Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 99 C 2172--Michael P. McCuskey, Judge.
Before Posner, Kanne, and Rovner, Circuit Judges.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kanne, Circuit Judge.
On August 5, 1999, Alonzo Mitchell filed a one-count complaint against Emanuel Donchin and Julian Rappaport, alleging that Donchin and Rappaport violated his First Amendment rights. The district court found that Mitchell's claim was barred by Illinois' two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Mitchell now appeals, alleging that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling apply to toll the two-year statute of limitations. We affirm.
Plaintiff-Appellant Alonzo Mitchell was employed at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ("University"). Mitchell administered a community-based program, established in the early 1970s and known as "Oasis Graphics Arts." The goal of Oasis Graphics Arts was to develop a relationship between the Department of Psychology at the University and the neighboring community. Specifically, Oasis Graphics Arts published a journal, Ground Level Critique, that discussed issues impacting low-income residents in the community and minorities. Mitchell reported directly to Julian Rappaport, a professor in the Department of Psychology at the University. Rappaport in turn reported to Emanuel Donchin, the head of the Department of Psychology at the University.
In September 1991, Mitchell published several articles in Ground Level Critique critical of another community-based research project at the University, the "New North Project," headed by psychology Professor Robert Felner. Five months later, Rappaport decided to terminate the funding for Oasis Graphics Arts. Rappaport cited severe budgetary constraints, the deteriorating physical facility, and the program's failure as a training ground for graduate students as reasons for terminating the program's funding. Donchin approved the termination. Mitchell was informed that the funding for Oasis Graphics Arts was being terminated on March 2, 1992. The funding was actually terminated, and Mitchell's position eliminated, in mid-1993.
On February 22, 1994, Mitchell filed a four-count complaint against several University of Illinois administrators and professors, not including Donchin and Rappaport. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, Mitchell alleged that the defendants violated his First Amendment rights by terminating the funding for Oasis Graphics Arts in retaliation for publishing articles in the Ground Level Critique critical of the New North Project and Felner. Mitchell supported his complaint with statements allegedly made to him by Rappaport that indicated that the named defendants were behind the decision to terminate the funding for Oasis Graphics Arts. Specifically, Mitchell alleged that Rappaport stated that he had strongly opposed terminating the funding for Oasis Graphics Arts, but that he had been overruled by the defendants. Mitchell further alleged that Rappaport told him that "it was that f..... Felner that's behind this. I know it is Bob Felner that caused this to happen."
On November 16, 1998, Mitchell deposed Rappaport in connection with his February 22, 1994 complaint. During this deposition, Mitchell learned that, in fact, Rappaport himself had made the decision, in conjunction with the approval of Donchin, to terminate the funding for Oasis Graphics Arts. On June 2, 1999, Mitchell's February 22, 1994 complaint was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41(a)(1). On August 5, 1999, Mitchell filed this suit against Donchin and Rappaport, asserting that Donchin and Rappaport violated his First Amendment rights by terminating Oasis Graphics Arts' funding in retaliation for publishing the articles critical of the New North Project and Felner.
In the district court, Donchin and Rappaport asserted Illinois' two-year statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Mitchell argued that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling precluded such a defense. However, the district court disagreed, and finding that Mitchell knew or should have known that circumstances existed that violated his rights by mid-1993, granted summary judgment in favor of Donchin and Rappaport.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Lewis v. Holsum of Fort Wayne, Inc., 278 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 2002). We view all of the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Mitchell. See id. We will affirm the district court only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that Donchin and Rappaport are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.
As we stated, in this case, the district court found that by mid-1993 Mitchell knew or should have known that circumstances existed that violated his constitutional rights. Because Mitchell did not file suit against Donchin and Rappaport until 1999, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Donchin and Rappaport on the ground that Mitchell's section 1983 claim was barred by Illinois' two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.*fn1 On appeal, Mitchell ...