Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County 99 CR 4496 The Honorable Mary Ellen Coghlan Judge Presiding
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Cohen
On January 4, 2000, after a bench trial, defendant Andre Fuller was convicted of aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10-2 (a)(2)(West 2000)). Defendant was sentenced to a term of six years of imprisonment for the December 26, 1998, theft of a van in which two children, ages 6 and 15, were passengers. Defendant raises three issues on appeal. Defendant first raises a due process challenge to section 2(B)(1.5) of the Sex Offender Registration Act (the Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.5)(West 2000)), which mandates his adjudication as a sex offender. Defendant next alleges that Public Act 89-707 (Pub. Act 89-707, eff. June 1, 1997) which amends several statutes, violates article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (the single subject rule) (Ill. Const. 1970, art IV, § 8(d)) and is therefore void. Defendant finally argues that if Public Act 89-707 is void, then section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Corrections Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii)(West 2000)) is unconstitutional because defendant's mandated sentence violates article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (the proportionate penalties clause) (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). We hold that section 2(B)(1.5) of the Registration Act does not violate due process and that Public Act 89-707 does not violate the single subject rule. Consequently, because Public Act 89-707 is constitutional, this court need not consider whether section 3-6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii)(West 2000)) violates the Illinois Constitution. We therefore affirm.
On December 26, 1998, defendant stole a van. Two children, ages 6 and 15, were in the stolen van, having remained in the back of the van while their father purchased some bread from a nearby store. Defendant drove the van through Chicago for about 20 minutes until he reached Highland Park. Defendant stopped twice along the way, once in front of a neighborhood home to view Christmas lights and once outside a restaurant. During the drive, defendant spoke briefly with the children in response to their questions. Defendant never touched the children. While the van was stopped at a traffic light in Highland Park, the children opened the van's unlocked door and ran to a nearby service station. The defendant drove away from the intersection and made no attempt to catch the children.
The Highland Park police were called to the service station and took the children to the Highland Park police station. The police began to search in the surrounding area for the van and the defendant. The police found the van intact and locked approximately 600 feet away from the service station. Shortly after midnight on December 27, 1998, the police located the defendant in another service station parking lot in Highland Park. The defendant did not try to evade the police. When the police asked defendant if he had taken a van with two children inside of it, defendant stated "Just lock me up." The police arrested the defendant and recovered the van's keys from his pocket.
As defendant's appeal presents questions of law, statutory construction and constitutional validity, our standard of review is de novo. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418, 793 N.E.2d 433, 437 (2000); Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 466, 739 N.E.2d 521, 529 (2000); E & E Hauling Inc. v. Ryan, 306 Ill. App. 3d 131, 136, 713 N.E.2d 178, 182 (1999). II. Due Process
Defendant claims that section 2(B)(105) of the Registration Act violates due process because the definition of a sex offender is overly broad. Specifically, defendant claims that there is no rational relationship between the offense of aggravated kidnaping and the legislative intent of the Registration Act. The Registration Act provides in part:
"(A) 'Sex offender' means any person who is:
(1) charged pursuant to Illinois law, or any substantially similar federal, sister state, or foreign country law, with a sex offense set forth in subsection (B) of this Section or the attempt to commit an included sex offense, and:
(B) As used in this Section, 'sex offense' means: ***
(1.5) A felony violation of any of the following Sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, when the victim is a person under 18 years of age, the defendant is not a parent of the victim, and the ...