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U.S. v. SHERIFF OF PAGE COUNTY

July 3, 2001

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL THOMAS R. HOLLIDAY, PETITIONER,
V.
SHERIFF OF DU PAGE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, JOHN E. ZARUBA, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, RESPONDENTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Alesia, Judge

  MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is petitioner Thomas R. Holliday's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the following reasons, Holliday's petition is denied.

I. BACKGROUND*fn1

On May 8, 1997, Petitioner Thomas R. Holliday ("Holliday") was a party to a domestic altercation with his wife, Mary Holliday ("Mary"). Holliday was arrested, charged with domestic battery and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and jailed in the DuPage County jail. He posted bond and was released on May 10, 1997. The conditions of bond required that Holliday have no contact with Mary for seventy-two hours.

On May 13, 1997, Mary sought and obtained from the Circuit Court of DuPage County ("the circuit court") an emergency order of protection pursuant to 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/217. On May 27, 1997, Holliday appeared with counsel in the circuit court to defend the allegations from the emergency order of protection that he committed domestic abuse. After a hearing, the court vacated the May 13, 1997 emergency order of protection and mutually enjoined, restrained and prohibited both Holliday and Mary from "harassment, interference with personal liberty, physical abuse, intimidation, willful deprivation or stalking of the other" pursuant to 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214. (Circuit Ct. Order dated May 27, 1997.).

On October 8, 1998, following a criminal bench trial in Illinois state court, Holliday was found guilty of one count of domestic battery pursuant to 720 ILL. CAMP. STAT. 5/12-3.2(a)(1), and not guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Holliday was sentenced to two years of probation, no contact with Mary, a $500.00 fine, costs and fees, domestic violence counseling, and sixty days of convict labor under the DuPage County Sheriff's Work Alternative Program. Holliday has completed all portions of the sentence except for the sixty days of convict labor.

On November 19, 1998, Holliday filed a motion for a new trial, alleging twenty-two errors. The motion was denied.

Next, Holliday appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court and raised the following six arguments for review: (1) the State failed to prove him guilty of domestic battery beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the State committed a discovery violation by failing to tender his police statements; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow the defense to cross-examine Mary about her alleged past episodes of violence; (4) Holliday was denied effective assistance of counsel; (5) the State was precluded from prosecuting him for domestic battery after the emergency order of protection proceeding; and (6) the trial court erred in excluding from evidence the transcript from the order of protection proceeding.

On April 26, 2000, the Illinois Appellate Court of the Second Judicial District affirmed Holliday's conviction and sentence, finding (1) a reasonable trier of fact could have found sufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Holliday was guilty of domestic battery; (2) there was no evidence that Holliday was prejudiced by the alleged discovery violation; (3) the trial court properly excluded the proffered evidence regarding Mary's alleged violent character; (4) there was no merit to Holliday's claim that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel; (5) the State was not barred from prosecuting Holliday for domestic battery based upon the same facts alleged in the petition for a protective order because the State was not a party or in privity with a party to Mary's petition for a protective order; and (6) there was no merit to Holliday's claim that the trial court erred in excluding the record from the order of protection proceeding as substantive evidence.

On June 16, 2000, Holliday filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. His sole argument was that "[t]he Appellate Court's decision failed to consider res judicata and misapplied collateral estoppel" when it did not bar or estop prosecution of Holliday on domestic battery charges after the order of protection proceeding. (Holliday's Petition for Leave to Appeal at 4.) On October 4, 2000, the Illinois Supreme Court denied Holliday's petition for leave to appeal.

On January 30, 2001, Holliday filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his habeas petition, Holliday raises the following five issues for consideration:*fn2

1. Whether, the Circuit Court of DuPage County lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try; convict; or sentence, the Petitioner for one count of class A misdemeanor Domestic battery, after the Petitioner was exonerated*fn3 for the offense charged on the basis of self defense, in a prior Order of protection proceeding in the same Circuit Court. Further, whether said actions violated Petitioner's rights to Due Process and Equal Protection of the Law. II. Whether, the State violated the right of the Petitioner not to be subject to trial more than once for the same offense;*fn4 and the right not to be compelled to testify against himself; when he was required to testify to defend and [sic] exparte order of protection, or face continued exclusion for [sic] his own home and having prevailed in that action was forced by the State to stand criminal trial for the same alleged misconduct. Further, whether said State actions violated the Petitioner's rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
III. Whether, the State violated the Petitioner's Fundamental Confrontation Rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by barring all cross examination of the alleged victim about her prior violence directed against him; barring all such direct testimony of the Petitioner during his case in chief; and by limiting such testimony in the Petitioner's redirect examination to two responses, when the State forced the Petitioner to stand criminal trial for Domestic battery after he prevailed on the allegations of Domestic abuse in the prior proceeding.
IV. Whether, the failure of the state to allow the admission of the transcript of the order of protection hearing as substantive evidence in the Petitioner's subsequent criminal trial, per Illinois statute, Petitioner's right to confront his accuser with her prior statements; denied the Petitioner the right to effective assistance of counsel; and denied the Petitioner the equal protection of the laws; rights secured the Petitioner under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. V. Whether, the State violated the Petitioner's fundamental Fifth and Fourteenth amendment right not to be convicted for a criminal offense unless the evidence, and not unsupported argument, established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; where the trial court noted that there were serious inconsistencies in the sole eyewitness' [sic] testimony; where no physical evidence was presented capable of establishing that it was the Petitioner, and not his accuser, that was the perpetrator of the alleged criminal conduct; where the trial court entered no findings of fact in support of their [sic] judgment; where the accusing witness materially changed, added to, and subtracted from her previous testimony and statements to peace officers; where the Petitioner's entire testimony had been previously disclosed to the State and his accuser in the prior proceeding; and where the Petitioner had been previously exonerated of criminal wrongdoing at the preponderance level of the evidence.

(Holliday's Petition at iv.)

In responding to Holliday's habeas petition, respondent conceded that Holliday exhausted his state court remedies. Further, respondent declined to address the merits of any of Holliday's claims, asserting only that each claim has been procedurally defaulted. On February 15, 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court entered an order, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 368(c), staying the uncompleted portion of Holliday's sentence — the sixty ...


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