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HULME v. MADISON COUNTY
November 28, 2001
ROBERT HULME, THE MADISON COUNTY REPUBLICAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE, HOMER HENKE, STEVEN STOBBS, WILLIAM MEYER, EUGENE FRIZZO, AND JUDY KUHN, PLAINTIFFS,
v.
MADISON COUNTY, A BODY POLITIC CORPORATE, AND MARK A. VON NIDA, CLERK OF THE COUNTY OF MADISON, ALL IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY, DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: David R. Herndon, United States District Judge.
As happens with each new decade, the year 2000 and its nationwide
census brought about the need to reapportion the political subdivisions
in the State of Illinois. Reapportionment induces a great deal of
tension as political parties try to hold onto seats they have acquired in
the preceding decade. Individual officeholders
hope to retain a constituency that will re-elect them. Political
considerations naturally abound. Although "politics" is a dirty word in
some quarters, the presence of politics in reapportionment need not
constitute a negative nor unacceptable factor. For instance, it may be
politically expedient, and in the best interest of the electorate, to
maintain the integrity of a district that is primarily minority in makeup.
Likewise, it is common sense that an incumbent would not wish to be placed
in a district that would pit him against another incumbent. Also, a
representative's familiarity with a district is likely to benefit the
citizens residing in that district. Ideally, the only politics that
should ultimately prevail is that which assures that elected
representatives act in the best interest of all of the people. Democrats,
it must be remembered, are not elected to represent Democrats exclusively
any more than Republicans are elected to represent Republicans
exclusively. The gathering of ideas for the process of reapportionment
should be an inclusive process, not an exclusive process. Some degree of
bipartisanship is ideal. At the very least, as the Court will explore,
the reapportionment process should be guided by the mandates of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Illinois statute
which sets forth the specific requirements for reapportionment.
This brings us to the 2001 County Board redistricting process in
Madison County, Illinois. That process demonstrated the worst of
politics. The process fell so far short of representing the electorate
that it seems the citizens of Madison County were not so much as an
afterthought. Rather than the collective work of five committee members
or twenty nine board members, the 2001 apportionment plan was the
creation of one Board member, Wayne Bridgewater, the Chair of the
assigned Committee, influenced by another Board member, who was not on
the Committee. Far from some semblance of bipartisanship, the
reapportionment process in Madison County was characterized by threats,
coercion, bullying, and a skewed view of the law. The resulting County
Board districts, and the map which exemplifies them, contravene the
United States Constitution and certain statutes of the State of
Illinois.
As a result, Plaintiffs filed a three-count Complaint on July 13, 2001
against Madison county, the Clerk of Madison County, Mark Von Nida, the
Illinois State Board of Elections and several of its members (Doc. 1).*fn1
On August 22, 2001, upon motion by the Plaintiffs, the Court dismissed
Count III of the original complaint and granted Plaintiffs leave to file
an amended complaint (Doc. 18). In Count I of the First Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the reapportionment plan adopted by the
Madison County Board on June 20, 2001 violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it is not consistent with the
required principle of "one person, one vote" (Doc. 19). In Count II,
Plaintiffs allege that the reapportionment plan violates the Illinois
Counties Code, 55 ILCS 5/2-3003, which sets forth the specific guidelines
a county board must follow in adopting an apportionment plan (Doc. 19).
Federal jurisdiction is properly grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)*fn2
and in this Court's supplemental
jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
II. Procedural Vehicle of Resolution
On November 2, 2001, the parties followed a curious path in litigating
this case and filed cross motions for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, motions for judgment on partial findings pursuant to FEDERAL
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 52(c) (Docs. 30 & 35). On November 6, 2001, the
Court held a hearing on the motions (Doc. 41).
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56, summary judgment may be
granted only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Because the Court finds that
there are clearly genuine issues of material fact that would preclude
summary judgment for either party, the Court will proceed under Rule
52(c).
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 52(c) provides:
(c) Judgment on Partial Findings. If during a trial
without a jury a party has been fully heard on an
issue and the court finds against the party on that
issue, the court may enter judgment as a matter of law
against that party with respect to a claim or defense
that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or
defeated without a favorable finding on that issue . . . .
Such a judgment shall be supported by findings
of fact and conclusions of law as required by
subdivision (a) of this rule.
The Notes of the Advisory Committee for the 1991 Amendment to Rule 52
state, in relevant part:
Subdivision (c) is added. . . . It authorizes the
court to enter judgment at any time that it can
appropriately make a dispositive finding of fact on
the evidence. The new subdivision replaces part of
Rule 41(b), which formerly authorized a dismissal at
the close of the plaintiff's case if the plaintiff had
failed to carry an essential burden of proof.
Therefore, the Court will apply the standard previously articulated for
an involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b). "[T]he court must take an
unbiased view of all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, and accord
it such weight as the court believes it is entitled to receive." Sanders
v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 707 F.2d 969, 971 (7th Cir. 1983) (discussing Rule
41(b)). Pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 52(c) this
opinion shall serve as the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
A. Count I — Equal Protection
Defendants argue that because the apportionment plan adopted by the
Madison County Board has a total population deviation under 10%, it is
presumptively valid and, therefore, Plaintiffs cannot prove a violation of
Equal Protection. Plaintiffs, however, contend that although the total
population deviation of the apportionment plan adopted by the Board is
less than 10%, it violates the Equal Protection Clause because the
process by which the plan was adopted was tainted with arbitrariness and
discrimination.
In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the United States Supreme
Court held that "the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make
an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of
its legislature, as nearly of equal population as practicable." Id. at
577. Extending its holding in Reynolds to local governmental units, the
Supreme Court in Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474 (1968),
held that the Equal Protection Clause "permits no substantial variation
from equal population in drawing districts for units of local governments
having general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served
by the body." Id. at 484-85. In Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964),
decided the same day as Reynolds, the Supreme Court rejected the district
court's attempt to establish a fixed mathematical formula for evaluating
the constitutional validity of an apportionment plan. The Roman Court
stated:
[T]he problem does not lend itself to any such uniform
formula, and it is neither practicable nor desirable
to establish rigid mathematical standards for
evaluating the constitutional validity of a state
apportionment scheme under the Equal Protection
Clause. Rather, the proper judicial approach is to
ascertain whether, under the particular circumstances
existing in the individual State whose legislative
apportionment is at issue, there has been a faithful
adherence to a plan of population-based
representation, with ...