Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. METRA, Honorable Martin E. McDonough, Judge Presiding.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Gordon
Plaintiff Christopher King (plaintiff), filed a complaint against defendant, Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District (defendant) *fn1 , alleging that defendant's employees were negligent in removing plaintiff from a commuter train against his will, in an incapacitated state, and that defendant's negligence proximately caused the injuries plaintiff sustained when he fell from the train platform. Defendant thereupon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that a suit brought against an Indiana state agency or its employees must be brought in Indiana pursuant to the holdings of our supreme court, as well as this court, in Schoeberlein v. Purdue University, 129 Ill. 2d 372 (1989) and Grabarczyk v. Chicago South Shore and South Bend R.R., 279 Ill. App. 3d 208 (1996), respectively. The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the "Illinois Constitution prohibits Illinois Courts from declining to exercise jurisdiction over Indiana state agencies when the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the cause of action takes place in Illinois." Pursuant to defense counsel's motion, the trial court then certified the following questions for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (Rule 308) (155 Ill.2d R. 308):
"1. Does the Illinois Supreme Court Decision of Schoeberlein v. Purdue University, 129 Ill.2d 372 (1989) and the Illinois Appellate Court Decision of Grabarczyk v. Chicago and South Shore R.R., 279 Ill.App.3d 208 (1st Dist. 1996) require that Illinois Courts decline to exercise jurisdiction over Indiana state agencies even when the cause of action accrues or arises from an occurrence which takes place in Illinois?
2. Is it unconstitutional, as held by the trial court, for Illinois Courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over Indiana state agencies when the occurrence giving rise to the cause of action takes place in the State of Illinois?"
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand.
The facts of this case are undisputed by the parties. On January 21, 1999, plaintiff boarded a commuter train in Chicago destined for Indiana. He was in an intoxicated and impaired condition. Train personnel removed plaintiff from the train at the Kensington Station, which was not the location of his intended destination. The record does not explain why plaintiff was removed. While at the Kensington station, plaintiff fell off the platform and was injured. The extent of his injuries are not set forth in the record.
In July 2001, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County alleging three counts of negligence against defendant. One month later, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that a suit brought against the State of Indiana or its agents or employees must be brought in an Indiana court pursuant to previous Illinois Supreme and Appellate Court opinions deciding similar issues. Plaintiff responded to defendant's motion arguing that Illinois courts are not required to follow Indiana law, that Illinois policy provides all persons injured in Illinois with a legal remedy and that Indiana state agencies are subject to Illinois jurisdiction based on the Illinois long-arm statute. See 735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 2000).
After hearing argument on the motion to dismiss which reasserted the contentions made by the parties in their respective pleadings, the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss. In making its ruling, the court stated:
"To the extent that the Indiana statute bars a cause of action by the defendant for doing an act of business in Illinois and bars that *** plaintiff from access to the Illinois courts, which is what you're contending here, I find that portion of the act as it applies to the plaintiff in this case unconstitutional. I believe that under full faith *** I believe that the defendant operating a business, particularly a commuter line, in the state of Illinois is subject to jurisdiction as any other railroad corporation or transportation company. For that reason, your motion to dismiss is denied."
Thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended complaint which re-alleged three counts of negligence against defendant and added a fourth count against another party. Defendant countered by filing a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the same basis previously alleged in his motion to dismiss the original complaint. The trial court denied defendant's motion for the same reasons it previously articulated. Defendant then moved to certify the questions previously set forth above for immediate appeal and the trial court certified the questions pursuant to Rule 308. 155 Ill.2d R. 308.
This court is first called upon to determine whether the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Schoeberlein, and this court's decision in Grabarczyk, require that Illinois courts decline to exercise jurisdiction over defendant, Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, which is an undisputed agency of the State of Indiana, even when the cause of action arises from an occurrence which took place in Illinois. Plaintiff argues that, since the issue in this case is not one of jurisdiction, but one of comity, the principles of comity should not, in this instance, protect defendant from the jurisdiction of Illinois courts, notwithstanding the decisions in Schoeberlein and Grabarczyk. We disagree.
This case is controlled under principles of stare decisis by our supreme court's decision in Schoeberlein. See Wreglesworth ex rel. Wreglesworth v. Arctco, Inc., 316 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1030 (2000) (the appellate court is bound by the principle of stare decisis and therefore, must adhere to the decisions of our supreme court.) In Schoeberlein, our supreme court addressed an issue very similar to the one raised here. There, Purdue University (Purdue), an undisputed instrumentality of the State of Indiana, sold a defective product to an Illinois company, and as a result, an Illinois resident was injured while working in Illinois. Purdue contended that it was immune from suit in Illinois under the principle of comity, defined as a common law doctrine authorizing the courts of one state to give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state for the purposes of "foster[ing] cooperation, promot[ing] harmony, and build[ing] goodwill and to encourage amiable and respectful relations among ...