requests that the Court hold that Defendants did not make a "firm offer of credit" or, in the alternative, grant Plaintiff leave file a second amended complaint alleging the offer to be a sham.
Each of the arguments that Plaintiff asserts were raised in Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Although some of these issues were not explicitly discussed in the earlier Memorandum Opinion and Order dated October 24, 2002, the Court considered all of the issues raised in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss at that time. "A district court is not required to specifically address [in its opinion] each and every [fact] asserted. . . ." Shannon v. Saks & Co., No. 94 C 1793, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9324, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 3, 1995). Plaintiff's motion to reconsider merely restates arguments previously rejected by the Court and, therefore, is denied. See Sikora, 18 F. Supp. at 844. Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second amended complaint instanter.
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's, Oneta S. Cole's, Motion to Reconsider is denied. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend is granted.
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