The opinion of the court was delivered by: Milton I. Shadur, United States District Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This Court's April 4, 2001 oral order held that Landreth, Steinkamp and
Snyder lacked the requisite personal involvement in the alleged
deprivations and dismissed Knox's claims against those defendants. That
left Smith, Walker and DeTella, who have now filed a joint Fed.R.Civ.P.
("Rule") 56 summary judgment motion, pursuant to which both sides have
complied with this District Court's LR 56.1.*fn2
K. Mem. 7 n. 4 says Knox has decided not to pursue his claims against
DeTella because discovery has revealed that DeTella also had no personal
involvement in Knox's arrests (see Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527,
530-31 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)). Knox's claim against DeTella is
therefore also dismissed. As for the joint Smith-Walker motion, for the
reasons set out here it is granted in part and denied in part.
Summary Judgment Standards
Familiar Rule 56 principles impose on parties moving for summary
judgment the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of
material fact (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
For that purpose this Court must "consider the evidentiary record in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party . . . and draw all
reasonable inferences in his favor" (Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.,
282 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 2002)). And Pugh v. City of Attica,
259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001) has echoed the teaching of Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
A genuine issue of triable fact exists only if "the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party."
As with any summary judgment motion, this Court accepts nonmovant
Knox's version of any disputed facts, but only so long as it is supported
by record evidence. What follows in the Background section is culled from
the parties' submissions in those terms.
Over the past 20 years Knox has been in and out of Department custody
for a variety of offenses, including a 1976 conviction for two counts of
rape (S-W. St. ¶ 8). After Knox had completed the sentences for his
earlier convictions, in 1999 he was serving a one year sentence for
possession of controlled substances.*fn3 In the spring of 1999 plans were
made to place him on mandatory supervised release (also called "parole")
(id. ¶ 9; S-W. Ex. G) — a status that required him to remain
under intensive supervision and to reside at a host site with
his brother and ailing mother in Robbins, Illinois (S-W. St. ¶ 10).
On two separate occasions during the period of that parole
arrangement, a warrant was issued and Knox was arrested for violating
conditions of his release. Because Knox claims that both of those arrests
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizure, this opinion examines each episode and its ensuing arrest in
On April 1 Knox signed a Parole or Mandatory Release Agreement
("Agreement") that, among other conditions, required that he comply with
the instructions of his parole agent (S-W. St. ¶¶ 11-l2). Knox also
signed a reporting instruction form stating that he was required to
register as a sex offender, but he did not sign the Electronic Home
Detention Rules form or the Illinois Sex Offender Registration Act form
(id. ¶ 13). On April 2 Knox was released on parole (id. ¶ 21).
That afternoon Smith, assigned as Knox's parole agent, met with Knox at
the host site (S-W. St. ¶ 21). Because Knox was living in an
apartment adjacent to his brother's apartment and did not have regular
access to a telephone as required for home monitoring, Smith instructed
him to call the toll free number for Automated Management Systems
("AMS")*fn4 from a nearby pay phone every two hours (id. ¶ 23).
According to Smith, she also requested that he register as a sex offender
and gave him a window of time within which to do so (id.). Knox disputes
the latter, stating that Smith instructed him to remain home and gave him
permission to leave only to use the pay phone to call AMS (K. St. ¶
During that host site visit Smith called AMS, and the AMS record
reflects her instructions to Knox to call in. But neither the AMS record
nor Smith's violation report mentions that she gave Knox permission to
leave home to register (K. St. ¶ 7). Because Smith told AMS that Knox
did not have access to a telephone, a technician was not sent to his home
to hook up the electronic monitoring system (S-W. R. St. ¶ 14).
As recorded by AMS, Knox called in at 8:13 p.m. and 11 p.m. on April
2, but he did not check in again until 2:32 p.m. the following day (S-W.
St. ¶ 25). During that morning lapse AMS paged Smith, who then
requested that a warrant be issued for Knox as a parole violator (id.
¶¶ 26-28). Smith's violation report says that Knox committed the
offense of unauthorized movement or absence, noting that he did not check
in as directed and that he failed to register as a sex offender. Smith's
supervisor Walker issued a parole violator warrant on April 3 (id. ¶
Unaware of that warrant, Knox continued to call AMS approximately every
two to four hours (S-W. Ex. J) until April 9, when the warrant was
executed and Knox was retaken into Department's physical custody (S-W.
St. ¶¶ 29-30). On May 3 Knox was notified of the charges against him
and waived his preliminary hearing (id. ¶¶ 31-32). After a full
revocation hearing, a May 11 Prisoner Review Board order declared that
Knox had violated his mandatory supervised release but ordered that plans
should be made for his continued parole (id. ¶ 33; S-W. Ex. L).
On May 28 Knox was again released on parole to the same host site. Knox
signed an Agreement with the Board that contained the same conditions as
his prior release and that also specifically required him to comply with
the Sexual Offender Registration Act ("Act," 730 ILCS 150/1 to 150/12)
and to attend sex offender counseling (S-W. st. ¶¶ 35-39). Again Knox
signed his reporting instructions requiring that he go directly to his
host site and call AMS, but once more he failed to sign the Electronic
Home Detention Rules (id. ¶ 39).
Upon arriving at his host site on the night of May 28, Knox called to
check in with AMS. According to a call recorded by AMS, early the
following morning a technician attempted to install the home monitoring
electronic equipment at the host site, but Knox's mother and brother
refused to allow the hookup because Knox would not be allowed access to
that telephone (S-W. Ex. O at 25).
At 1 p.m. May 29 AMS paged Smith because Knox had not called in since
the previous evening and attempts to reach him at the host site's
telephone number had been rejected by Knox's brother, who said he did not
know Knox's whereabouts (K. Reap. St. ¶ 46). Smith responded by
asking AMS to page her supervisor to request that a warrant be issued on
Knox (K. St. ...