(Id. ¶ 42.) In February 1999, Stevens returned
to work under this lifting restriction. (Id. ¶ 44.) Navistar has
provided Stevens with numerous accommodations for her condition since her
return. (Id. ¶¶ 45-59.)
II. Procedural Background
On November 15, 2001, Defendant Navistar filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment before the Honorable Elaine Bucklo. (R. 25-1.) Judge Bucklo
ordered Plaintiff to respond to the motion by December 27, 2001. (R.
29-1, Dec. 4, 2001 Order.) Judge Bucklo thereafter granted two extensions
of time for Plaintiff to file her response to the pending motion. (R.
32-1, Dec. 20, 2001 Order; R. 35-1, Apr. 9, 2002 Order.) Plaintiff's
appointed counsel, Lanre O. Amu, subsequently moved to withdraw from the
case and Judge Bucklo granted his motion. Stevens v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Corp., 210 F. Supp.2d 1031 (N.D. Ill. 2002). In granting his
motion, Judge Bucklo noted Mr. Amu's "failure to comply with [her)
scheduling orders" and "his total lack of zealous representation of Ms.
Stevens" Id. at 1032. The court gave Plaintiff until September 10, 2002
to respond to the pending summary judgment motion. Id. at 1033.
On August 30, 2002, the ease was transferred to this Court by order of
the Executive Committee. Plaintiff Stevens failed to file her response to
the summary judgment motion on September 10, 2002. On September 25,
2002, even though Plaintiff failed to appear for a status hearing, the
Court again extended Plaintiff's time to respond to the motion for
summary judgment until October 7, 2002. (R. 46-1, Sept. 25, 2002 Order.)
To date, Plaintiff has failed to file any response even though she has
been provided ample time.
I. Legal Standards
A. Summary Judgment
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper
where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court's function is "not to weigh the evidence
but merely to determine if `there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Jackson
v. Illinois Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505,
2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A genuine issue of material fact exists
only if a "fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [non-moving
party] on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
In assessing whether a genuine issue of material fact exists in a
case, the Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences
in favor of that party. See Id. at 255. However, neither "the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," id. at
247, nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), is sufficient to defeat
a motion for summary judgment. See also Skorup v. Modern Door Corp.,
153 F.3d 512, 514 (7th Cir. 1998).
B. Local Rule 56.1
Local Rule 56.1 sets forth specific requirements for the party moving
for summary judgment, as well as the non-moving party. It directs the
moving party to file "a statement of material facts as to which the
moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the
moving party to a judgment as a matter of law." LOCAL RULE 56.1(a)(3).
The party opposing the summary judgment motion must respond to each of
the purported undisputed facts with "a concise response to the movant's
statement." LOCAL RULE 56.1(b)(3)(A).
In this case, Plaintiff Stevens has failed to respond to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment for more than eleven months. She has not
filed a response to Navistar's 56.1 Statement. Although the Court reads a
pro se plaintiff's pleadings liberally, "pro se status does not excuse a
failure to comply" with these procedural requirements. Fischer v.
Ameritech, No. 98 C 7470, 2002 WL 1949726, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23,
2002). Rule 56.1 provides: "All material facts set forth in the 156.1)
statement . . . will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the
statement of the opposing party." LOCAL RULE 56.1(b)(3)(B). Given that
Plaintiff failed to respond to any of Navistar's undisputed facts, the
Court will take as uncontested each of Navistar's statements of material
facts that is supported by the record. "A district court need not scour
the record to make the case of a party who does nothing." Herman v. City
of Chicago, 870 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1989).
II. The American with Disabilities Act
The ADA prohibits discriminating against an
individual with a disability:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of
the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a). The ADA requires employers to provide
"reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of
an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant
or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship." 42 U.S.C. § 12112
(b)(5)(A). In order to invoke protection under the ADA, Stevens must
demonstrate that: (1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the
ADA; (2) she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of
the job either with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) she has
suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. Dvorak
v. Mostardi Platt Assoc., Inc., 289 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2002); Moore
v. L.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2000).
Stevens cannot establish discrimination under the ADA because she does
not suffer from a disability as defined in the statute. The ADA defines
"disability" as follows:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of [an] individual;
(B) a record of such impairment; or