rambling fails to satisfy the Federal Rule's requirements.
First, Terpening mentions only one Defendant by name
(i.e., Michael Brett Irving) in his Complaint. Thus, it is
unclear how, if at all, any of the other Defendants have wronged
Second, Terpening has failed to identify the Constitutional
right of which Defendants allegedly deprived him.*fn2 In
order to maintain a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a would-be
plaintiff must show "that the conduct complained of (1) `was
committed by a person acting under color of state law' and (2)
`deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States.'" Yang v.
Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 284 (7th Cir. 1994), quoting Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420
(1981), overruled in part on other grounds by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662
(1986). Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient coherent
facts to establish either element.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants cannot reasonably
file an Answer to Terpening's Complaint and also finds that
Terpening's Complaint fails to state a cause of action upon
which relief can be granted. Therefore, Terpening's Complaint is
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, Terpening's
Complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata (claim
preclusion). As is evident from the documents attached to his
Complaint, Terpening has previously litigated (and lost
according to Defendants) in state court the claims arising from
the sequence of events which form the basis for the instant
Complaint. See Perry v. Globe Auto Recycling, Inc.,
227 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2000) (listing the three elements necessary
to establish federal claim preclusion). As such, claim
preclusion "bars not only those issues which were actually
decided in a prior suit, but also all issues which could have
been raised in that action." Brzostowski v. Laidlaw Waste Sys.,
Inc., 49 F.3d 337, 338 (7th Cir. 1995).
In addition, to the extent that Terpening is alleging that his
injury was inflicted by a state court's decision or, more
specifically, by a decision of Judge Greenlief and/or Judge
Roseberry, his claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
"This doctrine stands for the principle that decisions of state
courts may not be challenged in litigation under § 1983; instead
the aggrieved party must pursue all remedies through the state
system and then seek certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1257."
Durgins v. City of East St. Louis, Illinois, 272 F.3d 841, 844
(7th Cir. 2001). If this is Terpening's claim, then this Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case, and the case
must be dismissed. See Jensen v. Foley, 295 F.3d 745, 747-48
(7th Cir. 2002) (discussing the similarities and differences
between the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and claim preclusion and
noting that a district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
if Rooker-Feldman applies).
Finally, to the extent that Terpening is suing Judge Greenlief
and Judge Roseberry in their official capacities, his
suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Nowicki v.
Ullsvik, 69 F.3d 1320, 1324 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
"Judicial immunity and the Eleventh Amendment bar such claims
against Judge Ullsvik in his personal and official capacities
respectively."). Moreover, the doctrine of judicial immunity
bars this suit against Judges Greenlief and Roseberry in their
individual capacities. Id. Thus, Defendants' motion to dismiss
One final caveat is necessary. As the Court noted supra,
Terpening has filed at least seven separate state court cases
arising from the same set of facts and circumstances which form
the basis for his Complaint in this case. Terpening's conduct
prompted two Defendants to move for sanctions pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Although it denied the
motion, the Court emphasized to Terpening that he should not
interpret the denial of the motion for sanctions as an
indication that the Court approves of or condones his
The Court underscores this point again. If Terpening continues
to file meritless, harassing, oppressive, redundant, vexatious,
and repetitive law suits against these or other Defendants, he
may rest assured that this Court, other federal courts, and
state courts possess the power to sanction him monetarily (see
Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 11 and Ill. S.Ct. R. 137), to impose an
injunction against him (see Sassower v. American Bar Ass'n,
33 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 1994)), to hold him in civil contempt (see
Sassower v. Sheriff of Westchester County, 824 F.2d 184, 186
(2d Cir. 1987)), and/or to hold him in criminal contempt. See
id. Terpening should considered himself forewarned.
Ergo, Defendant Marla Ferguson's Motion to Dismiss,
Defendant Brandi Sheppard's Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Pat
Waters' Motion to Dismiss, and Defendants Judge Richard D.
Greenlief and Judge Michael R. Roseberry's Motion to Dismiss are
ALLOWED. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Complaint is, hereby, DISMISSED