Appeal from Order of the Chief Legal Counsel, Illinois Department of Human Rights, Charge No. 2000SF0154
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Slater
The plaintiff, Raylana S. Anderson, filed a discrimination charge (775 ILCS 5/7A--102(A) (West 1998)) with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (Department) against her employer, RSM McGladrey, Inc. (McGladrey). Her charge was dismissed by the Department (775 ILCS 5/7A- -102(D)(2)(a) (West 1998)). Upon administrative review, the Chief Legal Counsel for the Department sustained the dismissal (775 ILCS 5/7-- 101.1(A) (West 1998)). On appeal (775 ILCS 5/8--111(A)(1) (West 1998)), Anderson argues that the Chief Legal Counsel abused her discretion by sustaining the dismissal. We affirm.
On September 23, 1999, Anderson filed a discrimination charge against McGladrey with the Department. In her charge, Anderson alleged that on April 1, 1999, she learned McGladrey had been paying a similarly situated male employee, John Fishel, Sr., $110,000 per year during the time McGladrey paid Anderson $68,000 per year. She submitted that she had more seniority than Fishel and that her duties and responsibilities were "similar if not identical" to Fishel's duties and responsibilities. Anderson contended that McGladrey had sexually discriminated against her based on disparate pay.
McGladrey responded to Anderson's charge by acknowledging the disparity in pay between Anderson and Fishel. The employer admitted that Fishel was hired by McGladrey after Anderson was hired. However, McGladrey submitted that Anderson and Fishel were not similarly situated employees.
Both employees shared the title, "Senior Manager, Consulting Services." McGladrey stated that seniority was not a factor in determining compensation for senior managers. The employer contended that Fishel's and Anderson's duties and responsibilities were not similar or identical. According to McGladrey, Anderson had eight years of experience in the field of human resources. Fishel had 12 years of experience in the fields of operations, information technology, and financial management. McGladrey submitted that Anderson's and Fishel's positions required dissimilar levels of skill, effort, and responsibility.
On June 5, 2000, the Department issued a notice that it was dismissing Anderson's charge for lack of substantial evidence. The notice of dismissal was accompanied by an investigation report. The report stated that it was uncontested that Fishel was paid more than Anderson.
The report said Anderson's prima facie allegations were that (1) she is female; (2) she performed her duties consistently with McGladrey policy; (3) she was compensated at $68,000 per year; and (4) McGladrey provided greater compensation to similarly situated male employees. The report then listed several defenses for McGladrey, including the differences in experience, duties, responsibilities, and compensation among Anderson, Fishel, and several other senior managers.
According to the report, Anderson spoke with Jeff Johnson, a managing director at McGladrey, about her level of compensation. Anderson alleged that Johnson told her that she was "too sensitive to women's issues." Johnson stated that he mentioned Anderson's sensitivity to "women's issues." However, Johnson contended that his remark was not related to Anderson's compensation.
The report concluded that Anderson lacked substantial evidence that McGladrey's defenses were a pretext for discrimination. It stated that neither information supplied by Anderson nor the Department's investigation had revealed a similarly situated male employee at McGladrey who was treated differently from Anderson.
On July 10, 2000, Anderson requested that the dismissal of her charge be reviewed by the Department's Chief Legal Counsel. The Chief Legal Counsel vacated the dismissal and reinstated Anderson's charge "for further work" and "other proceedings by the Department" on February 26, 2001.
The Department issued a second notice of dismissal on July 5, 2001. The second dismissal was accompanied by an addendum to the original investigation report. The addendum stated that McGladrey billed its clients for Fishel's services at a higher rate than for Anderson's services. The difference between the two billing rates was greater than the difference between the compensation McGladrey paid Fishel and Anderson. Fishel had three consulting specialties (operations, information technology, and finance) and Anderson had one specialty (human resources).
The addendum again concluded that Anderson lacked substantial evidence that McGladrey's reasons for the pay differential between Anderson and Fishel were a pretext for discrimination. According to the addendum, this conclusion was supported by (1) McGladrey's documentation showing that billing rates compared to salaries did not indicate sex discrimination, and (2) the ...