must be dismissed. We decline, however, to
exercise jurisdiction over Mearday's state claim for malicious
prosecution as we have granted summary judgment to Defendant Officers on
Mearday's federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3). Instead, we remand
Mearday's state malicious prosecution claim (Count IV) to the state
circuit court from which it was removed.
II. Claims Against the City
Mearday also alleges a § 1983 claim against the City for failing to
supervise and discipline officers and investigate complaints. (See R.
15, Second Am. Compl., Count III; R. 157, Pl.'s Resp. to City's Mot. for
Summ. J. at 15.) The City argues that Mearday cannot establish municipal
liability because he cannot show an actual policy of not supervising or
disciplining officers or investigating complaints, or that a deliberately
indifferent policymaker acquiesced in such a practice directly causing
the alleged injury.
To establish municipal liability under § 1983, Mearday must meet
the elements set out by Monnell v. Department of Social Services of City
of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). and its progeny. First, Mearday must
establish that he has suffered a constitutional injury. City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). We proceed no further than
this, however, because Mearday's claim against the City fails at this
initial step. Because Mearday did not establish a violation of the Fourth
Amendment and the Court has granted summary judgment to Defendant
Officers, we must also grant summary judgment to the City.*fn20 Id.
This Court's views on the need to publicly air, debate, review and
eliminate police misconduct are well established. See Doe v. Marsalis,
202 F.R.D. 233 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (granting Chicago Reader, Inc.'s petition
to intervene and obtain access to documents related to settled police
misconduct suit); Wiggins v. Burge, 173 F.R.D. 226 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(similarly granting Chicago Reader, Inc.'s petition to intervene and
obtain access to documents related to settled police misconduct suit).
The Court deeply sympathizes with Mearday's experiences. On September
26, 1997, Mearday suffered a brutal beating by Chicago police officers.
As a result of that beating, he has obviously suffered significant pain
and trauma. Perhaps, as Mearday argues, his nervous reaction to Defendant
Officers on March 19, 1998 was precipitated by his prior experiences with
Chicago police officers. The Court cannot, however, let our sympathy for
Mearday's history interfere with our difficult task in this case. The
Court was asked to determine whether Defendant Officers violated
Mearday's Fourth Amendment rights on March 19, 1998. Because we are
constrained by the limits of Fourth Amendment analysis, we must —
given the totality of the circumstances — find the Defendant
Officers' conduct objectively reasonable.
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we grant Defendant Officers' motion
for summary judgment on Counts I and II, (R. 145-1), and the City of
Chicago's motion for summary judgment on Count III, (R. 136-1).*fn21
Counts IV and V are hereby remanded to the state circuit court from which
they were removed. We deny
Defendant Officers' motions to strike, (R.
163-1, 164-1), as moot. The Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter
final judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, in favor
of Defendant Officers and the City and against Mearday on Counts I, II
and III which involved federal claims. This Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.