judgment, (R. 12-1), and grant the Commissioner's cross-motion
for summary judgment, (R. 13-1). The Clerk of the Court is instructed,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58, to enter judgment in favor
*fn2 During this three month period, Egas missed three of seven
appointments with Dr. McGrath. (R. 11-1, Admin. R. at 160-65, McGrath
Notes.) The ALJ, however, noted only one missed appointment.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with Egas that this factual error requires
us to find that the ALJ's decision was unsupported by substantial
evidence in light of the fact that the record demonstrates that Egas
ventured from his home on several other occasions to visit his family and
for medical treatment and disability proceedings.
*fn3 We note that, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404, anxiety-related
disorders include Egas' social phobia and agoraphobia. Accordingly, the
ALJ's decision properly referenced Egas' impairments, and the ALJ
properly considered the unique functional restrictions imposed by these
*fn4 Egas claims that Dr. McGrath's opinion should have been given
controlling weight by the ALJ. We disagree. A treating physician's
opinion is only given controlling weight if it is, inter alia, "not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record."
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (d)(2). We find that the portion of Dr.
McGrath's opinion that the ALJ rejected is inconsistent with the other
substantial medical evidence in the record. Therefore, we do not give
controlling weight to Dr. McGrath's opinion.
*fn5 Egas also claims that the ALJ ignored an "important line of
evidence" because he did not discuss all of Egas' self-reported episodes
of deterioration or decompensation. (R. 12-2, Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of its
Mot. for Summ. J. at 11.) Egas argues that inclusion of these episodes in
the hypothetical question to the vocational expert may have resulted in
different testimony. We disagree. The ALJ acknowledged that Egas had
experienced an episode of deterioration or decompensation. He did not
ignore a line of questioning, but rather merely declined to credit all of
Egas' statements. The ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of
evidence in the record, Diaz v. Chater, 55 F.3d 300, 309 (7th Cir.
1995), and the medical evidence in the record failed to demonstrate that
Egas experienced repeated episodes of deterioration or decompensation in
a work environment.
*fn6 Egas repeatedly argues that his "ability to leave home and his
functioning at that time is what is at issue." (R. 15-1, Pl.'s Reply at
1.) While we acknowledge that Dr. McGrath reported that Egas "rarely
leaves home" and that Egas missed three of seven appointments with Dr.
McGrath, we find that the record as a whole demonstrates that Egas
regularly left his home for medical treatment and disability proceedings
and to visit his family and that he was never noted to display symptoms
of marked distress or panic attacks, or even excessive shaking as would
be indicative of a severe anxiety disorder. (R. 11-1, Admin. R. at 146,
Vora Psychiatric Examination.) See also supra note 2.