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Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Local Union

February 15, 2002

ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
BEER, SOFT DRINK, WATER, FRUIT JUICE, CARBONIC GAS, LIQUOR SALES DRIVERS, HELPERS, INSIDE WORKERS, BOTTLERS, WAREHOUSEMEN, SCHOOL, SIGHTSEEING, CHARTER BUS DRIVERS, GENERAL PROMOTIONS EMPLOYEES, AND EMPLOYEES OF AFFILIATED INDUSTRIES, MALTSTER, LABORERS, SYRUP, YEAST, FOOD, VINEGAR, BREWERY, RECYCLING AND MISCELLANEOUS WORKERS OF CHICAGO AND VICINITY, ILLINOIS, LOCAL UNION NO. 744, AFFILIATED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.



Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 00 C 1424--James B. Zagel, Judge.

Before Coffey, Easterbrook and Rovner, Circuit Judges.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Coffey, Circuit Judge

Argued JUNE 7, 2001

Plaintiff-Appellant Anheuser-Busch, Inc., appeals the judgment of the district court upholding an arbitrator's decision in favor of Teamsters Local Union #744 ("the Union"), concerning the commission rate Anheuser-Busch paid its union drivers pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement executed in 1998. We reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the award and enter judgment in favor of Anheuser-Busch, Inc.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Anheuser-Busch Brewing Company (the "employer") operates a beer distributorship in Arlington Heights, Illinois, and employs Union drivers-salespeople ("drivers") and assistants to deliver pre-sold products to roughly 1,300 retail accounts in the northern suburbs of Chicago. The drivers are paid on a commission basis, with the commission rate set forth in a 5-year collective bargaining agreement (the "contract") that took effect February 1, 1998.*fn1 The contract provides one commission rate for drivers who work alone ("one-person routes") and a lower commission rate for drivers who are assisted by a helper ("two-person routes").

From May 1986 to April 1989, the employer and the Union operated under an earlier collective bargaining agreement, which provided that drivers, whether assisted by a helper or not, received the same commission rate.

This commission rate became an issue in negotiations, and after long, reasoned, and thorough negotiating sessions, the parties executed a new contract in 1990 that altered the prior commission arrangement and adopted a new two-tiered commission payment structure as referred to above. The same commission rate payment provision was thereafter incorporated into and made a part of the parties' 1994 and 1998 contracts, again after extensive and reasoned negotiations. During the term of the 1990 and 1994 contracts, the employer paid all the drivers at the one-person commission (higher) rate. Anheuser-Busch continued this practice of paying the drivers the increased rate of compensation, in contradiction of the written contract, only during the first two months of the newly negotiated, 60-month 1998 contract. In early April 1998, the company announced that effective April 27, 1998, the drivers would henceforth be reimbursed according to the contract language now in force. According to testimony taken during the arbitration hearings, the decision was motivated by the company's need to create more two-person routes and hire additional helpers in response to an increasing number of customers as well as customer complaints dealing with the timeliness of their deliveries. At this same time, in order to achieve more pay for each driver, the employer reduced the number of routes from ten to nine, eliminating all expenses associated with one route and dispersed the cost savings and workload among the remaining nine drivers.

On May 7, 1998, the Union filed a grievance protesting the company's decision to follow the terms of the contract, and the dispute proceeded to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the agreement.

The parties stipulated to the parameters of the issue as being, "Did the company violate the labor agreement by changing its practice to conform to the contract provision relating to two-person route commission rates?" It is interesting to note that the question presented was: "Is the company violating the contract when complying with the written terms of the most recent labor agreement?" The contract contained two clauses that limited the arbitrator's power, the arbitration clause and the "zipper clause," or merger clause. The zipper clause states that: (1) the written agreement constitutes the full and complete agreement between the parties; and (2) the written agreement supercedes all prior agreements and practices not specifically preserved in the contract. Further, the contract specified that the arbitrator had "no authority to add to, subtract from, modify or change" the terms of the contract. The zipper clause in its entirety reads:

This Agreement constitutes the full and complete agreement between the parties and supercedes all prioragreements between the parties or their representatives, oral or written, including all practices not specifically preserved by the express provisions of this Agreement. This Agreement is the entire agreement between the parties and is the result of extensive negotiations in which both parties had the right and the opportunity to submit proposals and to negotiate their proposals with the other party.

The arbitrator somehow sustained the Union's grievance, and found that the employer's payment of the greater commission rate to all drivers during the brief span of but the first two months (60 days) of the new five-year contract constituted a "practice," in the eyes of the arbitrator, that rose to the level of a "post-execution amendment" of the agreement. This action, according to the arbitrator, allegedly nullified the company's right to invoke the thoroughly negotiated and mutually agreed upon contract provision dealing with the parties' agreement to have the two-tiered commission rate. The arbitrator somehow made this finding in spite of the very specific and limiting language in the zipper clause of the contract, "This Agreement . . . supercedes all prior agreements between the parties . . . oral or written, including all practices not specifically preserved by the express provisions of this Agreement," as well as the specific arbitration clause forbidding him from modifying the written contract. The arbitrator recognized that the company's April 27, 1998, decision to pay the two-tier (lower) commission rate to drivers working two-person routes was in full compliance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement agreed to by the Union and the company in each of the three contracts (1990-2003) referred to herein; that the 1998 contract also contained the zipper clause; and that the 1998 contract was the product of exhaustive negotiations. But instead of adhering to the limitations the contract placed on his authority and to the unambiguous and plain language of the contract as it was written, the arbitrator took an end-run around the clear and unambiguous restrictive terms of the contract. The arbitrator somehow reasoned that because the employer allowed the first two months of the sixty-month contract to elapse before changing its practice to adhere to the written contract's commission rates clause, it thus "deprived the Union of its right to bargain [over commission rates] for almost five years," a result that the arbitrator somehow felt (without any explanation) was a "fundamentally unfair maneuver inconsistent with well-settled principles of collective bargaining."

In a vain attempt to find support for his newly fashioned remedy, the arbitrator reached all the way back and justified his overreaching decision in the partial testimony taken at the arbitration hearing that during a worker's strike in 1989, some thirteen years ago, the distributorship's general manager commented to the drivers that the drivers would "have the same pay" whether they worked alone or with a helper. The arbitrator found that this passing state ment somehow and someway became an "oral understanding," which, according to the arbitrator, was "readopted" by the employer during the first two months of the 1998 contract in spite of the fact that each of the three most recent collective bargaining agreements (ratified in 1990, 1994 and 1998) contained the very explicit and properly limited zipper clause stating that the contract contained the parties' entire agreement, as well as the identical language dealing with commission rates. Further, these contracts failed to contain any indication, much less language, that the parties had reached any type of oral understanding that all drivers would be compensated equally, much less an understanding that was the product of a meeting of the minds reflecting an enforceable agreement supported by offer, acceptance and consideration, which is so vital to any contract.

Thus, the arbitrator cast aside the written and thoroughly negotiated terms of the agreement and returned to the terms of the contract in effect prior to 1990 by ordering the employer to pay the higher commission to drivers regardless of whether they were working on one or two-person routes. This finding by the arbitrator contradicts and ignores the express language throughout the 1998 contract at issue, including the unambiguous terms contained within the commission rates clause, the arbitration clause, and the zipper clause. Moreover, the arbitrator's finding re-institutes the commission structure that the drivers agreed in negotiation to give up as a concession in 1990 and reaffirmed in the last two contracts in 1994 and 1998. The arbitrator summarized his conclusion as follows:

[N]either the zipper clause nor the parole evidence rule bars post-execution amendment or modification of an agreement . . . . Although I cannot "add to, subtract from, modify or change in any way the terms of this Agreement," I am not precluded from giving effect to a long-standing practice or oral understanding reaffirmed and readopted by the Company following execution of the agreement.

The employer filed suit in federal court requesting the court to vacate the award, and the Union counter-claimed for enforcement of the arbitrator's decision. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Union, holding that because the arbitrator had "interpreted the parties agreement to include both the written [collective bargaining agreement] and a separate oral agreement," the decision should be affirmed under the high degree of deference given to arbitral orders. Anheuser-Busch appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Tootsie Roll Indus., Inc. v. Local Union #1, 832 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1987), we set forth the applicable standard of review for arbitration awards. Quoting from language that has been approved in Supreme Court decisions that are of no less vitality today, we stated in pertinent part as follows:

[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award. Id. at 83 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).

[T]he arbitrator's decision should not be upset unless it is arbitrary or capricious or fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining contract because it exceeds the confines of interpreting and applying the contract . . . . It is only when the arbitrator must have based his award on some body of thought, or feeling, or policy, or law that is outside the contract that the award can be said not to "draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." Id. (quoting Burkort Randall v. ...


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